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ARTICLES 
GOD, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE AMERICAN 
WAY: RECONSTRUCTING ENGEL 
Corinna Barrett Lain* 
If ever a decision embodied the heroic, countermajoritarian function we ro-
mantically ascribe to judicial review, it was the 1962 decision that struck dowM 
school prczyer-Engel v. Vitale. Engel provoked more outrage, more congres-
sional attempts to overturn it, and more attacks on the Justices than perhaps any 
other decision in Supreme Court history. Indeed Engel 's countermajoritarian 
narrative is so strong that scholars have largely assumed that the historical rec-
ord supports our romanticized conception of the case. It does not. Using primary 
source materials, this Article reconstructs the story of Engel, then explores the 
implications of thl~ reconstructed narrative. Engel is not the countermajoritarian 
case it seems, but recognizing that allows us to see Engel for what it is: a re-
markably rich account of Supreme Court decisionmaking that furthers a number 
of conversations in constitutional law. Engel adds a new strand to a burgeoning 
body of scholarship on the power of culture in general, and social movements in 
particular, to generate constitutional change. It presents a rare glimpse of the 
Justices explicitly engaging in a dialogue with the American public. And it expos-
es qualitative differences in the forms that popular constitutionalism might ta/re, 
with implications for the theory itself In the end, Engel still offers valuable in-
sights about Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role of judicial review. They 
just aren't the insights we tend to think 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional lore casts the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian pro-
tector, champion of unpopular minorities against tyrannical majority rule. 1 
Over the last several decades, this romanticized conception of the Court has 
softened somewhat as empirical work on Supreme Court decisionmaking has 
mounted. 2 Today, "underground conventional wisdom" 3 within the legal acad-
emy is what political scientists have known, and shown, for almost fifty years: 
the Supreme Court is a--fundamentally majoritarian institution.4 
1. The Supreme Court itself has promoted this narrative, most famously in a 1938 
footnote, but elsewhere as well. See United States v. Caro\ene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 
n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion ... which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."); see also 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U,S. 227, 241 (1940) ("[C]ourts stand ... as havens of refuge for 
those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because 
they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."). For a famous theory 
of judicial review based on this account, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DrSTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ( 1980). 
2. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme 
Court? Possibly Yes (but We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 265 tbL\ (2010) 
(summarizing the results of nine quantitative studies from 1993 to 2009 showing the Su-
preme Court's responsiveness to public opinion). 
3. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE 
AMERJCA, at xii (2006). 
4. For classic =pirical studies establishing the Supreme Court's majoritarian 
decisionmaking proclivities, see, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a De-
mocracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 1. PUB. L. 279 (1957); and Da-
vid G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the 
Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652 (1985). For more recent empirical work, see Epstein 
& Martin, supr~ note 2. 
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For those who study Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role of judi-
cial rcvic·.v, the question then becomes how to understand the Court when it 
deviates from the general rule. If the Supreme Court is mainly majoritarian, 
what can we learn from when it is not? The answer, as Barry Friedman has rec-
ognized, is "remarkably impoverished."5 
Against this backdrop, Engel v. Vitale6 ~the 1962 decision that struck 
dolNil school prayer~stands as a conspicuous case for renewed scholarly atten-
tion. Engel started with a want ad. 7 A parent was looking for others to join him 
in challenging a New York school board's decision to begin the school day 
with a short ecumenical prayer: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depend-
ence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers 
and our Country."8 Steven Engel answered the ad, as did the parents of a num-
ber of other children of varying religious backgrounds. 9 They lost in the trial 
court. 10 They appealed, and lost again. 11 And in New York's highest appellate 
court, they lost yet again. 12 Then the Supreme Court granted certiorari and in-
validated the prayer under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 13 The 
nation freaked. 
Within the academy, Engel is wide1)' regarded as one of the most unpopu-
lar decisions in Supreme Court history, 1 and for seemingly good reason. Engel 
5. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTTTUTlON 3 73 
(2009). 
6. 370 U.S. 421 ( 1962). 
7, See CBS Reports: Stonn over rhe Supreme Court Part//; The School Prayer Case 
(CBS television broadcast Mar. 13, 1963) [hereinafter CBS Reports: The School Prayer 
Case]. 
8. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). Students who wished to 
leave the room were allowed to do so, although the prayer was so short that they generally 
did not bother. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
9 . .Around fifty people initially answered the ad, but many dropped out, leaving ten 
children and their parents as the original plaintiffs in the case. Engel was Jewish, but the 
plaintiffs also included a Unitarian, a member of the Society for Ethical Culture, and a non-
believer. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 423; CBS Reports: The School Prayer Case, supra note 7. 
10. See Engel v. Vitale, 191N.Y.S.2d453, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
11. See Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183, 183-84 (App. Div. 1960) (per curiam). 
12. See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 582 (N.Y. 1961). 
13. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. For a theory of why the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in the case, see note 383 and accompanying text below. 
14. See BRUCE J. DlERENF!ELD, THE BATTLE OVER Sc1moL PRAYER: How ENGEL v. 
VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 145 (2007) ("Constitutional experts maintain that Engel was 'a 
wildly unpopular decision,' engendering more public hostility than almost any previous 
opinion in the Court's history ... .''); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARRE!N COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 187 (2d prtg. 2001) ("[A] later study found more widespread opposition 
to Engel than lo any other case."); RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 17 5 ( 1987) ("Public fu-
ror which was without equal in any prior case before the Supreme Court arose after the En-
gel decision was announced."). 
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provoked more outrage than Dred Scott v. Sandford. 15 It infuriated more areas 
of the country than Brown v. Board of Education. 16 It inspired more congres-
sional attempts to nullify it and impassioned vows to evade it than Roe v. 
Wade. 17 And it was intensely unpopular with the American public. The Su-
preme Court received more mail on Engel than it had ever received on a single 
case-around 5000 letters, "mostly negative," in the first month after the deci-
sion 18-and a Gallup poll taken shortly after the decision registered disapprov-
al of the ruling at seventy-nine percent. 19 The Justices had misbehaved before, 
but "never in the wildest of their excesses" had they gone as far as they did in 
Engel. 20 To the people and their representatives, Engel was more than a mis-
reading of the Establishment Clause. It was an affront to God, civic virtue, and 
the American way. 
Indeed, Engel's countermajoritarian narrative is so strong that the tension 
between minority rights and majority rule was explicit in the framing of the 
15. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at vii (noting that 
Engel was "greeted with more shock and criticism than Dred Scott v. Sandford''). Given the 
vastly different historical time frames, the comparison is a difficult one; but Dred Scott is 
(like the other cases mentioned here) a standard-bearer of counterrnajoritarianism, so I think 
the comparison worthy-and valid. See irifra Part II.A (discussing the reaction to Engel, 
which included public denunciations, picketing, billboards, letter-writing campaigns, editori-
als, resolutions, pay retaliation, legislation, vows of defiance, noncompliance, and calls to 
amend the Constitution, impeach the Justices, strip their jurisdiction, buy them Bibles, and 
inscribe the words "In God We Trust" above their bench). 
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE 
PRNATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 425 (Del Dickson 
ed., 2001) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE] (comparing Engel to Brown, and 
noting that "this time the hostility was not confined to one region of the country-although 
southerners were more angry than most" (italics omitted)); The Court Decision-and the 
School Prayer Furor, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 1962, at 43, 44 (reporting on the "swell of indigna-
tion, astonishment, and bewilderment that swept across the nation" in the wake of Engel). 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see ROBERTS. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE 
CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107 (1994) ("Of all the Court rulings of this century 
none has sparked more action in Congress than Engel."); DrERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 150 
("Nearly one thousand constitutional amendments have been proposed to overturn the re-
gents' prayer ruling."); Nation Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., May 18, 1964, at 63, 63 ("Fifteen States have refused to discontinue prayer and Bible 
reading in their schools."). 
18. Bruce J. Dicrenfield, Engel v. Vitale, in THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER CONTROVERSIAL 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 215, 220 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006); see also Mail Pours into 
Court on its Prayer Decision, N. Y. TIMES, June 29, 1962, at 11 (noting that mail on Engel 
"was reported to be the largest in the tribunal's history"). 
19. See 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLlC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1779 
(1972) (reporting results of a July 26-31, 1962, survey asking, "Do you approve or disap-
prove of religious observances in public schools?"). For subsequent polling data, sec note 
271 below. 
20. See Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 4, at 9 
(quoting Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia). 
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case. It was in the parties' arguments. 21 It was in the public discourse. 22 And it 
was in fastice Black's delivery of the decision itself. 2 
Little wonder, then, that as scholars today debate the nature of Supreme 
Court decisionmaking, Engel is-as it has been for fifty years-a go-to case. 
For some, it is proof of the Supreme Court's staunchly countermajoritarian ca-
pacity. 24 For others, it is the rare exception to a reliably majoritarian Supreme 
Court. 25 Either way, Engel stands as a sterling example of countermajoritarian 
decisionmaking, a classic case of judicial bravery in the face of public senti-
ment the opposite way. 
21. See, e.g., Brief of lntervenors-Respondents at 45, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962) (No. 468), 1962 WL 115863 ("Petitioners seek, under the cloak of the First Amend-
ment, to coerce the vast majority into subservience to their demands." (holding omitted)); 
Oral Argument at 43:55, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), available at http://www.oyez.org 
/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_ 468 ("[Respondents] boldly argue that the majority should 
control in this particular instance, and [that] this is a case where the minority is imposing its 
views upon the majority. Of course, our answer to that is simple. We say that the Constitu-
tion-the very purpose of the Constitution is to protect the minority against the majority."). 
22. See Editorial, Prayer Is Personal, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1962, at 34 ("Doubtless 
those who oppose school prayers are a minority. But the Constitution was designed precisely 
to protect minorities .... "); infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing criticism 
of Engel for subjecting majority will to minority rule). 
23. See Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Outlaws Official School Prayers in Regents 
Case Decision: Ruling Is 6 to I, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at I (reporting Justice Black's 
"extemporaneous comments" from the bench while announcing Engel, including the com-
ment that "[i] f there is any one thing clear in the First Amendment, it is that the right of the 
people to pray in their own way is not to be controlled by the election returns" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
24. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, A (Modest) Separation of Powers Success Story, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REY. 1647, 1670-71 (2012) ("For example, the Warren Court's decisions on 
issues like school prayer ... were extremely unpopular .... Thus, it appears that federal 
courts do have some leeway to ... protect 'unpopular' constitutional values."); Daryl J. Lev-
inson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 736 (2011) ("Real questions about the viability of judicial power arise 
only when courts act counter to the interests of the national political branches or popular ma-
jorities. These cases do exist: Supreme Court decisions invalidating school prayer ... have 
been unpopular with majorities of the public."); Richard H. Pildes, ls the Supreme Court a 
"Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 Sur. CT. REV. 103, 125 & n.77 (citing "the Court's highly 
unpopular school-prayer decisions of the 1960s" as a counterexample to claims that the Su-
preme Court is constrained by political and/or popular majorities). 
25. See, e.g,, FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 263-66 (discussing Engel within the larger 
historical context of alignment of the Justices with popular opinion); Lori A. Ringhand, In 
Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 135 n.19 (2009) ("While some Supreme Court decisions al-
most certainly are genuinely countcrmajoritarian (the flag burning decisions and much of the 
Court's current school prayer jurisprudence probably fall into this group), such cases appear 
to be rare."); Michael J. K.lannan, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & 
MARYL. REY. 265, 281 (2000) (book review) ("[N]one of this is to deny that occasionally the 
Supreme Court does strike blows in defense of freedoms that do not enjoy majoritarian sup-
port. Clearly, the Court's decisions invalidating school prayer ... have not commanded ma-
jority support."). 
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Perhaps because Engel's countennajoritarian narrative is so strong, few 
scholars have paused to consider whether the case in fact tells the story of Su-
preme Court decisionmaking for which it is famous. Thus far, only one law re-
view article has dedicated its pages to the larger sociopolitical context in which 
Engel was decided, and even there Engel is but a piece of a larger Establish-
ment Clause history. 26 Still lacking is a robust account of the decisionmaking 
in Engel: how larger sociopolitical forces influenced the case and its timing, 
what the Justices thought when they decided it, why the nation reacted as it did, 
and ultimately, what the case says about the Supreme Court's 
countermajoritarian capacity. My aim is to provide such an account. 
Using primary source materials, this Article reconstructs the story of Engel, 
providing a dramatically different account of the case than that which appears 
in the conventional script. The contribution is twofold. First, this Article chal-
lenges the prevailing view of Engel as proof of the Supreme Court's 
countermajoritarian capacity. On the surface, Engel exudes judicial bravery, but 
closer examination shows that to be a fai;ade. To the extent the Justices in En-
gel played a countermajoritarian role at all, they did so unwittingly. Indeed, all 
indications are that if the Justices had known just how unpopular Engel would 
be, they would not have taken the case in the first place. 
Second, this Article brings to light what the surface appeal of Engel's 
countermajoritarian narrative has eclipsed-a remarkably rich account of Su-
preme Court decisionmaking that furthers a number of conversations in consti-
tutional law. Engel is a testament to the power of the 1950s ecumenical move-
ment in generating constitutional change, adding a new thread to a burgeoning 
body of scholarship in the "court and culture" literature. It shows the Justices 
explicitly engaging in a dialogue with the American public, revealing a rare 
"strong form" of the dialogic function of judicial review. It illustrates the varie-
ty of forms that popular constitutionalism might take, offering an opportunity to 
think about qualitative differences in the way democratic dissent fosters consti-
tutional discourse. And along the way it illuminates issues that are not at the 
forefront of conversations in constitutional law, but perhaps should be: how the 
media filters our perception of judicial review, what the support of highly edu-
cated cultural elites might say about an issue, and the ways in which messaging 
26. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 280-81, 318-27 (2001). Three others offer substantial contri-
butions that merit mention here. See Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School Prayer Deci-
sions: Civil Religion Under Assault, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 193, 196 (Richard w. 
Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (telling a similar, albeit limited, story of Engel); 
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 46-62 (1996) (outlining the contours ofa historical understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause and stating the need for legal scholarship in this area); Steven D. Smith, Consti-
tutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. 
L. REv. 945, 1015-16 (2011) (discussing Engel's cultural backdrop as part of a larger discus-
sion about its transfonnative significance in establishing a secularist constitutional concep-
tion of America). 
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can matter. Engel offers a wealth of insights into Supreme Court 
decisionmaking and the role of judicial review, but only once we have a robust 
understanding of what happened in the case. 
Before proceeding, a point of clarification merits mention. This Article is 
not concerned with whether Engel was correctly decided; it is concerned with 
why the Justices decided it. Nor is this Article concerned with doctrinal devel-
opments since Engel, at least after 1963. 27 I take Engel for the case it was, and 
its broader implications for what contemporary observers understood them to 
be. All that is to reiterate that this Article is about understanding the Justices' 
decisionmaking in Engel, and explaining why, if the understanding I offer is 
right, it was obscured by what happened in the aftermath of the case. Only by 
understanding the decisionmaking in Engel can we begin to understand what its 
contributions to constitutional theory are, and aren't. 
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I shows how history shaped En-
gel, tracing the major historical developments in the school prayer controversy, 
situating the case against its larger sociopolitical backdrop, and examining the 
Justices' decisionmaking in the case. Part II turns to the aftermath of Engel, de-
tailing the events that occurred in Engel's wake, explaining why the nation re-
acted as it did, and presenting the Supreme Court's 1963 Bible reading decision 
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp28 as an important part of 
Engel's narrative. Part lll discusses the implications of this reconstructed ac-
count, rejecting the heroic, countennajoritarian narrative for which Engel is 
famous and exploring the vastly underappreciated contributions it makes to a 
number of other conversations in constitutional law. In the end, Engel is as im-
portant and instructive as it always was-just not for the reasons conventional 
wisdom would have us think. 
I. How HISTORY SHAPED ENGEL 
To understand Engel, one must first understand what happened before it. 
This Part aims to provide that understanding, showing how history shaped En-
gel in various ways. 29 First, I explain how the controversy over school prayer 
began. Then I show how the rise of religious pluralism made school prayer an 
intractable problem by the mid-twentieth century, and how Cold War religiosi-
ty kept the ruling at bay until 1962. I conclude with an inside look at the Justic-
es' decisionmaking in Engel, which seemed to them a relatively easy, uncon-
troversial case. 
27. I do consider the Supreme Court's ruling in School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), but only because it sheds light on the heroic, 
countcrmajoritarian narrative canonized in Engel. See infra Part 11.D. 
28. 374 U.S. at 205, 207 (invalidating Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer 
in public schools). 
29. The account is necessarily simplistic. Religious and other changes over several 
hundred years defy distillation without some glossing over of the nuances, crosscurrents, and 
complications along the way. 
486 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:479 
A. In the Beginning 
In the beginning, school prayer was not controversial. The colonists may 
have come to the New World to escape an established religion, but that did not 
mean they were against religious establishment per se. To the contrary, most of 
America's earliest settlers were staunch supporters of state-sponsored religion; 
they just wanted it to be theirs. 30 Schools played an integral part in this en-
deavor, as they were the place where children learned to read religious doc-
trine. 31 Thus, from the start, children in the colonies practiced religious obser-
vances in school. Indeed, that was the very point. 
America's independence and adoption of the First Amendment had no ef-
fect on this arrangement, 32 but immigration in the 1830s and 1840s did. Catho-
lics and new strands of Protestants streamed into America, placing strain on the 
communities already in place. 33 Schools seemed an ideal place to "American-
30. Nine of the thirteen original colonies had an established church. See LEONARD W. 
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT I, 5 (1994) (dis-
cussing establishments of religion in the colonies); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment at 
the Founding, in No ESTABLISHMENT Of RELIGION: AMERICA'S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 45, 45-47 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012) [hereinafter No 
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION] (same). 
31. See DONALD E. BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCIIOOLS 6 (3d ed. 
1965) ("[T]he motivating force behind public education in the American Colonies was to 
enable the students to read the Bible and to become better versed in Protestant religious 
dogma."); STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH 
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 13 (2012) (noting that America's earliest 
schools were "predominately religious (i.e., Protestant), with a heavy emphasis on reading 
religious texts and memorizing religious doctrine"); STEPHEN D. SoWMON, ELLERY'S 
PROTEST: How ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRAD!TION & SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL 
PRAYER 99-101 (2007) ("Most of the colonial and early nineteenth-century schools recog-
nized religion as a primary goal of learning. At the very least, children had to become literate 
in order to read the Bible and learn their prayers."). As Michael McConnell notes, by the 
1780s, religious establishment was less about theology and more about the role ofreligion in 
preserving morals for the good of society. McConnell, supra note 30, at 59-62. This civic 
justification-the inculcation of morals-became the central justification for religious teach-
ing in schools as well. For a discussion of the prayer in Engel as an example of that phenom-
enon, see note 95 and accompanying text below (noting the prayer's stated purpose as aiding 
the spiritual and moral development of children in public schools). 
32. The First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion"; it says nothing about the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. fudced, de-
bates in the First Congress make clear that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause was 
intended only as a limit on the federal government, leaving the states to do as they pleased. 
See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the 
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088-89 (1995) ("[T]he original Estab-
lishment Clause was intended to prohibit federal power over the subject of religion, reserv-
ing the same to the states. In this way, the original Establishment Clause expressed the prin-
ciple of federalism: The federal government could neither establish religion at the federal 
level, nor disestablish religion in the states."); id at 1090-92 (citing debates in the state rati-
fying conventions and the First Congress to prove the point). 
33. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 23 (discussing immigration in the 1830s and 1840s). 
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ize" these immigrants, 34 but there was a hitch: the religious instruction was 
sect-specific, alienating the newcomers. 35 The renowned Horace Mann, Ameri-
ca's first state secretary of education and founder of our public school sys-
tem, 36 had a solution. Keep religion in and differences out, he reasoned, by 
teaching basic Christianity-only those features that all denominations had in 
common. 37 
Thus began the so-called "nonsectarian" approach to religion in public 
schools. 38 Allow the Bible "to speak for itself," Mann famously quipped. 39 
Schools could accommodate different denominations by reducing religious in-
struction to two components: Bible reading without commentary and school 
prayer. 40 
For Protestants, Bible reading and school prayer-typically the Lord's 
Prayer, itself a form of Bible reading~worked well enough.41 But such prac-
34. See SAMUEL WrNDSOR BROWN, THE StiCULARIZATfON OF AMERICAN EDUCAnON: 
As SHOWN BY STATE LEGISLATION, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 2 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1912) (discussing the importance of educa-
tion as a means of "Americanizing the diverse racial and cultural elements composing our 
population"). For a slightly darker articulation of the point, see Thomas C. Berg, Disestab-
lishment from Blaine to Everson: Federalism, School Wars, and the Emerging Modern State, 
in No ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGLON, supra note 30, at 307, 315 ("The proponents ofcommon 
schools generally viewed Catholicism as a threat, seeing it as full of theological superstitions 
and, because of its hierarchical structure and theology, as antidemocratic. The common, or 
public, schools sought to 'Americanize' the immigrants and, by educating children of 
Protestant denominations together, strengthen values of democracy and individual freedom 
to which Protestantism was thought to be crucial."). 
35. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 23-25; BROWN, supra note 34, at 2. 
36. See JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OYER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 (2004); see also BOLES, supra note 31, at 23 (describing Horace Mann 
as "the father of the public school system in America"). 
37. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 24-27; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 297-98. 
38. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 14 ("[T]he approach that soon became domi-
nant in many states was the establishment of schools deemed 'nonsectarian' at the time, alt-
hough by today's standards they would be better described as pan-Protestant."); JOHN 
HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 78 (1969) 
("The concept of nonsectarianism was regarded as synonymous with 'common core reli-
gion,' 'common denominator religion,' 'civil or civic religion,' and 'public school reli-
gion."'). For a history of the common (i.e., public) school movement, see generally CARLF. 
KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860 
(1983). 
39. See HORACE MANN, Report for 1848, in 3 LIFE AND WORKS OF MORACE MANN: 
ANNUAL REPORTS ON EDUCATION 640, 729-30 (Ivlary Mann ed., Boston, Horace B. Fuller 
1868) (emphasis omitted). 
40. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 5, 131. 
41. See id. (discussing recitation of the Lord's Prayer and Bible reading as the core of 
nonsectarian religious practices in school); id. at 160 ("Reading the Bible without comment 
had been a brilliant innovation in the 1840s by Horace Mann, ... who pleased various 
Protestant factions by including the Bible in the curriculum while avoiding the commentary 
that had caused bitter divisions in the past."). But see Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" 
Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. 
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tices were not "nonsectarian" for everyone. Catholics used the Douay version 
of the Bible; schools (and Protestants) used the King James.42 Catholics 
thought Bible reading required the guiding hand of clergy; schools (and 
Protestants) thought the Bible could speak for itself. 43 
Catholics complained bitterly that so-called "nonsectarian" religious ob-
servances weren't. Protestants had their schools, they argued, so Catholics 
should have theirs-complete with government funding. 44 The argument fell 
flat. But the claim itself fed nativist fears and reprisals, adding to the tension 
already mounting as Catholics resisted religious observances in school as best 
they could.45 Children were severely beaten, priests tarred and feathered. 46 Ri-
oting in Cincinnati and Philadelphia left homes burned and dozens dead. 47 
In the end, the notorious "Bible Wars"48 only hardened nativist sentiment, 
inciting a drive for a constitutional amendment to "[k]eep the church and state 
forever separated" by prohibiting the use of public money for sectarian 
schools. 49 The Blaine Amendment failed (barely), 50 but states passed "Baby 
REV. 3 7, 51 (1991) (noting that the nonsectarian approach "was not entirely satisfactory even 
among Protestants"). 
42. See Laycock, supra note 41, at 51 ("Catholics used the Douay translation of the 
Bible, and objected to reading the King James translation, which they called 'the Protestant 
Bible."'); infra note 43. 
43. See DELP ATIORE, supra note 36, at 20-21 ("The [Catholic] Church defines itself as 
the only true interpreter of the Bible, and the Catholic translation, known as the Douay Ver-
sion, includes footnotes and commentary giving the Church's explanation of certain 
texts .... [T]he bishops saw [Bible reading without commentary] as hostile to the Church's 
assertion that even adults, let alone children, arc incompetent to interpret the Bible for them-
selves."). 
44. See BROWN, supra note 34, at 157 (describing the view of "[t]hose who advocate 
religious, sectarian schools" that "in educating the youth in such schools they are rendering 
to the state a distinct service, and are relieving the state of an obligation and a burden, and 
for this reason are entitled to stale assistance"). 
45. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 19-20 {"It was the Catholic drive for govern-
ment funding of these schools that inflamed public opinion more than any other religious 
issue in the nineteenth century."). 
46. See DELFAITORt:, supra note 36, at 43-49 (discussing incidents). 
47. For an in-depth discussion, see MICHAEL FELDBERG, THE PHILADELPHIA RIOTS OF 
1844: A STUDY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT (1975); and GREEN, supra note 31, at 93-129 (discuss-
ing the Cincinnati "Bible War" of 1869-1873). 
48. See SUSAN DUDLEY GoL.D, ENGEL v. VITALE: PRAYER IN THE SCl·IOOLS 49 (2006) 
(discussing the tenn's origin in newspapers reporting on the Cincinnati riots). 
49. BOI.ES, supra note 31, at 30-32 {discussing the Blaine Amendment of 1876 and 
quoting President Grant's 1875 speech proposing it). For an argument that the Blaine 
Amendment, which also sought to apply the First Amendment to the states, was more a na-
tivist political ploy than a proposed change to contemporary understandings of church-state 
relations, see Steven K. Green, The "Second Disestablishment": The Evolution of Nine-
teenth-Century Understandings of Separation of Church and State, in No ESTABLISHMENT OF 
RELIGION, supra note 30, at 280, 298-99 (noting that the states had already fonnally disestab-
lished religion by 1876, so incorporation would have changed nothing, and seventeen states 
had already taken a no-funding stance toward parochial schools). 
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Blaine" amendments in its wake, 51 and Congress required newly admitted 
states to do the same. 52 \Vhcn Catholics pointed out that public money was al-
ready going to sectarian schools, they were met with a single response: they 
were wrong. 53 
By 1890, the principle of separation of church and state had become popu-
larized over the school-funding controversy, but it was generally thought not to 
apply to "nonsectarian" exercises like Bible reading and school prayer. 54 The 
principle was, to borrow from historian Bruce Dierenfield, "soft on prayer, 
tough on money" when applied to public schools. 55 Catholics continued to 
complain, but not much changed until the dissenters became too loud, and nu-
merous, to ignore. 56 
B. The Rise ofReligious Pluralism 
From the start, Protestantism had been the dominant cultural conception of 
America's religious identity, the nation's de facto religious establishment after 
50. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 31 (noting the Blaine Amendment's passage in the 
House by a vote of 180 to 7); GREEN, supra note 31, at 220 (noting that the Blaine Amend-
ment came four votes short of the necessary two-thirds in the Senate). 
51. Seventeen states ~!ready had no-funding provisions in their constitutions by the 
time the Blaine Amendment was proposed in 1876, and another twenty-one states would 
adopt such provisions after 1876. Green, supra note 49, at 299; see Klarman, supra note 26, 
at 53; see also BROWN, supra note 34, at 57-67 (listing twenty-nine state statutes enacted 
since 1850 forbidding sectarian religious instruction in publicly funded schools); id at 103-
19 (listing forty-six state constitutional provisions forbidding the same). For a primer on the 
history, language, and operation of state Blaine Amendments, see Kyle Duncan, Secular-
ism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 
(2003). 
52. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 32 (discussing federal legislation requiring new states 
to adopt irrevocable ordinances that provided "for the establishment and maintenance of a 
system of public schools which shall be open to all the children of said state and free from 
sectarian control" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
53. See NOAH FELDMAN, DlVIDED BY Goo: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROALEM-
AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 85 (2005) ("Catholic objections that nonsectarianism 
did not include them were met with little more than the naked insistence that it did."), 
54. The Senate version of the Blaine Amendment made this point explicitly. See 4 
CONG. REC. 5453 (1876) ("This article shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the 
Bible in any school or institution, .. . ");see also BOLES, supra note 31, at 48 ("The majority 
of states ... tended to regard Rib le reading without comment, as nonsectarian religious or 
moral instruction."); Green, supra note 49, at 293-94 (discussing popularization of the idea 
of separation of church and state). 
55. DIERENFIELD, supra note l 4, at 31. 
56. Only two state courts ruled against Bible reading and/or school prayer prior to 
1910. See Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 238, 241-43 (1872) {upholding an 1869 
decision by the Cincinnati school board to abolish Bible reading ~d school prayer in public 
schools); State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd., 44 N.W. 967, 976 (Wis. 1890) {striking down Bi-
ble reading in public schools under the state constitution). 
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formal disestablishment. 57 That conception changed sometime between 1880 
and 1930, when approximately 27 million newcomers arrived on America's 
shores. 58 
The influx of Catholics alone was staggering. In 1850, the Catholic popula-
tion in the United States was around 1.6 million. 59 By 1900, it was 12 miJJion, 
and by 1930, it was 24 million. 60 By the mid-1950s, the Catholic population 
was more than 31 million, and Catholicism was the single largest denomination 
in the United States. 61 
That said, the impact of Catholics on America's sociopolitical landscape 
was not just about the numbers. Catholic immigrants assimilated rapidly, com-
ing into their own by the 1920s and 1930s with substantial social and economic 
clout. 62 With that clout came political power as well-power to decide elec-
tions, power to hold cabinet positions, and power to secure state aid for paro-
chial schools on matters such as textbooks and bus transportation. 63 
These developments, in turn, led to a second spike in Catholic-Protestant 
tensions by the late 1940s 64-this time a reflection of Protestant "status anxie-
ty" over Catholic power in a pre-Vatican II world. 65 Once again, the tension 
galvanized popular support for the separation of church and state. 66 It was dur-
57. Fonnal disestablishment ofreligion occurred in the states between 1776 and 1883; 
this is what Steven Green calls the "first disestablishment." The transformation he calls the 
"second disestablishment" is the subject of this Part-the fall of the de facto Protestant es-
tablishment that remained. See Green, supra note 49, at 280-84 (discussing both). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the second disestablishment, see generally STEVEN K. GREEN, THE 
SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2010). 
58. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 127. 
59. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 299. 
60. Id. at 299-300. Measured in percentage terms, Catholics went from around 5% of 
the total population in 1850 to around 17% by 1906; they would remain at 16% for the next 
two decades. ROGER FrNKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990: 
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 112-13 (1992). 
61. See Six out of Ten, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1954, at 57, 57. 
62. As Michael Klarman has discussed, World War I and the integration and growth 
that followed in the interwar period directly contributed to this phenomenon. See Kl=n, 
supra note 26, at 50-53. 
63. By 1947, twenty-two states authorized the public funding of bus transportation to 
parochial schools. Id. at 52-54 (discussing various manifestations of political power). 
64. See Berg, supra note 34, at 333-34. For a famously nativist response, see PAUL 
BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949). 
65. Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. 
u. CHI. L.J. 121, 132-38 (2001) (quoting RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICT: CHURCH AND STATE JN AMERICA 27 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing the reasons for heightened anti-Catholic fears in the 1940s, including the Catho-
lic Church's stance on various issues prior to the announcement of the Second Vatican 
Council in 1959); see Berg, supra note 34, al 334 (same). 
66. See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERJCAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 168 
(2003) (discussing "mid-twentieth-century fears of Catholic power" and their influence on 
"postwar American liberalism," which "included the insistence that religion, as an entirely 
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ing this time that the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause in-
to the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections, constitutionalizing the 
"wall of separation between church and State" that had come to epitomize 
proper church-state relations (and the standard response to Catholic demands) 
for over a hundred years. 67 
Compared to Catholics, Jews constituted a relatively tiny portion of the 
population in the United States-just 0.5% in the 1880s and 3% by 193068-
but they, too, were quick to assimilate and establish themselves in positions of 
influence and power.69 Then came the Holocaust. Americans saw the unspeak-
able atrocities of extreme anti-Semitism and made a sharp ideological tum.70 
American anti-Semitism, which had been rampant in the 1920s and 1930s (it-
self a response to rising Jewish influence and power) fell dramatically. 71 And 
Jewish claims of religious freedom "gained special resonance" with the Ameri-
can public. 72 Jews may not have had the numbers, but as John Jeffries and Jim 
Ryan put the point, they "laid an equal claim to America's conscience."73 
The nation's newfound sensitivity to Jewish claims of religious freedom 
likewise posed a problem for religious observances in public schools, which 
alienated Jews even more than Catholics. 74 Jews did not recognize the New 
private matter, must be separated from the state"); Berg, supra note 65, at 122, 124-26, 147-
48 (discussing the best-seller status and rave reviews of Paul Blanshard's book, BLANSHARD, 
supra note 64, and popular support for the separation of church and state as a response to the 
threat of Catholic power); Sarah Barringer Gordon, "Free" Religion and "Captive" Schools: 
Protestants, Catholics, and Education, 1945-1965, 56 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 1177, 1178-79, l 192, 
1205 (2007) (discussing how the discoveiy of "captive schools" in the late 1940s-schools 
that were public but infused with parochial markings, often with nuns teaching in full hab-
it-galvanized Protestant politicism in support of the separation of church and state). 
67. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15-18 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (incorporating the Estab-
lishment Clause and endorsing a strong separation of church and state while upholding pub-
lic funding of bus transportation to parochial schools); see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. 
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205-06, 212 (1948) (invalidating an early-release program for reli-
gious instruction on school grollllds). As Thomas Berg has explained, disestablishment had 
been viewed as a fundamental right since the antebellum period, so incorporation had little 
immediate effect and was treated by the Justices in Everson as almost a given. See Berg, su-
pra note 34, at 307-12. 
68. Klarman, supra note 26, at 49. In terms of sheer numbers, the Jewish population in 
the United States was less than 250,000 in the 1880s, and just over 4.2 million in 1927. Id. 
69. See id. at 51-53 (discussing the economic strides of the Jewish population and the 
concomitant social and political gains). 
70. See id. at 54-56 (discussing Americans' ideological tum in response to Nazi anti-
Semitism). 
71. See id. 
72. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 308. 
73. Id. 
74. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 158 (quoting a rabbi as stating in the Schempp tri-
al, "I don't want to step on anybody's toes but the idea of God having a son is, from the 
viewpoint of Jewish faith, practically blasphemous" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Testament, which meant they did not recognize the Lord's Prayer. 75 In fact, 
they did not recognize much of anything about Horace Mann's compromise 
approach to Christianity-they weren't Christian. 
By the mid-twentieth century, Protestants could no longer claim a preemi-
nent position in the nation's faith hierarchy; the reign of Protestantism as 
America's de facto religious establishment had come to an end. 76 In its place, 
the "three great faiths"-Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism-emerged as 
the dominant religious identities in America, 77 and even they had to make 
room. By the mid-1950s, eighteen religious denominations had over a million 
members, 78 while eighty-three had more than 50,000 members. 79 Pluralism 
reigned. 
With the rise of religious pluralism came two sociopolitical responses. One 
was an interest in religious toleration, accommodation, and standardization. 
This was the 1950s ecumenical movement, the same force that produced the 
National Council of Churches and numerous other interdenominational organi-
zations during this time. 80 "Modem man .... feels that people should have de-
nominational connections, but also a deep sense of religious give-and-take for 
the beliefs of others," wrote Better Homes and Gardens in 1956, adding that 
the concept of"ecumenicity, which means universality, is now in operation."81 
75. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND 
CURR~NT FICTION 162 (1982) ("The 'Lord's Prayer' is distinctively a Christian prayer, the 
most commonly used recitation of which is found in the New Testament Gospel attributed to 
Matthew."). 
76. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 297; Klarman, supra note 26, at 56-58. 
77. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN 
REUGIOUS SOCIOLOGY 53-54 (1955); RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
RELIGION 125 (1972) ("[TJhe mid-1940's was increasingly referred to as a distillation of 
'Three Great Faiths."'). For a discussion of the term "Judea-Christian" as the "new national 
creed" by the early 1950s, see MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND AMERICA 
SINCE WORLD WARII, at 40-53 (1988). 
78. Six out of Ten, supra note 61, at 57. 
79. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (l 963) (noting census 
data); see also FINKE & STARK, supra note 60, at 199 (noting the existence of 258 separate 
church denominations in America as of 1959). 
80. See Roswell P. Barnes, The Ecumenical Movement, 332 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& Soc. SCI. 135, 136 (1960) ("[T]he ecumenical movement is the trend toward unity among 
the Christians ofthc world .... The movement is much broader than its organized manifesta-
tions."); Marcus Bach, Whal 's Happening on Church Street, US.A.?, BETTER HOMES & 
GARDENS, Oct. 1956, at 74, 154 (discussing the thirty-denomination National Council of the 
Churches of Christ, sixty-denomination National Association of Evangelicals, and over-fifty-
denomination American Council of Christian Churches); The Spirit: A Time to Be Stern, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1959, at 121, 122 (predicting that "the ecumenical movement will con-
tinue to flourish"). For additional contemporary discussions of the ecumenical movement, 
see generally THE ECUMENICAL ERA IN CHURCH AND SOCIETY: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF 
JOHN A. MACKAY (Edward J. Jurji ed., 1959); and ROBERT LEE, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF 
CHURCH UNITY: AN INTERPRETATION OF UNITIVE MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 
(1960). 
81. Bach, supra note 80, at 154 (emphasis omitted). 
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What the ecumenical movement brought was what religious pluralism arguably 
required: building bridges between religions rather than disparaging differ-
ences. 
Naturally, not everyone agreed. While ecumenicals celebrated being "inter-
religious in the best American tradition,"82 traditionalists lamented the ecumen-
ical movement as a step toward civic religion-"religion-in-general, superficial 
and syncretistic, destructive of the profounder elements of faith." 83 Some things 
were simply too important for give-and-take. 
The second sociopolitical response, which was fueled in part by dissatis-
faction with the first, was public secularism-a natural extension of the princi-
ple of separation of church and state that had long been in play. This sort of 
secularism was neither anti-Catholic nor antireligious. It was instead a view 
that the perils of religious pluralism were best navigated by creating room: 
move religion out of shared space, where it was sure to offend, and into the pri-
vate sphere, where its expression was most sincere and its practice least en-
cumbered by the need to accommodate others. 84 
Naturally, this separatist response also assuaged lingering fears about 
Catholic power. John F. Kennedy's successful 1960 presidential campaign was 
a testament to this power, along with the need to assure the public that it would 
not be put to Catholic use. In a 1960 speech, Kennedy put the matter to rest us-
ing the principle Americans had come to know and trust: 
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is abso-
lute .... 
1 believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant nor 
Jewish ... -where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indi-
rectly upon the general populace .... 
. . . No rd~~ious group should be given special preference or advantage by 
the state .... 
In a land where pluralism reigned, Kennedy and others believed that the best 
stance the state could take toward religion was no stance at all. 
The same two responses--ecumenicalism and public secularism-were al-
so playing out in America's public schools, where the pressures of religious 
pluralism made even "lowest common denominator" Protestant practices deep-
ly problematic. By 1962, when the Supreme Court decided Engel, 9 states no 
82. Id. 
83. Perils of Freedom, TIME, Aug. 4, 1958, at 53, 53 (internal quotation mark omitted) 
(quoting William Lee Miller, a Presbyterian and a professor of divinity at Yale). 
84. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 28 l, 308-11. 
85. Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech to Protestant Ministers and Laymen on Religion 
(Sept. 12, 1960), reprinted in Both Sides of the "Catholic Issue," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Sept. 26, 1960, at 74, 79. 
494 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:479 
longer allowed religious observances in public schools, 86 and where allowed, 87 
the practice in large parts of the country had already died out on its own. 88 
Even the 12 states that required school religious observances in 1962 presented 
a complicated picture. In almost all of those states-11 of the 12-legislation 
requiring religious observances was passed in an apparent (and sometimes ex-
plicit) attempt to entrench such practices before the pressures of religious di-
versity led school boards to abandon them. 89 The status quo was on its heels. 
The regional variance was just as one might expect. In the South, 89% of 
public school districts practiced religious observances prior to Engel, no sur-
prise for a region known as the Bible Belt. 90 And in the Northeast, 80% of pub-
lic school districts did so-again no surprise given the region's deeply religious 
colonial customs. 91 
Outside these two areas of the country, however, a different baseline pre-
vailed. In the Midwest, only 26% of public school districts practiced religious 
observances, while in the West, only 9% did so. 92 Indeed, a number of com-
mentators in the 1950s and early 1960s described America's schools as largely 
secularist, "even militantly so."93 In parts of the country, they were wrong 
about that. But in much of the country, they were right. 
86. See DELf ATTORE, supra note 36, at 53 (listing the states that had already forbidden 
religious observances in school at the time of Engel as Alaska, Arizona, California, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
87. In 1962, 25 states allowed Bible reading either officially or through silence on the 
subject. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 129-30. 
88. See BRUCE T. MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORAR y PERSPECTIVE 98 (2008) ("But as immigration continued, 
pressure from the increasingly diverse population mounted on public schools, and adminis-
trators voluntarily began eliminating Bible study."); Berg, supra note 26, at 196 ("But 
recognition was also growing that such exercises were religiously partial, which occasionally 
led courts to invalidate them-and more often led school districts to discontinue them."). 
89. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 129-30 (discussing Pennsylvania's 1913 mandato-
ry Bible reading statute, passed "to preserve at least this last remnant of religion in the 
schools against the tide of immigrants," and the similar state statutes that followed "to en-
shrine the practice in law before local school boards could do away with it under the pressure 
of religious diversity"). As one supporter of legislation supporting mandatory Bible reading 
stated, "[W]e are seeking no change. We are resisting a change which amounts to a revolu-
tion." GREEN, supra note 31, at 237-38 (internal quotation mark omitted) (concluding that 
"[w]itnesses and observers alike understood the proposal for what it was: an effort not simp-
ly to forestall the secularization of public education but to reverse it"). 
90. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 130; see also H. Frank Way, Jr., Survey Research on 
Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189, 199 (1968) 
(discussing regional variances). 
91. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 130; see also Way, supra note 90, at 199. 
92. SOLOMON, supra note 3 1, at 13 0. 
93. Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict over Church & State: A Divisive Threat to 
Our Democracy?, 14 COMMENTARY 450, 451 (1952) ("[P]ublic school education ... is no 
longer religious, neither Catholic, nor Protestant, nor Jewish; it is, by and large, secularist, 
even militantly so."); see also VIRGIL c. BLUM, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION 109 
(1958) ("The state is imposing the secularist religion upon all public school children."); 
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Where religious observances remained in America's schools, the ecumeni-
cal movement began watering down what was left. The ~chool prayer at issue 
in Engel-called the "Regents' Prayer" for the New York Board of Regents 
that adopted it94-provides a rich example of this phenomenon. The Regents' 
Prayer was the product of an interdenominational committee whose mission 
was to draft a nonsectarian, ecumenical prayer to support the spiritual and mor-
al development of children in New York's public schools. 95 At just twenty-two 
words, it is worth repeating in full: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our de-
pendence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our 
teachers and our Country."96 
When the Regents' Prayer was proposed in 1951, critics called it "an emp-
ty formality with little, if any, spiritual significance," a pra~er so devoid of con-
tent that it might just work against the inculcation of faith. 7 Echoing the point, 
Yale Law School professor Louis Pollak later blasted the Supreme Court's de-
cision to grant certiorari in Engel, writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1963: 
New York's attempt to write a prayer had produced such a pathetically vacu-
ous assertion of piety as hardly to rise to the dignity of a religious exercise. 
The Court might very reasonably have decided to save its scarce ammunition 
for a ~rayer that soared, rather than squander it on New York's clay-footed pi-
geon. 8 
Robert Coughlan, Religion and the Schools, LIFE, June 16, 1961, at 110, 121 {"Bible-reading 
has disappeared from a majority of the public schools. For practical purposes the seculariza-
tion of the American public school is very far advanced."); Engel v Vitale, NEW REPUBLIC, 
July 9, 1962, at 3, 4 ("By and large public schools have in recent years tried to be not only 
non-denominational but secular."). 
94. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962). 
95. See id.; DELFATIORE, supra note 36, at 69 ("[T}he New York State Board of Re-
gents, which oversees public education in that state, appointed a committee of Protestant, 
Catholic, and Jewish clergy to compose a prayer .... [T]he Regents asked the committee to 
be sure that the prayer was devoid of sectarian doctrine and entirely inoffensive."). 
96. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Editorial, Prayers in Public Schools Opposed, 69 CHRJSTIAN CENTURY 35, 35 
(1952) ("[A Jn observance of this sort is likely to deteriorate quickly into an empty formality 
with little, if any, spiritual significance. Prescribed forms of this sort ... can actually work 
against the inculcation of vital religion."); see also Parochial Puzzle, TIME, May 18, 1959, at 
80, 83 (quoting a critic as stating, "I consider religion to be much too important in hum.an 
history to see it reduced to a patriotic exercise in the classroom" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); "To Stand as a Guarantee," TIME, July 6, 1962, at 7, 7 {discussing denounce-
ments of the Regents' Prayer when it was adopted, including the claim that it was "an abom-
ination" because it did not mention Christ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one theo-
logian stated, "A prayer which is the product of a blind, sentimental enthusiasm and 
therefore conceals or smoothes over differences in themselves divisive is indefensible .... 
To portray God, in prayer, as the good-natured old man accessible to all on any terms is to 
bely the Father of our Lord, Jesus Christ." To Pray or Not to Pray, TIME, Aug. 8, 1960, at 
63, 63 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
98. Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Courl 1962 Term-Foreword: Public Prayers in 
Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 63 (1963 ). 
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Students had said that school prayer was like "peeing-you just do it; it has no 
meaning."99 And ecumenical "to whom it marr concern" recitations like the 
Regents' Prayer in Engel were making it worse. 00 
In short, the rise of religious pluralism made school prayer an intractable 
problem by 1962. Mid-twentieth-century America had too many religions to 
devise a prayer that would suit everyone-and the harder one tried, the closer 
one came to a perfunctory ritual that was more trouble than it was worth. As a 
state-sponsored religious exercise, school prayer had become (to borrow from a 
1970s tune) "too much, too little, too late." 101 
C. The Fall cf Cold War Religiosity 
Thus far, I have framed Engel in light of the religious diversity that marked 
mid-twentieth-century America. But at the same time that pluralism was mak-
ing its mark on the sociopolitical landscape, another force was making a mark 
of its own: the Cold War. The Cold War figures prominently in the story of En-
gel in two ways. First, the Cold War replaced concerns about Catholic power 
with concerns about Communist power, easing interfaith tensions at home. 102 
Indeed, Cold War nationalism is almost certainly what gave rise to the ecumen-
ical movement in the first place. 103 Second, and the focus of the discussion 
99. DJER£NFIELD, supra note 14, at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Ellory Schempp); see also id at 95 (quoting Steven Engel as being opposed to the prayer 
because "[i]t's sacred, and when you rattle these things off and they have no meaning to it at 
all, I mean, you vitiate the value ofreligion" (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
100. Id. at 130 (referring to Justice Black's view of the Regents' Prayer as "a bland en-
treaty addressed 'to whom it may concern"'). 
101. The phrase is common, but at the risk of revealing my nerdy penchant for 1970s 
music, I confess that it was the 1978 duet by Johnny Mathis and Deniece Williams that 
brought it to mind. If church leaders had written a farewell ballad to school prayer, the open-
ing lines to this 1978 hit are just what they would have said. For those too young (sadly) to 
know what I am talking about, see Chinazo2007, Johnny Mathis & Deniece Williams-Too 
Much Too Little Too Late, YouTUBE (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IM 
39ylKoSo4. See also DELFATIORE, supra note 36, at 71 (noting "competing assertions that 
the Regents' Prayer included too much doctrine to be nonsectarian and too little to be mean-
ingful"). 
102. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STILE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 80 (1965) ("(l]n the grand ecumenicism of their anti-Communist passion they 
welcome all allies. They are particularly happy to have made tenns with the Catho-
lics .... That the Whore of Babylon now sits in Moscow, not Rome, is to their incalculable 
advantage, for they have been able to turn a powerful domestic foe, the Church, into an al-
ly .... "). 
103. It is hard to imagine that the ecumenical movement's timing in the 1950s was mere 
fortuity. What does society do when religion is of utmost importance, but pluralism reigns? 
It finds a way to make room, which is what the ecumenical movement was all about. For an 
illustration of this phenomenon, see President-elect Eisenhower's famous statement from 
1952, "[O]ur fonn of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious 
faith, and I don't care what it is." President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Ad-
dress (Dec. 22, 1952), reprinted in N.Y. HERAW TRrn., Dec. 23, 1952, at 8. 
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here, the Cold War brought with it a surge in religiosity, rendering anything re-
ligious virtually unassailable for almost a decade. 
By the early 1950s, the Cold War was cold indeed. McCarthyism gripped 
the country, triggering a Red Scare as intense fears of Communist control and 
influence dominated the American psyche. 104 Obsessed with distinguishing 
themselves from "godless communism," 105 Americans flocked to the one thing 
that proved democracy different, as well as right and true-religion. 
Religion was the place where American patriotism played out in the 
1950s. 106 It was the embodiment of American identity, proof positive of de-
mocracy's virtue. As one magazine ~ut the point, "Religion in America is an 
endorsement of the American way." 1 7 
And what an endorsement it was. In the mid- l 950s, Congress adopted "In 
God we trust" as the national motto, 108 instituted a national daJ' of prayer, 109 
and added the words "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance. 11 The President 
held prayer breakfasts. 111 Church membership soared. 112 And school prayer 
104. For a primer on McCarthyism and American anti-Communism more generally, see 
ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: McCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998). 
105. Thomas Aiello, Constructing "Godless Communism": Religion, Politics, and 
Popular Culture, 1954-1960, AMERICANA: J. AM. POPULAR CULTURE (1900-PRESENT) 
(Spring 2005), http://www.americanpopularculture.com/jouma1Jarticles/spring_2005/aiello 
.htm; see also DtERENFlELD, supra note 14, at 68 (noting that the governor of New York, 
Thomas Dewey, "quickly endorsed" the Regents' Prayer "as an essential means of defeating 
'the slave world of godless communism'"); FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 13 (1976) ("[T]he enemy came to be 
known-positively, if a bit redundantly-as 'godless atheistic communism.'"). 
106. See DELF'ATTORE, supra note 36, at 68 ("Since the Soviet Union was closely iden-
tified with atheism while most Americans considered themselves a religious people, belief in 
God came to symbolize the difference between democracy and totalitarianism."); 
DlERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 64-65 ("For many Americans, the best defense against Soviet 
aggression was not political, economic, or even military mobilization, but open expression of 
religious conviction."). For a vivid example of how Cold War religiosity drove foreign poli-
cy decisions, at times with disastrous results, see SETH JACOBS, AMERICA'S MIRACLE MAN IN 
VIETNAM: NGO DINH DIEM, RELIGION, RACE, AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 
1950-1957 (2004). 
107. Bach, supra note 80, at 74; see also SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION lN MODERN AMERICA 54 (2010) ("By 
the 1950s, the 'American Way' was anchored firmly to the three great religious groups in 
America."). 
108. See Act ofJuly 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 
36 U.S.C. § 302 (2013)). 
109. See Act of Apr. 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-324, 66 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 
36 u.s.c. § 119). 
11 O. See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 234 (codified as amended at 
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2013)). President Eisenhower signed the bill on June 14, 1954--Flag Day. 
GORDON, supra note 107, at 47. 
J 11. See Smith, supra note 26, at 951. The National Prayer Breakfast "has taken place 
since 1953 and every U.S. president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has participated in the 
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was conducted in new, previously secular areas of the country. 113 Religious 
books became best sellers-including l 952's Revised Standard Version of the 
Bible 114-and "Dial-a-Prayer" became so popular that telephone companies 
had to add extra lines. 115 In 1954, Ideal Toy Company announced a new prod-
uct in response to "the resurgence of religious feeling and practice in America 
today": a doll with jointed knees so it could pray. 116 In the mid-l 950s, a whop-
ping ninety-six percent of Americans professed to have faith in God, rendering 
religion not just a belief but a national phenomenon as well. 117 
Given the surge in Cold War religiosity, it is hard to imagine the Supreme 
Court invalidating school prayer in the 1950s, or any other religious practice 
for that matter-and it didn't. From 1953 to 1961, the Court did not decide a 
single First Amendment case in the area of religion. 118 Indeed, the Justices 
passed by o~portunities to strike down school religious observances in 1952 
and 1954, 11 when doing so would have taken real judicial courage. Prior to 
Engel, the Court's last word on religion in school was 1952's Zorach v. 
Clauson, which upheld early-release programs for off-site religious study. 120 
Ironically, it was Justice Douglas, a staunch supporter of the separation of 
church and state, who penned the opinion's famous line, "We are a religious 
breakfast." Macon Phillips, "This Is My Hape. This Is My Prayer.," WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Feb. 5, 2009, 12:08 PM EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/this_is_my_prayer. 
112. Mighty Wave over the US., LIFE, Dec. 26, 1955, at 46, 46-4 7 ("Nearly I 00 million 
Americans-three of every five-belong[] to some Christian church."); Task far the 
Churches, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1959, at 65, 65 (noting that church attendance in 1958 was at 
an "all-time high" of "50.5 million adults in an average week"); Jonah B. Wise, Survey of a 
Half Century of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1954, § 6 (Magazine), at 17 (comparing the 
percentage of the population having membership in religious institutions over the first sever· 
al decades of the twentieth century and noting the midcentury spike). 
113. See SoRAUF, supra note 105, at 14. 
114. See Eugene Carson Blake, Is the Religious Boom a Spiritual Bust?, LoOK, Sept. 
20, 1955, at 27, 29 ("More than one million copies of the Revised Standard Version of the 
Bible were sold in its first three months of publication."); see also SORAUF, supra note 105, 
at 13 (noting that four of 1953's top ten sellers were religious books and that seven religious 
leaders graced the cover of Time magazine between 1951 and 1954). 
115. See Dial a Prayer, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1955, at 23, 23. 
116. Words & Works, TlME, Sept. 20, 1954, at 65, 65 (internal quotation marks omit· 
ted). 
117. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 65 (discussing the results of a 195 7 Gallup poll 
and its breakdown offonnal religious affiliations between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews); 
Blake, supra note 114, at 29 ("'I've got religion' has become a national phenomenon."). 
118. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 39. 
119. See Gideons Int'! v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816 (1954), denying cert. to Tudor v. Bd. of 
Educ., 100 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1953); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1952) 
(dismissing appeal for lack of standing because by the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the plaintiff's child had graduated, leaving only taxpayer status as a basis for stand-
ing, which the Court held was insufficient). 
120. 343 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1952). 
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people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 121 In the early to mid· 
1950s, that was aii one needed to say. 
But the world was a different place by 1962. The Cold War continued with 
the Berlin crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and, after Engel, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, 122 but by the late 1950s, McCarthyism was dead (as was McCarthy 
himself) 123 and religiosity had peaked. Contemporary commentators pegged 
1958 as the year that Cold War religiosity began to wane, 124 and the difference 
was palpable. In 1955, Newsweek had reported on the resurgence of religiosity 
in America, noting that "[a]n attack on religion is regarded by most Americans 
as an attack on the basic values by which the nation lives." 125 In 1959, the 
same magazine reported on the reemergence of religious criticism in America, 
noting that "[r]eligion always grows fat and vulgar and obscene when its 
strength is unquestioned." 126 By 1962, commentators were questioning wheth-
er there had been a religious revival at all, surmising that religion had just been 
a proxy for anti·Communist sentiment. 127 Whatever it was, it was on the de-
cline by the late 1950s, giving the Justices what they needed most to take an· 
other First Amendment religion case--room. 
D. For the Justices, a Relatively Easy Case 
For engendering so much controversy, Engel was remarkably uncontrover-
sial among the Justices who decided it. The Supreme Court was down two 
members at the time-Justice Frankfurter had collapsed just days after oral ar-
guments in the case, and Justice White, who had been nominated to fill Justice 
121. Id. at 313. The irony did not go unnoticed. See id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
("Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial 
processes than to students of constitutional law."). For Justice Douglas's expression of his 
staunchly separatist views in Engel, see notes 227-29 and accompanying text below. 
122. See generally MARTIN WALKER, THE COLD WAR: A HISTORY (1993). The Cuban 
Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962. See id at 171. Engel was decided in June. 
123. The Senate censured McCarthy in December 1954. See McCARTHYISM: THE 
GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE 178, 179-80 (Albert Fried ed., 1997) (discussing McCarthy's 
censure in 1954 and death in 1957). 
124. See Task for the Churches, supra note 112, at 65 (describing 1958 as "the year 
when 'the "revival of religion" had begun to wane"' (quoting Editorial, The Year the Revival 
Passed Crest, 75 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1499, 1499 (1958))). 
125. Americans and Religion: State of the New Revival as Billy Graham, Niebuhr, and 
laFarge See It, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 1955, at 44, 44. 
126. See Task/or the Churches, supra note 112, at 65 (quoting Editorial, supra note 
124, at 1500). 
127. See, e.g., Editorial, Keeping the Pews Filled, 192 NATION 491, 491 (1961) ("There 
has not been a religious or spiritual revival; more people have attended church merely be-
cause it was the correct thing to do, showed one's opposition to atheistic communism, and 
gave one a certain social status."). 
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Whittaker's open seat, had not yet been confirmed. 128 But the Court in Engel 
had little trouble deciding the case without them. The Justices voted to strike 
down the prayer 6 to 1, and even Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter, was initial-
ly undecided. 129 Conservative Justices Harlan and Clark both voted with the 
majority in Engel, and Justice Frankfurter, who led the conservative bloc, had 
stated his intention to vote that way as well. 130 With even the conservatives in 
agreement, the Justices did not need a full bench to strike down school prayer. 
As far as Supreme Court controversies went, Engel was a relatively easy case. 
Granted, the vote in Engel could have disguised a much more difficult 
decisionmaking process, but notes from the Supreme Court's conference dis-
cussions indicate that this was not the case. Engel required little discussion in 
conference, which began with Chief Justice Warren noting that the state had 
"practically conceded" a violation of the Establishment Clause. 131 No one was 
denying that the Regents' Prayer was a religious exercise-it was prayer, after 
all-and no one was denying that the state wrote it. 132 School officials were 
telling children what to prar, where, and when; even the name of the prayer 
bore the mark of the state. 13 The Court's prior Establishment Clause decisions 
had not been a model of clarity, 134 but they did not need to be to decide Engel. 
Whatever else the Establishment Clause prohibited, it at least prohibited the 
state from drafting a prayer and asking schoolchildren to pray it. 
128. See SAM DUKER, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELIGION: THE LEGAL CONTEXT 158 
(1966); see also Gow, supra note 48, at 81 ("On April 5, two days after the arguments had 
been heard, Frankfurter collapsed at his desk and was rushed to the hospital. After a lengthy 
leave of absence, ... [he] resigned from the Court in August of that year."). 
129. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note I 6, at 424 (noting that all the Jus-
tices in conference voted to reverse except for Justice Stewart, who stated, "I am still in 
doubt, and am not at rest"). 
130. See id 
131. Id (quoting Chief Justice Warren in conference). 
132. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) ("The nature of such a prayer has 
always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this ... . ");Engel v Vitale, supra 
note 93, at 4 ("Once having decided to hear Engel v Vitale it is difficult to see how the Court 
could have reached a substantially different decision. The case posed the clear-cut issue of a 
prayer drafted by a state government and prescribed by certain local bodies."). 
133. See DTERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 91 (quoting one of the plaintiffs in Engel as 
saying, "My basic feeling was that if the state could tell us what to pray and when to pray 
and how to pray, that there was no stopping"). 
134. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-12, 315 (1952) (upholding an carly-
release program for off-site religious study); Illinois ex rel. McCotlum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 
U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948) (invalidating an early-release program for religious instruction on 
school grounds); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947) (endorsing strong sepa-
ration of church and state while upholding public funding of bus transportation to parochial 
schools); see also WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA'S FOUNDATION IN 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 196-200 (2003) (discussing the incoherence that marked the Supreme 
Court's three Establishment Clause cases prior to Engel and likening Justice Douglas's posi-
tion in particular to "the homeward journey of a New Year's Eve reveler"). 
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This is not to say there were no arguments the other way. The state had ar-
gued that children could be excused from the prayer-and they could, more or 
less 135 -but the Justices found the claim inapposite. The problem in Engel was 
that the state had written the prayer, and excusing those who objected did noth-
ing to change that fact. 136 Similarly, the Justices rejected the claim that invali-
dating the Regents' Prayer would deny the free exercise rights of those who 
wanted to pray. 137 If students wanted to pray, they could pray, the Justices 
maintained. What the Establishment Clause forbid was using the arm of the 
state to help. 138 
If any aspect of Engel was difficult, it was the implications of the case. 
God's name was on the nation's coins and paper money, in the Pledge of Alle-
giance, and at the start of new sessions in court-including the U.S. SuEreme 
Court. 139 Justice Douglas struggled with these line-drawing difficulties, 40 but 
among the Justices in the majority, he appears to have been the only one. It was 
one thing to "speak of God with reverence," Chief Justice Warren reasoned in 
conference, and quite another to recite a state-composed prayer in school. 141 At 
135. See Brief for Petitioners at 23-24, 31-32, Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (No. 468), 1962 WL 
115797 (arguing that because the prayer was only twenty-two words long, nonparticipating 
students usually stayed in the classroom; indeed, the prayer was about over by the time those 
who wanted to leave reached the door); Anthony Lewis, The Prayer Decision, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 1962, at 17 ("[S]tudents could be excused from participating only at the risk of la-
beling themselves nonconfonnists-'pariahs,' as the complaining parents put it."); see also 
Editorial, Religious Neutrality, WASH. POST, June 18, 1963, at Al6 (noting in the wake of 
Schempp that "even though individual children may be excused from the observance if they 
are willing to undergo the embarrassment of such nonconformity, the practice entails an in-
escapable element of coercion"). 
136. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. Excusal mattered in the free speech context, see W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943), but Engel was not a case 
about free speech-it was about state-sponsored religion. See Oral Argument, supra note 21, 
at 42: 17 (distinguishing Barnette during oral arguments in Engel). 
137. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-34 ("It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in 
such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment ofrcligious services in pub-
lic schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, 
could be more wrong."). 
138. See id.; see also Sch. Dist of Abington T\.VJJ. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 
(1963) ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the 
rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery 
of the State to practice its beliefs."). 
139. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 446, 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
140. See Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo L. Black 
(June 11, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("If, however, we would strike 
down a New York requirement that public school teachers open each day with prayer, I think 
we could not consistently open each of our sessions with prayer. That's the kernel of my 
problem."). All sources in this Article cited to the Hugo Lafayette Black Papers or the Earl 
Warren Papers are on file with the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. 
141. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 424 (quoting Chief Justice 
Warren in conference as saying, "The fact that we speak of God with reverence does not 
mean that we can take the prayer into the school"); see also ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A 
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some point, there would be hard cases, but neither patriotic references to God 
on the one hand, nor state-composed school prayer on the other, were among 
them. 
The ease with which the Justices decided the case came through in the En-
gel opinion. "There can be no doubt;' key passages befan, with the words "of 
course" sprinkled here and there for good measure. 14 To the Justices in the 
majority, Engel was self-evident, a matter of constitutional common sense. 
That is why, as the Court would later explain, its opinion in Engel did not cite a 
single case. 143 
But the fact that the Justices saw Engel as a relatively easy case under the 
law does not mean that the law was all, or even most, of what was driving it. 
Shortly before Engel was announced, Justice Black gave a candid account of 
his jurisprudential views in what the press called "one of the most remarkable 
interviews in judicial history." 144 As to the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause, Justice Black said this: 
I have to be honest about it. I confess not only that I think the Amendment 
means what it says but also that I may be slightly influenced by the fact that I 
do not think Congress should make any law with respect to these subjects . 
. . . [B]eing a rather backward country fellow, I understand it to mean what 
the words say. 145 
Justice Black's wife later recounted that separation of church and state was an 
issue her husband "felt deeply and passionately about" 146-an ideological 
commitment he forged largely from growing up in rural Alabama and experi-
BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 387 (1997) ("1n Warren's mind, it was one thing to invoke 
God's benevolence, and another to compel that prayer."). 
142. See, e.g., 370 U.S. at 424 ("There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's 
program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' 
prayer is a religious activity."); id. at 430 ("There can be no doubt that New York's state 
prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' pray· 
er."); id at 433-34 (addressing the claim that striking down the Regents' Prayer would signal 
hostility toward religion with the answer that "[n]othing, of course, could be more wrong"); 
id at 435 n.21 ("There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent 
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our 
country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration oflndcpendence which con· 
tain references to the Deity .... "). 
143. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220-21 (noting that the principles underlying Engel 
"were so universally recognized that the Court, without the citation ofa single case," issued 
its ruling). 
144. James E. Clayton, Black Answers Critics of 1st Amendment View, L.A. TIMES, 
June 25, 1962, at 16. 
145. Interview by Edmond Cahn with Justice Hugo L. Black in N.Y., N.Y. (Apr. 14, 
1962), in Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 549, 553-54 (1962). 
146. HUGO L BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEM-
OIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 95 (1986). 
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encing firsthand the awesome power of the church in Southern society. 147 
"Prayer ought to be a private thing," Justice Black told his son. 148 It was, to 
borrow from the opinion in the case, "too personal, too sacred, too holy" for the 
state to draft and ask others to recite. 149 
Whether the rest of the Justices in Engel-most of whom were reli-
gious, 150 and some of whom were anti-Catholic 151-were also moved by their 
individual views of proper church-state relations (at least at a conscious level) 
is hard to say. We do know from an early draft of the Engel opinion that the 
Justices in the majority were thinking about school prayer in practical, as well 
as legal, terms. Even seemingly all-inclusive prayers were impossibly problem-
atic, the draft stated, explaining: 
This case itself shows beyond doubt that New York has not succeeded and 
cannot succeed in writing an official prayer satisfactory to everybody in the 
State. Non-believers in the State, as one of the petitioners here is shown to be, 
certainly cannot conscientiously participate in the prayer. And many devoutly 
religious people, as other of these petitioners are shown to be, are deeply of-
fended by the practice of publicly reciting a memorized state prayer under the 
circumstances prevailing in a public school classroom even though they 
strongly believe that everything stated in the prayer is true. 152 
The state would never please everyone, the Justices had come to conclude; the 
best it could do was to get out of the business of trying. 
The same view permeated the cultural backdrop against which Engel was 
decided. Writing in 1963, Newsweek reported that when the Supreme Court de-
cided Engel, "[t]wo points were widely agreed upon: (1) fostering religion in 
the young is properly the job of church and home and (2) religious observances 
which are perfunctory or so watered down as to be offensive to no one are a 
waste of time for everyone." 153 Perhaps Newsweek was wrong in that regard, 
147. Barbara A. Peny, Justice Hugo Black and the "Wall of Separation Between 
Church and State," 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 55, 56-59 (1989) (discussing Justice Black's reli-
gious background and the role it played in shaping his attitudes about religion); see also 
DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that Justice Black "never forgot how harmful and 
humiliating religion could be, especially when a local congregation publicly expelled his fa-
ther and two uncles for imbibing alcohol"). 
148. HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 176 (1975). 
149. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962). 
150. See EARL w ARR EN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 316 (1977} ("The majority of 
us on the Court were religious people, yet we found it unconstitutional that any state agency 
should impose a religious exercise on persons who were by law free to practice religion or 
not without state interference."). 
151. See Berg, supra note 65, at 129 (discussing the anti-Catholic views of Justices 
Black and Douglas). 
152. Hugo L. Black, Draft Opinion at 4-5, Engel v. Vitale, No. 468 (June 25, 1962) 
(Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 354); see also Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Ar-
thur J. Freund (Aug. 10, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358} ("This experience 
illustrates the simple truth that it is impossible to find a single prayer that will give full satis-
faction to several conflicting religious groups."). 
153. Church and State, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1963, at48, 48. 
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but there is reason to think not. Critics lamented Engel as the product of a 
"broad public consensus" that religion was a private matter, 154 and chastised 
the Supreme Court for forcing by judicial fiat what the country was already in 
the process of doing on its own. 155 Even the Board of Regents had issued a 
statement when it adopted the Regents' Prayer that read, "Formal religion is not 
to be injected into the public school. It is a matter for the church and the home, 
for the religious leaders and the parents of each child."156 The principle of pub-
lic secularism had gained widespread acceptance by 1962; it is hard to imagine 
the Justices not being impacted by those views. 
That leaves one final, but critically important, point about where the Justic-
es were coming from in Engel-their utter unawareness of just how unpopular 
the ruling would be. By all accounts, the Justices were surprised by the hostile 
reaction to Engel. 157 Indeed, they found it difficult to fathom how the public 
could disagree. In a letter to his niece just days after Engel, Justice Black wrote: 
The basic premise of the First Amendment is that people must be left to 
say their prayers in their own way, and to their own God, without express or 
explicit coercion from any political office holder. There are not many people 
with religion and intelligence who will think this constitutional principle 
wrong on mature second thought 158 
154. School Prayer Ban Scored at Red Mass, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1962, at 36 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting a Jesuit priest). Not surprisingly, this view was widely 
shared by supporters of the decision as well. See Editorial, In Behalf of Religion, WASH. 
POST, June 26, 1962, at A12 ("But religious faith is best inculcated in the home or in places 
consecrated to religion."); Editorial, supra note 22. 
155. See Editorial, Unrealistic and Unwise, CATH. STAR HERALD, June 21, 1963, at 6 
(Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("[R]eligious practices have been eliminated more 
and more over the years. The evidence has been clear that the 'trickling stream' was drying 
up rather than building up into a potential torrent. Justices should judge with an eye on the 
times as well as on the lawbooks."). 
156. Brief of lntervenors-Respondents, supra note 21, at 5 (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
157. See CRAY, supra note 141, at 387 ("Certainly the brethren were unprepared for the 
public outcry that the School Prayer Case provoked."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: 
EARL WARREN AND Hts SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 442 (1983) ("Even after 
all the abuse they had taken during the past decade, Warren and the Justices were both sur-
prised and pained by the reaction to their decision."); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Public Mood 
Plays Big Role in Court Rulings, N. Y. TIMES, June 23, 1963, § 4, at 4 ("When the prayer 
case came along last June few observers expected it to touch a raw nerve in the American 
politic. The Justices themselves treated it briefly with little of the aura that tends to surround 
a 'great case."'); see also infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text (discussing comments 
by several Justices that Engel had been grossly misunderstood). 
158. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK; A BIOGRAPHY 523-24 (1994) (reproducing in 
part a letter to Hazel Davis). The same sentiment was shared by several school-age boys, 
whose history teacher wrote to Justice Black to share that "[iJn our class discussion [the stu-
dents] stated over and over again that they could not understand why something so self-
evident needed to have the Supreme Court hand down a decision." Letter from Gordon Reid 
to Justice Hugo L. Black (Nov. 21, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354). 
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Justice Black expressed the same sentiment (albeit in a slightly more acerbic 
tone) when responding to hate mail on Engel. In letter after letter, he sent a curt 
response like this one: 
Your letter indicates to me that you have probably not read [the Engel] opin-
ion and for that reason I am sending a copy of it to you. After you have read it, 
I would appreciate your writing me what is said in that opinion, if anything, 
. h h" h d" 159 wit w 1c you 18agree. 
Nowhere in the conference notes is there any indication that the Justices in En-
gel anticipated the possibility of negative public reaction to their ruling, as was 
the case in Brown v. Board of Education before it, 160 or Schempp the following 
year. 161 To the contrary, one almost gets the sense that the Justices thought 
they would be applauded for the decision, as had been the case when they pro-
tected the free speech rights of religious dissenters in 1943. 162 Engel's confi-
159. Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to A.E. Shafer (June 4, 1964) (Hugo LaFayette 
Black Papers, Box 354); see also Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Macy Blanton (July 
3, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 357) ("In order that you may see for yourself 
what the Supreme Court decided and what it did not decide, lam sending you [a] copy of the 
opinion."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Mrs. James Burson (Mar. 20, 1963) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("I would suggest that you might get a new insight into 
the problem about which you wrote me by reading the Court's opinion in that case, a copy of 
which you will find enclosed. After you have read the full opinion of the Court and the notes 
I would be glad to have you write me stating with which particular part of the opinion you 
disagree."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to John W. Davis (Sept. 10, 1963) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("After you have taken time out of your own busy sched-
- ulc to read these opinions, I shall be very happy to hear from you again."); Letter from Jus-
tice Hugo L. Black to Cornelia 0. Edington (July 26, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, 
Box 354) ("I believe that if you will read the Court's opinion I am sending you in the Re-
gents' case ... you, like many others who have expressed themselves about the latest opin-
ion, will understand it much better than you have up to this time."); Letter from Justice Hugo 
L. Black to R.L. Flowers (May l 8, 1964) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Since 
your letter seems to be based in part upon what you think that case decided, I would like to 
suggest that you read it."); Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Jane Wasson & Faye Jerni-
gan (July 17, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("In your letter you referred to 
the decision as one in which the Court declared 'the use of prayers in public schools uncon-
stitutional.' In order that you may understand what the Court did. hold, I am sending you a 
copy of the opinion and would like to request that both of you read every word in it, includ-
ing the footnotes."). 
160. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 648 (reproducing confer-
ence notes in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 482 (1954), including discussion of 
possible violence following a ruling holding segregation unlawful). 
161. See id. at 426 (reproducing conference notes in School District of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 3 74 U.S. 203 ( 1963 ), including discussion of the need for the public to be 
reassured). 
162. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629, 642 (1943) (invali-
dating a compulsory flag salute in a challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses); GORDON, supra note 
107, at 46 ("Barnette was greeted with widespread praise."); see a/so Philip B. Kurland, The 
Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, SignifYing . .. , " 1962 SUP. Cr. REV. l, 33 
("It is hard to believe that many who now find this notion [that religion should not be in 
school] unpalatable will not soon, or eventually, be applauding it.")-
506 STANFORD LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 67:479 
dent tone. The sense that there was no need to cite precedent. Even Justice 
Black's comment from the bench while delivering Engel-"[T]he right of the 
people to pray in their own way is not to be controlled by the election re-
tums"-bore an uncanny resemblance to West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette's famous line. 163 
How the South would have figured into the Justices' expectations is hard to 
say. One would think that the Justices would have known that a region referred 
to as the Bible Belt would not take kindly to their decision, particularly in the 
wake of Brown. 164 And maybe that was true, but the Justices figured they had 
enough support elsewhere, or just didn't respect the South enough at that time 
to care. 165 
Yet it is also possible that the Justices did not think the South had a dog in 
the fight. The petitioners had pointed out that the Regents' Prayer was sui gene-
ris; there was not another state-composed prayer in the country. 166 And the Jus-
tices knew that the pious hated the Regents' Prayer as much as religious dis-
senters did. 167 In the end, the Justices may have viewed the South as 
inapposite. The Regents' Prayer was progressive, and progressive prayer was 
not what the South was about. 
Either way, this much was true: Engel was for the Justices a relatively easy 
case. From the facts, to the law, to the practical considerations and cultural 
cues-all of the Justices' data points were pointing the same way. And that tells 
us something else too. Regardless of what they thought about the South, the 
Justices were utterly unprepared for what happened next. 
163. Compare Lewis, supra note 23 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Justice 
Black's comments from the bench while announcing the Engel opinion), with Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 638 ("[F)undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the out-
come of no elections."). 
164. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that 89% of school districts in 
the South practiced religious observances). 
165. See POWE, supra note 14, at 204-05 ("[T)he Court could more than balance any 
opposition to its actions [in Enge!J by active support of the most prominent politician in the 
United States-John Kennedy."); cf Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term-
Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of 
the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (1964) ("The Court has been most fortunate in 
the enemies that it has made, for it is difficult not to help to resist attack from racists, from 
the John Birch Society and its ilk, and from religious zealots who insist that the Court adhere 
to the truth as they know it."). 
166. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 135, at 15 ("Petitioners do not believe that 
there is any prayer in use in the public schools of any State in this country which, like the 
prayer involved in this case, has been composed by State officials for use in such schools. In 
1955, a prayer virtually identical with the Regents' Prayer was presented to the Honorable 
Edmund G. Brown, now the Governor but then the Attorney General of Califor-
nia .... Governor Brown ruled that the prayer presented to him was a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment .... "). 
167. See supra notes 97, 152 and accompanying text. 
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IL WHAT HAPPENED NEXT 
Why, if Engel was so right, did it strike the country as so wrong? In this 
Part, I offer an answer to that question. First, I discuss the nation's reaction to 
Engel. Then I turn to the role of the media in tanking the decision, and the role 
of the religious establishment in saving it. I end with a discussion of School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the 1963 decision that struck down 
Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools. 168 
A. "When We Won the Case, All Hell Broke Loose" 
For the families who filed suit in Engel, the Supreme Court's ruling was a 
brief moment of elation, 169 followed by a living nightmare. 170 For the Supreme 
Court, it was only the nightmare-a "veritable avalanche" of fury and hate.171 
Contemporary commentators described the public's reaction to Engel as an 
"explosion of shock and resentment,"172 a "thunderclap of outrage."173 The 
count~ had not seen the decision coming, and the scale of the jo1t was enor· 
mous. 74 In terms of sheer volume, the vitriolic attacks on Engel (and the Su· 
preme Court for deciding it) were unlike anything the nation had ever seen. 175 
The first seventy.two hours after Engel were especially intense. Writing for 
the New York Times, Anthony Lewis reported that "[f]or several days all the 
serious business of the Congress of the United States was put aside while 
168. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
169. Plaintiff Lawrence Roth's response when told the Supreme Court had ruled his 
way in Engel was "Thank God." SHANE MOUNTJOY, ENGEL v. VITALE: SCHOOL PRAYER AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 104 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
170. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 138 (discussing harassment of the plaintiffs af-
ter Engel, which included "a deluge of 'chilling' hate mail, snubs from erstwhile friends, and 
telephone threats of job dismissal, arson, and kidnapping"). One plaintiff responded, "I have 
a feeling of sadness because these are so-called godly people .... If their God teaches them 
to wish my kids get polio and my house be bombed, then I think He hasn't done a very good 
job with them." The Court Decision--and the Schoo/ Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 44 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
171. JULIA C. LOREN, ENGEL V. VITALE: PRAYER TN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 60 (2001). 
172. Public Fears Diminish that Prayer Will Have Wide Impact, WALL Sr. J., July 6, 
1962, at I. 
173. The Court Decision--and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 43. 
174. In part this was because of the longstanding view that nonsectarian prayers did not 
raise Establishment Clause concerns, and in part it was because the country had just spent 
the last decade embracing its religious heritage. See GORDON, supra note 107, at 86-87 (dis· 
cussing both and observing that "[h]owever predictable the holdings may seem decades later, 
they fell like a meteor into American society"); see also Kurland, supra note 162, at 17 (not-
ing "the wide-eyed surprise with which [Engel v.] Vitale was greeted by its detractors"). For 
an excellent discussion of the radical political and religious realignment that occurred when 
Protestant organizations that had been championing the separation of church and state in or-
der to curb Catholic power learned, much to their surprise, that the same arguments applied 
to them, see GORDON, supra note 107, at 84-95. 
175. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
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members spent their time denouncing the Supreme Court." 176 Members of 
Congress called Engel "the most tragic [decision] in the history of the United 
States," 177 an "outrageous edict which has numbed the conscience and shocked 
the highest sensibilities of the nation."178 Engel was "the most serious blow 
that has ever been struck at the Constitution," one congressman claimed, a 
"bold, malicious, atheistic and sacrilegious twist."179 Two former Presidents-
Hoover and Eisenhower-immediately denounced the decision, with Hoover 
urging representatives to "at once submit an amendment to the Constitution" 
(which they did). 180 Meanwhile, newspapers drowning in letters from angry 
readers erupted in editorial hate. 181 
The reasons varied. Many hated Engel for "'secularizing' national life," 
single-handedly destroying America's identity as a Godly nation. 182 "Court 
Outlaws God," headlines blasted, 183 while congressmen declared, "[T]he Su-
preme Court has held that God is unconstitutional," 184 and accused the Justices 
of a "deliberate design to subordinate the American people ... to a godless 
176. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., Court Again Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 1962, § 4, 
at 10. 
177. Anthony Lewis, Both Houses Get Bills to Lift Ban on School Prayer, N .Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 1962, at I (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative Frank J. 
Becker of N cw York). 
178. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Senator Hennan E. Talmadge of 
Georgia). 
179. 108 CONG. REC. 11,732 (1962) (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South 
Carolina). 
180. See Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting former Presi-
dents Hoover and Eisenhower); "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("Two for-
mer U.S. Presidents took issue with the court."); see also infra notes 209, 274-87 and ac-
companying text (discussing proposed amendments to overturn Engel). 
181. "To Stand as a Guarantee," .rnpra note 97, al 7. 
182. Alan F. Westin, Also on the Bench: 'Dominant Opinion,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
1962, § 6 (Magazine), at 30; see also The Court Decision~and the School Prayer Furor, 
supra note 16, at 43 ("[N]othingjolts many Americans more strongly than a challenge to the 
religious feelings which are still bound up with their sense of national identity."); Opinion of 
the Week: Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting Cardinal Spellman as stating that "[t]he 
decision strikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for 
so long been raised"). 
183. See WARREN, supra note 151, at 315-16 ("I vividly remember one bold newspaper 
headline saying, 'Court outlaws God.'"); see also LEVY, supra note 30, at 185 ("Newspaper 
headlines screamed that the Court had outlawed God from the public schools .... "). For a 
discussion of media coverage on Engel, see Part ILB below. 
184. Lewis, supra note 176 (quoting Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina); see also 
Lewis, supra note 177 (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina as stat-
ing that the Supreme Court had "officially stated its disbelief in God Almighty" (internal 
quotation mark omitted)); Editorial, Prayer and Hysteria, 195 NATION 2, 2 (1962) (quoting a 
New York Daily Mirror article accusing the Supreme Court of"an attempt to expel God from 
American life" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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state." 185 In ruling against God in the classroom, the Supreme Court had ruled 
against God, "bringing untold glee to the capitals of the godless communistic 
world." 186 Engel was the beginning of the end, "America's downfall." 187 And 
the nation was not going down without a fight. 
Others hated Engel for being patently undemocratic. "No longer does the 
majority rule in our nation," 188 one letter to the editor claimed, while an edito-
rial lamented "a tyranny of the weak over the strong." 189 Letters from citizens 
exclaimed, "The views of the majority need to be protected too!" 190 In favoring 
"some fancied rights of a minority of citizens," 191 the Supreme Court had 
turned the core precept of democratic governance on its head, subjecting major-
ity will to minority rule. 
Still others hated Engel for what it wasn 't-a prayer worth getting worked 
up about. "[T]t is possible that the Court has given life to quiescent forces which 
will do more damage to our free institutions than the prayer ever did," 192 one 
commentator wrote. Others, too, pointed to the innocuous nature of the Re-
gents' Prayer, criticizing the Court for "grinding such small grist" and "ab-
sorb[ing] time and attention that should be devoted to the correction of evils 
that afflict far more people far more grievously than a few minutes' lip-service 
185. DtE.RENFI£LD, supra note 14, at 147 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 
Governor George Wallace of Alabama); see also 108 CoNG. REc. 11,734 (1962) (quoting 
Congressman John Williams of Mississippi as stating that Engel was "a deliberate and care-
fully planned conspiracy to substitute materialism for spiritual values, and thus to commu-
nize America"). 
186. Editorial, supra note 184, at 2 (quoting Representative John Bell Williams of Mis-
sissippi); see afso Lewis, supra note 176 (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South 
Carolina as stating, "I know of nothing in my lifetime ... that could give more aid and com-
fort to Moscow" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
187. OJERENFIELD, supra note 14, at l (paraphrasing a statement by David Barton, a 
Texas Republican). 
188. Letter to the Editor, COM. APPEAL (Memphis) (n.d.) (Hugo Lafayette Black Pa-
pers, Box 361 ). 
189. See Gerald W. Johnson, Anise and Cummin, NEW REPUBLIC, July 9, 1962, at 8, 8; 
see also A Loss ro Make Up for, TIME, June 28, 1963, at 13, 14 (quoting Billy Graham as 
stating, "I don't believe that a small minority should rule the majority of the people"). 
190. Letter from Dorothy Sowers to Justice Hugo L. Black (Mar. I, 1963) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 356) (emphasis omitted); see also Letter from Cornelia 0. 
Edington to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Is it the 
opinion of the court that minority groups should rule the majority, if so please tell me why 
this should be so?"); Letter from Anna Thurman Finch to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 2, 
1963) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 356) {"The real issue is simple and fundamental. 
Which shall prevail in the land-the wishes of the majority or the desire ofa minority?"). 
191. 108 CONG. REC. 12,227 (1962) (quoting Representative William Raleigh Hull, Jr., 
of Missouri). 
192. Engel v Virale, supra note 93, at 5; see also Editorial, supra note 22 ("In part the 
shock may be explained by the innocuous nature of the prayer."). 
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given to anything." 193 Maybe the Court was right about a state-drafted prayer, 
critics conceded, but the stakes were so small that it was "a stupid decision, a 
doctrinaire decision" 194-the "Ultimate in Asininity." 195 
And still others hated Engel just for the occasion it presented to hate, for all 
that had come before it. Engel was the decision that Southerners in particu1ar 
loved to hate, 196 a "heaven-sent opportunity" to defend God Almighty while 
simu1taneously attacking the Supreme Court. 197 "They put the Negroes in the 
schools, and now they've driven God out," went one oft-quoted refrain. 198 And 
aside from the fact that "Negroes" weren't actually in those schools yet, 199 the 
statement summed up the South's position perfectly. 200 
193. Johnson, supra note 189, at 8; see also Pollak, supra note 98, at 63 (faulting the 
Supreme Court for not "sav[ing] its scarce ammunition for a prayer that soared," spending it 
instead on New York's "clay-footed pigeon"). 
194. Alexander Burnham, Court's Decision Stirs Conflicts, N.Y. TlMES, June 27, 1962, 
at 1 (internal quotation mark omitted) (reproducing a forthcoming editorial in the Pilot, the 
oldest Catholic paper in the United States). 
195. An Ultimate in Asininity, ENQUIRER (Cincinnati), June 28, 1962, at 6. 
196. Interestingly, a 1964 empirical study explored a number of variables thought to in· 
fluence attitudes regarding the Supreme Court's school prayer and Bible reading decisions, 
including church attendance, religious affiliation, age, sex, education level, urban/rural 
commWiity, and geographic region in the United States. It concluded, "The most significant 
result of the multiple regression analysis is the confirmation it gives to the influence of re-
gion, or more particularly to distinctiveness of the South." Way, supra note 90, at 193-203. 
For an explanation of Southern exceptionalism on the issue of school prayer and how that 
has translated to persistent noncompliance with the Court's edicts on religious observances 
in school, see note 223 and accompanying text below. 
197. Dierenfield, supra note 18, at 219. 
198. Uproar over School Prayer-and the Aftermath, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 
9, 1962, at 42, 44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Representative George W. 
Andrews of Alabama); see Editorial, supra note 184, at 2 (paraphrasing same); see also 
Lewis, supra note I 76 (quoting Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina as stating, "I should 
like to ask whether we would be far wrong in saying that in this decision the Supreme Court 
bas held that God is unconstitutional and for that reason the public schools must be segregat-
ed against Him?" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
199. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 671 ("In l 964, ten years af-
ter Brown, only 1.2 percent of southern black children went to school with white children." 
(italics omitted)). 
200. See Kenneth Crawford, The Prayer Debate, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1962, at 28, 28 
("Some senators and representatives from the Deep South, who are still gunning for the 
Court because of its school-desegregation ruling, found the school-prayer decision too good 
an opportunity to resist."); Lewis, supra note 177 ("Southern members of Congress were 
among the most prominent critics. Some punctuated their denunciations with references to 
the racial segregation of schools."); Lewis, supra note 176 ("There were, first, those who 
were delighted to find any excuse to assault the Supreme Court. This was the particular reac-
tion of Southerners, who did their best to suggest that the prayer ruling only showed how 
equally wrong the court had been to outlaw segregation in public schools."). 
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That said, it wasn't just the Supreme Court's race-relations rulings that 
drove the furor over Engel. It was obscenity_ 201 It was Red Monday. 202 It was 
reapportionment. 203 It was search and seizure. 204 The hysteria that followed 
Engel was a "caldron of criticism,"205 and as one commentator put the point, 
"[t]he criticism became clamor" and "[t]he clamor became frenzy."206 Engel 
gave rise to a virtual feeding frenzy on the Supreme Court, a "national emo-
tional binge"207 of fury and hate. 
With reaction to Engel so strong, action was sure to follow. Legislators 
claimed something had to be done "to calm the power grab of these power-
drunken men"208 and proposed a number of Court-curbing measures. Dominant 
in the discussion were proposals to amend the Constitution to overturn Engel. 
More than fifty such proposals were submitted within the first three days of the 
decision, and by the time congressional hearings were held in 1964, nearly 150 
proposed constitutional amendments had been submitted. 209 Legislators also 
201- See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (narrowing the definition of 
obscenity while recognizing constitutional protection for nonobscene expression of sexual 
ideas); DIERENF!ELD, supra note 14, at 151 (quoting one critic as saying, "The Court blesses 
these rags peddling their photographs of nude male models, but makes a prayer to God a vio-
lation of the Constitution!" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Uproar over School Pray-
er-and the Aftermath, supra note 198, at 44 (quoting Representative August E. Johansen of 
Michigan as saying, "The upshot [of the Court's decisions] seems to be: Obscenity, yes; 
prayer, no" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
202. Known as Red Monday, the Supreme Court issued four rulings on June 17, 1957, 
that struck down various anti-Communist measures. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 
365-68, 382 (1957) (invalidating the discharge of a foreign service officer in violation of 
State Department regulations); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (interpret-
ing the Smith Act as not prohibiting speech advocating the overthrow of the government in 
the abstract); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957) (recognizing a claim 
to academic freedom by a socialist college professor); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178, 215-16 (1957) (recognizing limits of congressional investigatory power); see also Wes-
tin, supra note 182, at 30 (quoting one critic as saying, "[I]t pays to be a Negro or a Com-
munist if you want justice from the Warren Court"). 
203. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. I 86, 198-99 (1962) (holding legislative apportionment 
to be a justiciable issue). 
204. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (constitutionalizing the exclusionary 
rule). 
205. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 82 (1967) (internal quotation mark.s omitted). 
206. CRAY, supra note 141, at 389. 
207. Excerpts from Editorials on School Prayer DeciJ·ion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1962, 
at 11 (quoting an editorial from the Salt Lake Tribune). The editorial warned, "It will be un-
fortunate if a national emotional binge is set off. Irresponsible and demagogic criticism by 
some members of Congress will not encourage needed thoughtful study of the decision and 
its real effects." id. 
208. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rep-
resentative Thomas Abernathy of Mississippi). 
209. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Jn Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 823, 826 (1983); see also Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to En-
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called for the Justices' impeachment, 210 for jurisdiction-stripping legisla-
tion, 211 for the words "In God We Trust" to be inscribed above the Supreme 
Court's bench,212 and for federal funds to be appropriated to buy a Bible for 
each of the Justices. 213 None of the proposed measures passed, but there could 
be no doubt as to where Congress stood. The Justices that year reportedly re-
ceived a smaller annual raise than anyone else on the federal bench, 214 and the 
House of Representatives voted (unanimously, no less) to place the words "In 
God We Trust" above the Speaker of the House's rostrum. 215 It remains there 
today. 
Outside Congress, people took action too. Protestors picketed the White 
House with signs that read, "Remove Warren, Restore God," and the John 
Birch Society added the words "Save Prayer" to its "Impeach Warren" bill-
boards.216 Every governor in the nation, save one, endorsed a resolution con-
demning Engel and supporting a constitutional amendment to overturn it. 217 
gel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 50-51 {1962) (noting "fifty-odd proposals" immediately following 
Engel, most "directed to the precise Engel situation"); Kenneth Crawford, Politics and Pray-
er, NEWSWEEK, May 25, 1964, at 36, 36 (noting that "[n]o less than 147 bills" proposing to 
overturn Engel were introduced in the House). 
210. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 2 (quoting Representative Alvin O'Konski of 
Wisconsin as saying, "We ought to impeach these men in robes who put themselves up 
above God" (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
21 t. 108 CONG. REc. I 1,732 (1962) (quoting Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South 
Carolina as arguing that unless other measures were taken, it was time "to drastically restrict 
and limit the appellate jurisdiction of this court which flaunts its authority in our very faces 
and it flaunts its authority because we have permitted them to run rampant over us"). 
212. See LYNDA BECK FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY?: A HISTORICAL, 
JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER 130 (1989); see also 
JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 262 (1979) 
(noting that Chief Justice Warren wrote a letter that helped bury the bill). 
213. See !08 CONG. REc. 14,360-61 (1962) (quoting Representative James A. Haley of 
Florida as proposing to fund the purchase of a Bible "for the personal use of each justice"). 
The proposal was rejected by a vote of 66 to 47. Lours FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 127 (2002). 
214. See POLLACK, supra note 212, at 262 ("In retaliation, the following March, House 
members denied Justices a $3,000 annual pay raise on their $39,500 salaries, even though 
they then voted $7,500 increases for themselves, Cabinet officers and all lesser Federal judg-
es."). 
215. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 3; see also 108 CONG. REc. 21,102 (1962) (quot-
ing Representative William Randall of Missouri as justifying the move as "in a not so subtle 
way our answer to the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court order banning the regents 
prayer from the New York State schools"). 
216. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 151-52; Dierenfield, supra note 18, at 219. 
217. See Governors Seek Prayer Measure, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1962, at 1 (reporting on 
the nearly unanimous Governors Conference resolution, with only Governor Rockefeller of 
New York abstaining "because he thought the decision should be thoroughly studied before 
any action was taken"). 
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And thirty-two state legislatures, just two short of the required two-thirds, 
caileJ. for a constitutional convention.218 
Vows of open defiance were common. 219 "We will not pay any attention to 
the Supreme Court ruling,"220 one Southern superintendent stated, with another 
asserting that religious observances in school should continue "regardless of 
what the Supreme Court says." 221 Governors urged schools to "kee~ right on 
praying. "222 And in the South, that is exactly what most of them did. 2 3 
218. See SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425 (italics omitted). 
219. See The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 
("Twenty-four states expressly permit or require prayers in schools, and in many of these 
areas, the judgment provoked open threats of defiance."); Nation Chooses Sides in Fight 
over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64 ("[Fifteen] States have refused to give up devotional ser-
vices in their public schools."). 
220. The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) {quoting the Deputy Superintendent of Atlanta Public Schools); 
see also School Prayers: What's Scheduled This Autumn, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 
19, 1963, at 11, 11 (listing statements of defiance from various states). 
221. Burnham, supra note 194 (internal quotation marks omitted) {quoting the Alabama 
Superintendent of Education); see also William M. Beaney & Edward N. Beiser, Prayer and 
Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475, 487 
(1964) (quoting the Rhode Island State Commissioner of Education as stating that he did 
"not now or in the future intend to prostitute the office of Commissioner of Education of 
Rhode Island to further the cause of the irreligious, the atheistic, the unreligious, or the ag-. 
nostic" (internal quotation marks omitted)). One school board president stated that the board 
had "no intention of abolishing prayer. If we are compelled to ban it, then we'll devise an· 
other prayer. A school without prayers is not a school." Theodore Powell, The School Prayer 
Battle, SATURDAY REV., Apr. 20, 1963, at 62, 63 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
222. See DELfATTORE, supra note 36, at 104 (quoting Governor George Wallace of Al-
abama). "I want the Supreme Court to know we are not going to conform to any such deci-
sion," Governor Wallace said. "I want the State Board of Education to tell the whole world 
we are not going to abide by it." Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 486 (internal quotation 
mark omitted); see also Seaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 487 (quoting Governor Ross 
Barnett of Mississippi as saying that he was "going to tell every teacher in Mississippi to 
conduct prayers and Bible reading despite what the Supreme Court says" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Another Kind of Defiance, TIME, Aug. 16, 1963, at 16, 16 (quoting Gover-
nor Terry Sanford of North Carolina as saying, "We will go on having Bible readings and 
prayers in the schools of this state just as we always have" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
223. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER 
DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LocAL PRACTICE 33 & tbl.8 (1971) {finding that 93% of 
school districts in the East complied with Engel, but only 21 % of school districts in the 
South did so); see also SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 310 (discussing a study showing that af-
ter Engel, 11 % of schools in the East still conducted prayer, 5% of schools in the West still 
conducted prayer, but 64% of schools in the South still conducted school prayer). Frank 
Soraufwrites, 
Explanations for the Southern noncompliance [with Engel and Schempp] arc not hard to ad-
duce-the conservative Protestant homogeneity, the general traditionalism of values, the re-
inforcement of noncompliance in other areas of constitutional decision, indeed the whole 
complicated web of the Southern culture that relates religion to other social values and insti-
tutions. 
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In short, Steven Engel remembered it right in saying, "When we won the 
case ... all hell broke loose."224 The Supreme Court thought it was protecting 
the people from an overzealous, prayer-pushing state. But that point was lost on 
the American people, who wanted protection from the Supreme Court in-
stead. 225 There was a disconnect between what the Court said and what the 
people heard, and a disconnect between what happened before Engel and what 
happened after it. The question I explore next is why. 
B. The Role of Media and Misunderstanding 
Anyone who spends time with the historical record cannot help but notice 
that the public discourse surrounding Engel was not about what the Supreme 
Court actually held. The Justices themselves were partly to blame for that dis-
course. The rest of the responsibility lay with the media. 
Turning first to the Justices, two wrote minority opinions in Engel, and 
both turn out to be important in understanding the nation's reaction to the case. 
As previously mentioned, Justice Stewart wrote a lone dissent in Engel. 226 Not 
yet mentioned is the fact that Justice Douglas wrote a lone concurrence.227 
SORAUF, supra note 105, at 299. He goes on to explain that "[e]nforcement by court order 
would have to be literally on a school-district-by-school-district basis, assuming the availa-
pility of plaintiffs willing to come forward against the pressure of the community." Id. at 
300. 
Herein may lie a clue to the riddle of why the East readily complied with Engel and 
Schempp while the South did not, even though religious observances in both areas were 
equally entrenched. See id. at 297 tbl.12-5 (showing that in 1960, 68% of public schools in 
the East and 77% of public schools in the South reported Bible reading, whereas in 1966, 
only 4% of public schools in the East reported continued Bible reading compared with 50% 
in the South). In the East, there may have been enough religious diversity to pose a realistic 
threat of an enforcement action, whereas in the South, religious homogeneity and other fac-
tors contributing to community pressure may have been so strong that an enforcement action 
was unlikely. This surmise would also suggest that it is more than mere coincidence that cas-
es like Engel and Schempp came from the East rather than the South. For an excellent empir-
ical study of factors contributing to such community pressure, see generally Kevin T. 
McGuire, Public Schools, Religious Establishments, and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Exam-
ination of Policy Compliance, 37 AM. POL. RES. 50 (2009) (finding rural communities, less 
educated communities, and communities with higher concentrations of conservative Chris-
tians, all characteristics that dovetail with the South, to be statistically significant factors of 
noncompliance with the Supreme Court's school prayer decisions). 
224. DIERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Steven Engel). 
225. See Postcard from Mary F. Dickinson to Justice Hugo L. Black (June 18, 1963) 
(Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Our earnest prayer is: 'God save America from 
the Supreme Court.'"); Note from Peggy Ann Louis to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("God save us from the Supreme Court!"). 
226. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444-50 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also su-
pra note 129 and accompanying text (identifying Justice Stewart as the lone dissenter in En-
gel). 
227. 370 U.S. at 437-44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Both Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart argued that the prayer in Engel 
was indistinguishable from the myriad of other aclc11owledgments of God by 
the state; the only difference between the two was which way the argument cut. 
Justice Douglas claimed that any commingling of church and state was consti-
tutionally impermissible.228 Thus, he agreed with the majority's ruling on 
school prayer and pointed to other practices the Supreme Court could, and 
should, strike down as well. 229 Justice Stewart took the opposite stance, argu-
ing that school prayer was just as constitutional as everything else. "I cannot 
see how an 'official religion' is established by letting those who want to say a 
prayer say it," he wrote, pointing to "countless practices" that recognized reli-
gion and were sponsored by the state. 230 
The majority in Engel answered both Justices' claims, explicitly rejecting 
the premise upon which they were based-that school prayer and other refer-
ences to God in government were indistinguishable. In characteristically confi-
dent style, the Engel opinion stated: 
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent 
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to ex-
press love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Decla-
ration of Independence which contain references to the Deity .... Such patri-
otic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned 
religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this in-
stance. 231 
The line drawing was clear, but the statement was poorly placed. The majority 
had relegated the passage to a footnote that most everyone overlooked, includ-
ing critics and the popular press.232 The New York Times, for example, reprint-
ed the entire Engel opinion, along with parts of the concurrence and dissent, but 
neglected to include the footnote that addressed those Justices' claims. 233 Crit-
ics decried Engel's broad, sweeping language, and chided the Supreme Court 
228. See id. at 437 ("I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it 
takes."). 
229. See id at 43 7 n. l. 
230. Id. at 445-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
231. Id. at 435 n.21 (majority opinion). 
232. See RAYMOND J. CELADA, LIBRARY OF CONG. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., THE 
SUPREME COURT OPINION IN THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL V. VITALE); THE DECISION, 
THE REACTION, THE PROS AND CONS 12 (1963) {"The Court attempted to indicate the narrow 
limits of its holding in a significant but generally overlooked footnote to the opinion .... "); 
FENWICK, supra note 212, at 133 ("Unfortunately, most people skip over footnotes, and 
many of the published reports of the decision omitted any reference to this footnote. Intend-
ed to allay such fears as those expressed by religious leaders ... , the footnote was instead 
ignored."); "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 9 ("Black's footnote was virtually 
ignored in the public reporting of the decision .... "). 
233. See Text of Opinions in Supreme Court Case Holding School Prayer Unconstitu-
tional, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at 16. 
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for its "failure to emphasize the limitations of the decision. " 234 In fact, those 
limits were there. They just weren't where anyone would have thought to look. 
In different ways, both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Engel 
played a prominent role in the fury that followed the case. Justice Stewart's dis-
sent fueled hyperbolic claims that in striking down school prayer, the Supreme 
Court had told schoolchildren they could not pray even if they wanted to. "[TJo 
deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny 
them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation," he 
wrote. 235 Justice Stewart viewed Engel in free exercise terms, and in the public 
discourse, his was the view that stuck. 236 
Meanwhile, Justice Douglas's concurrence lent legitimacy to claims that 
the Court would soon be taking aim at other aspects of God in public life. Time 
and again, critics pointed to Engel's concurrence for the implications of the 
case. 
237 Indeed, on numerous occasions they quoted Engel's concurrence as 
thou~h it was the holding in the case, leading many people to think it actually 
was. 
38 This was especially incendiary because unlike Justice Stewart, who had 
234. lrving R. Kaufman, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1963, at 
47, 50; see also Arthur Krock, Op-Ed., The Prayer Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 4, at 
9 (describing Engel as "the latest in a series of high judicial rulings on the issue of church-
state separation that oontinue to supply no guide to the next one"); Lewis, supra note 135 
(writing that the "sweeping language" of the opinion made it "impossible to draw ... any 
conclusion on what the Supreme Court will or will not allow"); Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., 
School-Prayer Issue in High Court Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1962, § 4, at 5 ("Th[e] limits 
[of the Court's decision] have been difficult to set with any degree of confidence because 
Justice Hugo L. Black's opinion for the court was so broadly and vaguely phrased. The lack 
of boundaries in tum has doubtless served to heighten public agitation."). 
235. See 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
236. See Powell, supra note 22 I, at 62-63 ("Much opposition arose out of the mistaken 
impression that the decision was based on the 'free exercise' clause."); "To Stand as a 
Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("The Supreme Court last week based its ruling solely on 
the 'establishment' clause, but many Americans got an impression that the court impaired 
the free exercise of religion. This impression was fortified by Justice Stewart's dis-
sent _ ... "). 
237. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 479; see also The Court Decision-and 
the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 44 ("It was the concuning opinion, by Justice 
William 0. Douglas, however, which gave the aroused critics of the decision their greatest 
fears."); Editorial, In the Name of Freedom, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1962, at 14 ("If the major-
ity opinion prevails, however, it must logically require the excision of all those countless 
other official references to God-such as in the Declaration of Independence, the Pledge of 
Allegiance, [and] the Star-Spangled Banner .... Justice Douglas, concurring with the major-
ity, seems to say it does and should apply to these and all the other official instances."). 
238. See "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8 ("Adding greatly to the confu-
sion was Justice Douglas' concurring opinion-which was mistakenly understood by many 
as having some force of law."); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 485 ("[MJuch 
of the bitter first commentary was uninformed, and frequently was based on sentences ripped 
out of the context of the Court's opinion, or to be found only in the concurring opinion of 
Mr. Justice Douglas."); Chester A Newland, Press Coverage of the United States Supreme 
Court, 17 W. POL. Q. 15, 25 (1964) ("Basis for the most extreme and unplausible public crit-
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lamented Engel's implications, Justice Douglas embraced them as right.239 
Writing in the l 962 Supreme Court Review, Philip Kurland described Engel as 
a picture of the majority Justices "walking on eggs and of the two minority Jus-
tices stamping after them. "240 It was an apt analogy, particularly in light of the 
mess in their wake. 
In fairness, neither of the minority opinions in Engel could have been fully 
responsible for the hysteria that followed the decision, because the Supreme 
Court came under attack well before anyone had time to read them. 241 Engel's 
concurrence and dissent may have bolstered critics' claims, but they are just a 
part of understanding the misunderstanding that marked the case. For the rest of 
the story, one must leave the world of law altogether and enter the world of 
journalism. 
Within legal academia, Engel is a case study in Supreme Court decision-
making (and on the doctrinal side, First Amendment law, of course). But within 
journalism scholarship, Engel is a case study for an entirely different proposi-
tion-how the media's coverage of Court decisions can skew public opin-
ion. 242 As is so often the case, the insights of an interdisciplinary perspective 
enrich our understanding considerably. 
From a journalistic viewpoint, the story begins with the Supreme Court's 
announcement of Engel and the media race to report the ruling.243 The first 
wire service reports on Engel went out within five minutes of the decision's 
announcement, feeding what would become the lead story in all news outlets 
by the end of the day and front-page news the following morning. 244 Unfortu-
icisms of the majority opinion are to be found in the dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart; and Jus· 
tice Douglas' unrestrained remarks in a concurrence provide equally ample fuel for critics."). 
239. See Engel v Vitale, supra note 93, at 4 ("Mr. Justice Douglas concurring and Mr. 
Justice Stewart dissenting both thought-the one approvingly, the other with regret-that all 
sorts of invocations of the Deity associated with our public life are or will soon become un· 
constitutional."); supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Jus-
tices Douglas and Stewart). 
240. Kurland, supra note 162, at 13. 
241. See Thomas M. Menglcr, Public Relations in the Supreme Court: Justice Tom 
Clark's Opinion in the School Prayer Case, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 337 (1989). 
242. See, e.g., DAVID L GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1968); 
Newland, supra note 238; William A. Hachten, Journalism and the Prayer Decision, 
CowM. JOURNALISM R..Ev., Fall 1962, at 4, 4. 
243. Engel was announced on June 25, 1962, along with fifteen other decisions. 
Hachten, supra note 242, at 4. It was the only one to command immediate media attention. 
See id. For a glimpse of history repeating itself, see Katherine Fung & Jack Mirkinson, Su· 
preme Co!.irt Health Care Ruling: CNN. Fox News Wrong on Individual Mandate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 10:29 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012 
/06/28/cnn-supreme·court·hcalth-care·individual·rnandate _ n _ 1633950. html (discussing the 
media's mishandling of the Supreme Court's health care ruling in 2012). 
244. See GREY, supra note 242, at 87-88 ("Justice Black started reading Engel at about 
11:50 AM. on June 25, 1962 .... ln both Engel and Schempp, the AP and UPI were out 
with bulletins within five minutes of the start of announcing the cases in the courtroom."); 
Hachtcn, supra note 242, at 4 ("Wire-service reporters led their stories with [Engel], radio 
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nately, none of the reports stressed the limited nature of the Court's ruling; in-
deed, the AP bulletin failed to note the state-sponsored nature of the prayer at 
all. 245 Thus, from the start, media reports gave the impression that the Court 
had forbidden prayer of any type~individual or state sponsored-in public 
schools. 246 Newspapers sensationalized the ruling with headlines such as "No 
Praying in Schools, Court Rules" and "Supreme Court Outlaws Prayers in Pub-
lic Schools" that exaggerated the holding of the case and provided terse, over-
simplified accounts of the decision that were at best incomplete. 247 Radio and 
TV quickly followed suit. 248 
Meanwhile, public officials likewise reacted to the AP and other wire ser-
vice reports, quickly going on record to criticize Engel and take a stand in favor 
of God, prayer, and the American way. 249 The commentary was uninformed 
and television and afternoon newspapers used it prominently, and by the following morning 
it had become the leading story in most newspapers."); see also Mengler, supra note 241, at 
336 ("The response to the Engel decision was literally instantaneous and, consequently, un-
informed."). 
245. See GREY, supra note 242, at 88. 
246. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 75 ("In no instance d[id] a headline ... indicate 
that the banned prayer was one composed by state officials and prescribed by a school 
board-both relevant considerations as far as the Court was concerned."); Hach ten, supra 
note 242, at 5 ("The majority c;f newspapers appear to have kept 'prayer' in the singular, but 
many failed to specify ... its official character .... "); A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 
189, at 13 ("Misled by headlines, many thought that the court had all but ordered an end to 
all ties between government and religion .... "); see also Excerpts from Editorials on School 
Prayer Decision, supra note 207 (quoting the Evening Star as stating, "The real effect of the 
Court's ruling is to prohibit children who might wish to do so from reciting the prayer"). Be-
cause the only prayer in schools at this time was state-sponsored prayer, one can readily see 
how the media conflated the two. 
247. Newland, supra note 238, at 29 (discussing these and similar headlines, including 
"No Prayers in Schools, Supreme Court Orders" and "Possible End to Christian, Jewish Ho-
ly Day Activity in Public Schools as Court Bans N.Y. Prayer"); Hachten, supra note 242, at 
5 (discussing similar headlines, including "Court Rules Out Prayers in Schools" and "High 
Court Bans School Prayer"); see, e.g., Joseph Hearst, Supreme Court Bans School Prayers, 
CHI. DAILY TR!B., June 26, 1962, at 1; School Prayer Ruled Out, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1962, 
at l; see also LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 422 (1967) C'[T]he 
early newspaper treatment of the decision was incomplete, inaccurate, and intended to make 
headlines rather than to report the facts."); Mengler, supra note 24 l, at 33 7-3 8 ("The press 
caused perhaps greater damage through its incompetent interpretation of the decision and 
aggressive attempts to fan the flames. Headlines the morning after the decision obscured the 
narrowness of the Court's explicit holding .... "). 
248. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 84-85 ("Thus the radio and TV newscasts, with 
their characteristic incisiveness and drive to report events 'as they happen,' conveyed an im-
age of a much broader ruling than was actually handed down. In this regard their treatment 
was similar to the early news stories."). 
249. See Mengler, supra note 241, at 336 ("[C]ongressmen who spoke went on the rec-
ord quickly and, sensing a political bonanza, almost uniformly criticized the decision."); 
Lewis, supra note 176 ("The grotesque distortion of suggesting that the court had held God 
unconstitutional was characteristic of many comments. The purpose was abuse, not rational 
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and "not a little demagogic."250 But with proposed constitutional amendments 
flying, it was newsworthy, and papers quickly shifted frcm reporting on Engel 
to reporting on the reaction to the case.251 Here too the media fanned the 
flames, focusing almost exclusively on the comments of extremists and follow-
ing up with interviews to solicit the strongest sound bite reporters could get. 252 
Surveying the scene, the New York Herald Tribune lamented "the sight of so 
many otherwise responsible newspapers getting completely swept off their feet 
by the tide of emotionalism."253 Scholars reviewing the news re~orts agreed, 
finding "serious distortions" in the media's reporting of the case 54 and con-
cluding that there was "little question" that the way the news was handled con-
tributed to the reaction against Engel. 255 
All this points to a conclusion that several news magazines noted at the 
time: En~el was hated "not so much for what it said as for what people thought 
it said."2 6 Time magazine was one of the first to make the point, stating: 
discussion of the court's reasoning. And so these critics tended to denounce the motives of 
the justices, terming them pro-Communist, atheistic, conspiratorial."). 
250. Crawford, supra note 200, at 28; see also FENWICK, supra note 212, at 130 ("Yet 
many of the people voicing the greatest outrage spoke out against [Engel] without having 
read the opinion."); JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 91 ("The Educational Executives' Overview 
was particularly outraged about the fact that so many 'pontificated so freely' about the deci-
sion without bothering to see what the Court had said."). 
251. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 72-73, 74 tbl.2 (noting that "[s]ubsequent articles 
appearing on the news pages ... were uniformly concerned with public reaction to the deci-
sion," and listing headlines, including "Prayer Decision Stirs Anger," "Prayer Ruling Stirs 
Caldron of Criticism," "Lawmakers Seethe over Prayer Ban," "Local Religious Leaders De-
plore Prayer Ban," and "Court Ruled Against God: Goldwater," among others); Newland, 
supra note 238, at 27 ("Starting with day-two stories and throughout the remainder of the 
week, however, reports drawn from wire services generally departed far from the Court's 
action and stressed reaction instead."). 
252. See Hachten, supra note 242, at 8 ("[T]he wire services obtained comment largely 
from the angriest members of Congress."); see also Mengler, supra note 241, at 338 ("Argu-
ably worse than its misinterpretation was the press' solicitation of uninformed criticism. 
Starting immediately after the decision's announcement and continuing through the rest of 
the week, the press departed from wire service interpretations of the decision and actively 
sought good quotes."); Newland, supra note 238, at 27-28 ("On the Prayer case, wire reports 
of national level reaction were numerous and often on extreme views, completely obscuring 
the Court's opinion in most newspapers .... Solicited opinions of political and religious 
spokesmen and ofuninfonned people in general dominated the news."). 
253. Rockefeller Keeps His Head, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., July 5, 1962, at 18. 
254. Newland, supra note 238, at 29. 
255. Hachten, supra note 242, at 7 ("There seems little question but that the mechanics 
of handling news contributed to the reaction."); see also GREY, supra note 242, at 92 ("[I)t is 
hard to assess press responsibility for the uproar caused by the earlier decision. But, again at 
minimum, it would seem that the press was one element in the Engel case."). For an explana-
tion of why Engel's countennajoritarian narrative has persisted despite such evidence, see 
text accompanying notes 272-73 and 400 below. 
256. A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13; see also Does Schoolroom Prayer 
Require a New Amendment?, TIME, May 8, 1964, at 62, 62, 64 ("Much of the cry to 'Get 
God Back in the Schools' reflects deep misunderstanding of what the court actually said."). 
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Much of last week's controversy arose from confusion about what the Su-
preme Court ruled-and, perhaps more importantly, what it did not rule. All 
too typical was the reaction of an Atlanta clergyman who called the decision 
"the most terrible thing that's ever haf pened to us"-then admitted he did not 
really know what the decision said. 25 
Letters to the Justices confirmed it, 258 and surveys showed it in spades259-
people viewed Engel just as newspapers had reported it, as banning any and all 
prayer in public schools. Indeed, in one study, a whopping 78.8% of partici-
pants thought Engel said "prayer in the public schools was to halt," while just 
10.5% thought the ruling banned "state-prescribed prayer ... but saw no im-
pairment of prayer in general."260 Inadvertently proving the point, the studr 
then went on to conclude (wrongly) that most people had gotten Engel right 26 
The Justices felt they had been burned. Justice Black privately stated that 
Engel was "grossly misrepresented and misunderstood" and expressed hope 
257. "To Stand as a Guarantee," supra note 97, at 8. 
258. Some letters illustrated the confusion. See, e.g., Letter from Mary Kathryn Davis 
to Members of the Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1963) (Earl Warren Papers, Box 366) (expressing 
distress "at the thought of not being able to say a simple prayer in the public school which I 
attend" and accusing the Justices of '"trying to take away the privilege of being able to wor-
ship FREELY whenever and WHEREVER we wish"); Letter from Madeline Theresa 
McLain to Justice Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Your 
decision to outlaw God from public life is very bad."); see also Letter to Justice Hugo L. 
Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) (sharing a poem, titled "Prayer on the 
Q.T.," that opens with the line, "Now I sit me down to school/ Where praying is against the 
rule"); Petition (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) (proposing a constitutional 
amendment "to guarantee that nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit the 
voluntary expressions of belief in the existence and providence of God, or the voluntary say-
ing of prayers addressed to God"). 
Other letters recognized the confusion. See, e.g., Letter from Fred Larkins to Justice 
Hugo L. Black (July 11, 1962) {Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) {"I am really con-
cerned because of the greatly distorted views taken by the press and many individuals of the 
Prayer decision. The truth is that regarding it as prohibiting prayer in schools makes a much 
better and more sensational news story than to merely refer to it as a prohibition of prepara-
tion and promulgation of prayers by public officials."); Letter from George Mills to Justice 
Hugo L. Black (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 355) ("Also, the uproar over your 
decision on prayer in schools appears to me to indicate a serious lack of understand-
ing .... "). 
259. A 1968 survey asked, "In general, what has the Supreme Court said about prayers 
in the public schools?" Illustrative responses included, "They are not supposed to say prayers 
or mention God in school"; "They've just cut it out completely"; "It banned them, I think"; 
"I don't recall what they said but they took the prayer out of the schools"; "They ruled it 
out"; "They made a ruling that there were to be none"; and "It ruled them out. I don't know 
for what reasons .... [T]hat's what is wrong with our nation." Gregory Casey, Popular Per-
ceptions of Supreme Court Rulings, 4 AM. POL. Q. 3, 9, l 0 & tbl. l n.a (1976) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
260. See id. at I 0-11. 
Vi I. See id. at 11. 
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that in due time the truth about the ruling would come to light. 262 Chief Justice 
Warren expressed similar views, stating in private correspondence that he 
hoped that as Engel became "more clearly understood the hysteria concerning 
the decision w[ould] subside."263 Justice Brennan was slightly more pointed in 
his views, publicly stating that those who criticize a decision of the Suf[eme 
Court "should at least read the decision" to attempt to understand it first. 2 
And Justice Clark was more to the point yet. At an American Bar Associa-
tion meeting two months after Engel was decided, Justice Clark broke from ju-
dicial custom of not commenting on the merits of a case to explain the decision 
to the public.265 "Here was a state-written prayer circulated to state-employed 
teachers with instructions to have their pupils recite it in unison at the begin-
ning of each school day," he stated, faulting the press for writing stories that 
were inaccurate and incomplete. 266 Afterward, Justice Clark observed that 
[a]s soon as people learned that this was all the court decided-not that there 
could be no official recognition of a Divine Being or recognition on silver or 
currency of "In God We Trust", or public acknowledgement that we are a reli-
gious nation-they understood the basis on which the court acted. 267 
Ironically, his comments received little attention in the popular press.268 
As to whether such attempts to clarify Engel made much difference, the ev-
idence is mixed. One researcher concluded, "As the volume of informed com-
262. Letter from B.W. Simmons to J.A. Fortner (Jan. 17, 1963) (Hugo LaFayette Black 
Papers, Box 354) ("I talked with Justice Black .... [He) stated that the textual content of the 
decision was grossly misrepresented and misunderstood and that he hoped in time the real 
efficacy of the opinion and its objectives would be disseminated to the public."); see also 
Letter from Justice Hugo L Black to Tom Murphy, Minister to Students, Auburn Univ. (July 
3, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("Enclosed is the copy of all the opinions 
of the Court in the case involving the New York Regents' official public school prayer. 1 can 
readily understand how difficult it has been ... for you to know what the Court decided in 
this case from much of the newspaper publicity about it."). 
263. Letter from Earl Warren to Thomas J. Cunningham, Vice-President & Gen. Coun-
sel, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley (Oct. 15, 1962) (Earl Warren Papers, Box 365). 
264. High Court Found Imperiled by Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1963, at 13 (internal 
quotation mark omitted) (quoting Justice Brennan); see also id. ("He cited the decision ban-
ning ritual prayers in the public schools as an example of decisions that produced criticism 
by persons unfamiliar with what the Court said."). 
265. See Hachten, supra note 242, at 4; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 442 
(discussing Justice Clark's "almost unprecedented step of publicly defending" a Supreme 
Court decision). For Justice Black's view of the propriety of speaking to the press about En-
gel, see Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Paula Fraser (July 9, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette 
Black Papers, Box 358) ("Thanks for your interesting note of June 27th about our judgment 
and opinion in the New York Regents' official state prayer case. Your suggestion that I talk 
about the case on the radio or television is interesting, but I could [n]ot do this."). 
266. Hachten, supra note 242, at 4 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
267. id. 
268. See Newland, supra note 238, at 29. 
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ment grew, the reaction [to Engef] continued to subside,"269 and letters to Jus-
tice Black confirmed that at least some who took heed to actually read the deci-
sion did in fact change their view. 270 But at the end of the day, Engel remained 
a staunchly unpopular decision, with substantial majorities favoring school 
prayer (at least according to the results of most polls). 271 Scholars blamed the 
media for not publishing follow-up stories to correct erroneous reports prompt-
ly, concluding that by the time the decision was clarified, initial misperceptions 
had "hardened into the perception offact."272 The public had made up its mind 
about Engel, and was not open to changing it. 273 
269. Hachten, supra note 242, at 7; see also Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools 
and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1031-32 (1963) ("Moreover, much of the 
initial criticism was dissipated when the Court's full opinion was read and understood."). 
270. See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Roland Frye (July 17, 1962) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("In recent days I have also had a number of communica-
tions from people whose views have changed since they became familiar with what the 
Court decided. The quality of thought expressed in these communications has demonstrated 
that the capacity for thinking has not been lost in this country."); Letter from Margaret Hop-
kins Worrell, Exec. Sec'y, Nat'! Shrine Comm'n, to Justice Hugo L. Black (Dec. 6, 1962) 
(Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) (expressing changed view upon reading the deci-
sion); see also NEWMAN, s1'pra note 158, at 523 ("Many people wrote to say they changed 
their minds about the decision once they read it .... "). 
271. See 30 Years After the Supreme Court's School Prayer Decision, AM. ENTERPRISE, 
Mar./ Apr. 1992, at 102, 102 (reporting results of a September 1964 Gallup poll in which 
77% of those asked said they would "[f]avor a constitutional amendment to legalize prayers 
in public school"); id at 104 (reporting results of a June 1988 Gallup poll in which 70% of 
those asked said they "[f]avor[ed] prayer in public schools"). 
Interestingly, although support for the concept of school prayer is strong, the polling re-
sults look much different when the question is concrete. Since the mid-1980s, support for 
"Christian prayer" in schools has hovered around 10%, support for "general prayer" (like the 
prayer in Engel) has hovered around 20%, and support for "silent prayer" has hovered 
around 50%. See Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62, 68-70 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (comparing 
results of polls asking about support for school prayer in general with polls starting in the 
mid-l 980s asking about support for specific categories of prayer). 
272. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 263; see also FJSHER, supra note 213, at 126 ("The 
public impression never recovered from these irresponsible readings."); GREY, supra note 
242, at 95 ("[A]bscnt was any full-fledged drive by the wire services, especially, to speed 
their clarifications .... [M]uch of the news coverage of the Engel decision failed to meet a 
demanding standard of adequacy."); Hachten, supra note 242, at 9 ("Yet there should be a 
point in the development of a story where speed gives way to reflection. For much of Ameri-
can journalism, this point came too late in the school-prayer case. And for one segment, it 
never came at all."). 
273. See William C. Adams, American Public Opinion in the 1960s on Two Church-
State Issues, 17 J. CHURCH & ST. 477, 479 (1975) ("A remarkable 97 percent of that large 
majority favoring school prayers said that their minds were made up. Furthermore, 90 per-
cent of those opposing school prayers had no doubts about their stance. This degree of cer-
tainty may explain the striking similarity between the 1964 and the 1968 data on the school 
prayer issue."). 
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That said, there is another indication of what an informed public might 
have thought about Engel, and it comes from an unlikely source: the congres-
sional hearings to overturn it. By the time of those hearings in 1964, some 150 
proposals to amend the Constitution had been submitted by 115 members of 
Congress. 274 Observers thought an amendment stood a good chance of passing 
if it could make it out of the House Judiciary Committee, and a ma!ority of the 
Judiciary Committee members reportedly supported it at the outset. 75 Even so, 
a discharge petition to spring the amendment from committee and bring it 
straight to the House floor had 167 votes at the start of the hearing process-
just 51 short of the necessary 218. 276 At the time, pressure to ~ass some sort of 
constitutional amendment was considered "nearly irresistible." 77 
But the hearings changed everything. Supporters of the amendment process 
had taken a simplistic view: "The people want prayers in schools; the Court 
took them away; we, on behalf of the people, must restore them."278 The hear-
ings showed just how complex the issue actually was. What would the prayer 
look like? Proponents of an amendment yielded to the inclusion of the words 
"nondenominational" or "nonsectarian" in the proposed amendment's text, but 
then the question became what those words meant, and who would get to define 
them. 279 The best supporters could do was propose that local school boards de-
cide what was appropriate for each school, but that led to questions about what 
274. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 116. The Senate Judiciary Committee held two 
days of hearings in July 1962, but because the Justices recognized jurisdiction in Schempp 
shortly thereafter, the amendment process was deemed premature and no action was taken. 
See Steven K. Green, Evangelicals and the Becker Amendment: A Lesson in Church-State 
Moderation, 33 J. CHURCH & Sr. 541, 551-52 (1991). Even after Schempp was decided, the 
amendment process initially stalled because the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee was 
opposed to an amendment. See id. at 557. 
275. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 497 (noting that in early 1964, opponents 
of the amendment thought that it "had an excellent chance of receiving the approval of a ma-
jority of the Judiciary Committee, that if reported out favorably it was likely to pass easily in 
the House, and that while the Senate might delay passage of the bill, it would eventually pass 
there as well"); id. at 502 {noting that at the beginning of the committee hearings, observers 
estimated that the amendment "would easily win a majority in the committee"); Nation 
Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64 {"Sentiment in the House at this 
time appears to favor passage of an amendment if the Judiciary Committee can agree on lan-
guage and get a resolution to the floor."). 
276. See Nation Chooses Sides in Fight over Prayer, supra note 17, at 64. 
277. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 84; see also ALLEY, supra note 17, at 123 ('The mood 
was such that the Religious News Service offered the opinion, 'Congress will take action 
before fall to submit such an amendment to the states for ratification.'"). 
278. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 501. 
279. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 73; see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 500 
("Which version of the Bible would be used? Would the Koran qualify under the amend-
ment? Who would decide which prayers to say? Could the 'Ave Maria' be employed? And 
again and again they returned to the basic theme: 'thou shalt not touch the Bill of Rights."'). 
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that would look like too. 280 Would each school district have a dominant reli-
gion, with the expectation being that people would move to the religious area of 
their choice? Or were school districts expected to be able to accommodate nu-
merous interests, if that was even possible? And what about the divisiveness, 
and litigation, that would inevitably ensue if the hard questions were punted to 
localities to work out on their own? 
These questions and more filled three thick volumes of House Judiciary 
Committee records, encapsulating 2774 pages of testimony by 197 witnesses 
over the course of eighteen days. 281 Observers noted that proponents of the 
amendment "fre~uently seemed annoyed by the complexities of issues framed 
by opponents."2 2 Reporting on the hearings in 1964, Ne:wsweek summed up 
the glitch: "Everybody admits the difficulty of writing a proper amendment or 
even an acceptable school prayer. Nothing is as simple as it once seemed."283 
As the hearings progressed, the tide turned on support for a constitutional 
amendment. Congressmen reported a change in the constituency mail they were 
receiving, noting that correspondence once running twenty-to-one in favor of 
an amendment was now running just as strongly the opposite way. 284 Some 
who had been among the first to call for an amendment now opposed it, and 
others who had signed the amendment's discharge petition were prepared to 
take their names off should the total start to approach the number necessary to 
get to the House floor. 285 The Wall Street Journal reported that calls to amend 
the Constitution had "trailed off to a whisper" and that only eight of the House 
Judiciary Committee's thirty-five members still supported an amendment. 286 
The proposal died quietly in committee. 287 
280. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 73-74. Indeed, the Judiciary Committee's staff 
study report raised so many questions about the practicalities of school prayer that several 
members of the Committee strenuously objected to its release. See Beaney & Beiser, supra 
note221, at498. 
281. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 499. 
282. Id. at 501; see also DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 120 ("Supporters of the 
amendment were infuriated by questions about how this process would work for the same 
reason that its opponents kept asking them: they shone a spotlight on contentious issues that 
Becker would have preferred to finesse .... "). 
283. Crawford, supra note 209, at 36. 
284. See A Tide Reversed, TIME, June 19, 1964, at 60, 65. 
285. See LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 85 ("Congressman Leggett, one of the first spon-
sors of a prayer amendment, had changed his mind and was urging the committee to reject 
the Becker proposal."); Beancy & Beiser, supra note 221, at 502 ("It was apparent that the 
drive for a discharge petition had passed its crest; not only could it not gain the necessary 
218 signatures, but members who had signed the petition were prepared to remove their 
names should the total approach 210."). 
286. Joseph W. Sullivan, Support Fades for Change in Constitution to Allow Bible 
Reading. Prayers in Schools, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1964, at 3. 
287. See id ("[T]he prevailing disposition on the House committee is to bury the prayer 
issue as quietly as possible. 'The only reason its obituary notice hasn't gone out already is 
that we still don't know how to write it without risking another furor,' confides one commit-
tee leader."). Interestingly, later attempts to restore school prayer by constitutional amend-
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But the postscript to the story is, for present purposes, almost the best part. 
In the process of responding to objections during the hearing process, the text 
of the proposed amendment was repeatedly edited, bringing it closer and closer 
to the Supreme Court's position in Engel. 288 In the end, the amendment that 
died in committee became a plank in the 1964 Republican Party Platform, 
which declared support for 
a Constitutional amendment permitting those individuals and groups who 
choose to do so to exercise their religion freely in public places, provided reli-
gious exercises are not prepared or prescribed by the state or political subdivi-
sion thereof and no person's participation therein is coerced, thus preserving 
the traditional separation of church and state. 289 
The messaging was better, but the substance was the same. What the Republi-
cans wanted was no different from what the Supreme Court in Engel had actu-
ally held. 
In short, it is anything but clear that Engel was a decision the public hated 
on the merits, or even disagreed with at all. Misunderstanding played a massive 
role in tanking the case. 1 turn next to the role that the religious establishment 
played in saving it. 
C. The Role of Religious (and Other) Elites 
Lest the discussion thus far give the wrong impression, the hostility that 
met Engel was bitter, loud, and overwhelming-but it was not unanimous. A 
number of voices came to the Supreme Court's defense, and they too played a 
critical role in the narrative of the case. Education elites-high-echelon educa-
tion officials, the organizations they belonged to, and the professional publica-
tions they read-uniformly supported Enget.290 
ment failed for the same reason: once congressmen had to grapple with what school prayer 
would actually look like on the ground, the drive for a constitutional amendment lost sup-
port. See infra note 388 and accompanying text (describing legislators' attempt to restore 
school prayer by constitutional amendment in the 1980s). 
288. The original text of the amendment read, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be 
deemed to prohibit the offering, reading from, or listening to prayers, or biblical scriptures, if 
participation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, institu-
tion, or place." School Prayers: Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Re-
lating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the Public Schools Before the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 88th Cong. 236 (1964) [hereinafter Hearings}. But the language softened as the 
hearings progressed. See id. at 2320 (considering language to set aside time for "silent prayer 
by any individual or group on a voluntary basis"); id. at 2358 (considering language to pro-
tect a parent's right to have "children engage in voluntary religious exercise"); see also 
LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 151 ("But the more the texts were modified to meet the 
acknowledged objections, the more they resembled the Supreme Court's own position in the 
Engel and Schempp cases."). 
289. LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reproducing a 
resolution adopted at the 1964 Republican Convention). 
290. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 315 (discussing support for Engel among high-level 
educators); JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 91-93 (discussing support for Engel among educa-
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President Kennedy also supported Engel, which was no surprise given the 
fact that he had touted the principles underlying Engel two years before the Su-
preme Court decided it. 291 At a press conference shortly after Engel was decid-
ed, Kennedy stated: 
I think that it is important for us if we are going to maintain our constitutional 
principle that we support the Supreme Court decisions even when we may not 
agree with them. 
In addition, we have in this case a very easy remedy and that is to pray 
ourselves. And I would think that it would be a welcome reminder to every 
American family that we can pray a good deal more at home, we can attend 
our churches with a good deal more fidelity, and we can make the true mean-
ing of prayer much more important in the lives of all of our children. 292 
Kennedy's comments were careful, measured, politic. But that sort of support 
made sense in light of the fury that followed Engel; Kennedy was a politician. 
That said, the support that mattered most in Engel came from what might 
seem a surprising source: the nation's religious establishment. 293 In statement 
after statement, leaders of the largest denominations took the Supreme Court's 
side, and the reason was most always the same-Engel was a "blow against 
fonnalism,"294 invalidating a prayer that was "of necessity so neutral, so inter-
denominational, so nonsectarian that it was simply not a religious utterance 
tion specialty magazines appealing to a well-educated readership); Opinion of the Week: 
Prayers in School, supra note 20 (quoting the U.S. Commissioner of Education as support-
ing Engel); Prayer Ban Backed by Education Aides, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1962, at 26 (dis-
cussing support for Engel by the President of the National Education Association and the 
Secretary of the Educational Policies Commission). 
291. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
292. The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 509, 510-11 (June 27, 1962). To 
see the press conference, and how President Kennedy used intonation to communicate sup-
port for Engel, see British Pathe, President Speaks on Prayer Banning in US. Schools 
(1962), YouTusE (Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOsPUpj7Fac. 
293. One might have thought that the religious establishment would support school 
prayer because it was prayer, especially in light of the ecumenical nature of the Regents' 
Prayer. In addition, one might have thought that whatever fears the public had about the im-
plications of Engel for religion in American society, the religious establishment would have 
felt them tenfold. 
294. Paul A. Friedrich, A Sermon (n.d.) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) (un-
derlining omitted). "The prayer sounds like a Boy Scout oath," the Executive Secretary of 
the Synagogue Council of America said. "It's a downgrading prayer." The Court Decision-
and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Hearings, supra note 288, at 659 (quoting Edwin H. Tuller, General Secretary of the 
American Baptist Convention, as stating, "It is because ofa deep respect for religion, and the 
recognition that prayer is essential and should be a vital encounter between man and God, 
that Baptists oppose devotional exercises that are more rote than worship"); Emmet John 
Hughes, Schoolrooms and Prayers, NEWSWEEK, July I, 1963, at 15, 15 ("None of the na-
tion's 83 larger religious bodies would confess that the vigor of its faith depends on the ra-
ther perfunctory recitation of a schoolroom prayer. And many a religious leader sensibly 
views such routine rituals as more likely to blur than to focus religious feeling."). 
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worthy of the name."295 That kind of prayer wasn't good for prayer, religious 
leaders stated, and in a pluralistic society, there was no other kind it could be. 
"When the positive content of faith has been bleached out of prayer," said one 
church spokesman, "I am not too concerned about retaining what is left."296 
Others agreed, 297 including the nation's two leading Protestant magazines-
one liberal, one conservative. 298 Within two months, the National Council of 
Churches, which purported to speak for thirty-one Protestant denominations 
and forty million members, weighed in on Engel, praising the Supreme Court 
for "guard[ing] against the development of 'public school reli~ion' which is 
neither Christianity or Judaism but something less than either."29 
Within the religious establishment, that left just Catholics and Southern 
evangelicals against Engel-and their denunciation of the decision was 
fierce. 30° Catholics in particular were among Engel's most vehement critics.301 
295. Ruling on Prayer Upheld by Rabbis, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, § 1, at 48 (quoting 
Rev. Dr. Joseph H. Lookstein). 
296. See The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the President of the Lutheran Church in America). 
297. For example, the New York Times quoted Presbyterian Life, "the official magazine 
of the 3,260,000-member United Presbyterian Church," as saying, "If you have faith-in· 
general, you have no faith to speak of. Faith has to be in something-in-particular. A nonde-
nominational prayer is doomed to be limited and circumscribed. If prayer starts soaring, it 
starts to be controversial, which is one thing a nondenominational prayer dares not be." 
Prayer Ban Wins Church Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1962, at 35 (internal quotation 
mark omitted); see also Ruling on Prayer Upheld by Rabbis, supra note 295 (quoting one 
rabbi as saying that ''nothing is more likely to rob prayer of its most profound purpose than a 
prescribed and uninspired invocation" (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
298. See On Second Thought ... , TIME, Aug. 24, 1962, at 40, 40 ("Church magazines 
as different as the liberal Christian Century and the conservative Christianity Today have 
backed the court ruling."); see also id. (quoting Presbyterian Life as supporting Engel, stat· 
ing that the Regents' Prayer "was really a rather limited, circumscribed prayer directed to a 
limited, circumscribed God" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
299. Alexander Burnham, Edict Is Called a Setback by Christian Clerics~Rabbis 
Praise It, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1962, at 1 (quoting the Director of the National Council of 
Churches' Department of Religious Liberty); see also Crawford, supra note 209, at 36 (not-
ing membership numbers and approval of Engel by the National Council of Churches). 
300. See Kirk W. Elifson & C. Kirk Hadaway, Prayer in Public Schools: When Church 
and State Collide, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 317, 319 {1985) (describing Southern evangelicals as 
"those who are most vocal in pushing for constitutional amendments," and noting that they 
"favor allowing prayer in public schools by a margin of94 to 6 percent"); Jeffries & Ryan, 
supra note 26, at 323 ("The coalition of Protestants, Jews, and secularists produced a re-
markable array of elite opinion in favor of the Supreme Court's school·prayer and Bible 
reading decisions. This coalition left out conservative evangelicals-who were then less nu-
merous, less well organized, and far less influential than today-and Roman Catholics." 
(footnote omitted)). 
301. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 482 ("Roman Catholic spokesmen were 
extremely critical of the Court .... [T]he Jesuit weekly America used the adjectives 'asi-
nine,' 'stupid,' 'doctrinaire,' and 'unrealistic."' (quoting Kurland, supra note 162, at 2 n.5)); 
Kurland, supra note 162, at 2 ("The Catholic hierarchy and its spokesmen were almost unan-
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Indeed, reports of religious opposition to Engel almost always quoted Catholic 
leaders to prove the point. 302 Given the fact that Catholics had historically de-
cried religious observances in public schools, and even drove much of the liti-
gation to enjoin such practices, 303 the question is why. Why did Catholics con-
demn Engel when they had complained for so long about school prayer? 
As a number of contemporary commentators observed, the answer almost 
certainly had more to do with financial aid to parochial schools than school 
prayer per se. 304 As Catholics came into their own, their priorities shifted from 
wanting (Protestant) religion out of public schools to wanting public funding 
for religious schools of their own. 305 Engel undercut that position in two ways. 
First, it took away Catholics' chief complaint-that religious observances made 
public schools inhospitable for children of the Catholic faith. 306 Second, it add-
ed another brick to the wall of separation between church and state-culturally, 
imous in condemnation of the Court in most vehement terms."); Burnham, supra note 194 
("Roman Catholic opinion was particularly strong in opposition to the court's decision."). 
302. See, e.g., Buroham, supra note 194 (quoting multiple cardinals opposed to Engel); 
Burnham, supra note 299 (same); George Dugan, Clergy Is Divided on School Prayer, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 1962, at 51 (discussing Roman Catholic opposition); School Prayer Ban 
Scored at Red Mass, supra note 154 (discussing a Jesuit priest's remarks); Spellman Renews 
Attack on Court's Decision, N. Y. TIMES, June 28, 1962, at t 7 (discussing Cardinal Spell-
man's vigorous attack on the Supreme Court's school prayer ruling). 
303. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 220 ("When examining the attitudes of Roman Cath-
olics regarding Bible-reading practices in the public schools, one fact in particular stands 
out: Most of the litigation seeking to enjoin such exercises has been brought by Catholic and 
Jewish citizens."); SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 319 (stating that the Roman Catholic 
Church's opposition to Engel was "a reversal of the position it held for a century"); Gordon, 
supra note 66, at 1216 ("Engel and Schempp created a new fault line when Catholics, who 
had long complained that reading the King James Bible was hardly an ecumenical approach 
to religion, rallied around the concept of prayer as key to education in a democracy."). 
304. See, e.g., The Court Decision-and the School Prayer Furor, supra note 16, at 45 
("[An attorney] added that the decision 'makes it clear that Federal funds may not be used to 
finance parochial-school education.' The ruling may mean no such thing, but, judging from 
their heated response, the point was not lost on Catholic leaders, who favor church-school 
aid."); Lewis, supra note 234 ("The critics may have reacted as bitterly as they did because 
they felt the decision did foreshadow rulings against [parochial school] assistance."). Simi-
larly, the New York Times quoted the New York Post as writing, "The indignation of the 
Catholic hierarchy is understandable. It is prompted, we suspect, not by the prohibition of a 
prayer which many churchmen would agree had little religious value, but by the potential 
impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle." Excerpts from Editorials on School 
Prayer Decision, supra note 207. Indeed, a Catholic was on the interdenominational com-
mittee that wrote the Regents' Prayer. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
305. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 228 (noting Catholic preference for a "system oftax-
supported parochial schools" to overcome the various drawbacks to religious education in 
public schools); GREEN, supra note 31, at 83 (noting a tum in the wake of the Philadelphia 
"Bible Riots" from "seeking to resolve the Bible reading issue in the public schools" to "cre-
ating parochial schools to serve the growing number of Catholic children"). 
306. In fairness, this was a minor point, as Engel provided a new claim to make: public 
schools were secular, and that was inhospitable for Catholics too. 
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politically, jurisprudentially. 307 In short, Catholics genuinely hated Engel, but 
not because they loved school prayer. Catholics hated Engel because of what it 
meant for them. 
As time passed, however, the religious landscape shifted. By the start of 
the congressional amendment hearings in the spring of 1964, mainstream 
Protestant support for Engel had hardened and was virtually unanimous. 308 
And the Catholic position on Engel had moved from vehement opposition to 
"guarded approval."309 Even Southern evangelicals had split, with some sup-
porting efforts to amend the Constitution and others concluding that the Su-
preme Court had been right. 310 In the end, almost every mainstream denomina-
tion in the United States went on record in favor of Engel, with over thirty 
presenting testimony before Congress. 311 The consensus was clear~prayer that 
was "more rote than worship" was not prayer worth praying, 312 and in a world 
of religious pluralism, that was all that was left. 
With the religious establishment's testimony in Congress, momentum to 
amend the Constitution first slowed, then went the other way. 313 To be fair, 
others played a part too; a petition signed by 223 law professors, for example, 
was thought to have had sway (at least among law professors). 314 But it was 
307. See Berg, supra note 65, at 126-27 ("While the bishops clearly supported public 
school prayer itself (which had become less Protestant and more ecumenical over the years), 
they almost certainly were looking beyond the issue: their chief concern lay in establishing 
church-state 'cooperation' rather than separation as the rule for future school aid disputes."). 
308. See A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 62 ("Almost every Protestant denomina-
tion-ranging from the Seventh-day Adventists to the Episcopal National Council-has 
gone on record endorsing the decisions."). 
309. Id. Perhaps Justice Brennan's concurrence in Schempp made a difference. See in-
fra notes 349-52 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's stated intent to use 
his concurrence to speak to the Catholic Church); see also James O'Gara, Prayer in School, 
80 COMMONWEAL 442, 442 (1964) (discussing results of a po\1of48 Catholic editors, 35 of 
which opposed an amendment overturning Engel, and listing the reasons given as 
"[r]cluctance to resort to constitutional amendment; concern over weakening of chances for 
aid to parochial schools should the amendment be enacted; the view that public school devo-
tions with proper concern for all involved are a practical impossibility; and the fear that 
many parents would consider school prayers as adequate religious instruction for their chil-
dren" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
310. See Green, supra note 274, at 564. For a discussion of how Engel fundamentally 
realigned the traditional Protestant-Catholic split, creating a new coalition of conservative 
Protestants and Catholics, see Gordon, supra note 66, at 1210-19. 
311. See GoLD, supra note 48, at 126. 
312. Hearings, supra note 288, at 659 (quoting Edwin H. Tuller, General Secretary of 
the American Baptist Convention); see also LAUBACH, supra note 38, at 54, 78, 81 (quoting 
congressional testimony opposing a constitutional amendment to allow nonsectarian prayer 
on the grounds that such prayer was inherently "routine, casual, and indiscriminate, in the 
same category with algebra and spelling," "a theological caricature at best or a theological 
monstrosity at worst," and a "trivial inconvenience" to get out of the way before getting to 
the important work of the day {internal quotation marks omitted)). 
313. See A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 60, 62, 65. 
314. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 500. 
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church opposition to state-sponsored religion that formed the cornerstone of the 
anti-amendment position and religious support for Engel that ultimately won 
the day. 315 
In part, church testimony was important because it made people think 
about what nonsectarian prayer looked like in a religiously diverse society; in 
part, it was important just for the signal it sent. Members of Congress confided 
that before church leaders testified, it would have been political suicide to op-
pose calls for an amendment. 316 The question had been framed as "whether one 
is for prayer or against it," and the answer to that was easy, especially in an 
election year. 317 What religious leaders showed was that the question was not 
that sim~le, and it was also not true that only the godless opposed God in public 
schools. 18 Once backed by the religious establishment, congressmen could re-
spectably oppose school prayer if they wanted. And they did. 
What the support of religious (and other) elites in Engel might tell us about 
the nature of Supreme Court controversies more broadly is a question I explore 
below. For now, suffice it to say that elites played a distinctly educative role in 
Engel, and it was critical in preserving the case. For the Supreme Court's at-
315. See id. (describing religious opposition as "the major factor which tipped the bal-
ance against the [pro-amendment] forces"); Sullivan, supra note 286 ("Church opposition to 
a state-sponsored 'homogenized' religion has been the cornerstone of the case against other 
prayer amendment proposals."). 
316. See BOLES, supra note 31, at 299 ("A number of congressmen privately confided 
to this author that if the discharge petition had been successful the amendment would have 
passed the House of Representatives since many members of the House felt it was impossi-
ble politically to oppose the amendment despite personal views to the contrary."); Heaney & 
Beiser, supra note 221, at 496 (quoting an unnamed "powerful Southern committee chair-
man" as saying, "I have been somewhat silent on the subject matter, waiting for the hysteria 
to subside," and noting that "Congressman Becker put additional pressure on his colleagues 
by threatening to come into the district of every congressman who failed to support his 
amendment and actively campaign against him in the forthcoming election" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
317. BOLES, supra note 31, at 254 (paraphrasing testimony of the Executive Director of 
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 
496 ("In an election year, no Congressman wanted to be placed in a position of appearing to 
vote against God, which was exactly the role into which supporters of the Court were being 
forced."). As one Representative, an opponent of an amendment, said, "[T]he question be-
fore us now is, 'Do we want to change the First Amendment?' It must be discussed without 
any suggestion that those who seriously question any change are somehow anti-God, or 
antichildren or antimother." New Uproar over School Prayers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
May 4, 1964, at 12, 12 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
318. See DELFATTORE, supra note 36, at 115-16 ("Above all, [amendment opponents) 
were determined to neutralize the perception that a vote against the amendment would be a 
vote against God .... [T)his activism encouraged anti-amendment members of Congress to 
speak out, since they could refute the charge of ungodliness by pointing to all the religious 
leaders and legal experts who shared their view."); see also Beaney & Beiser, supra note 
221, at 497 (noting that "the most important function" that the religious establishment served 
at the hearings was "to make it 'respectable' and 'safe' for Congressmen to oppose the 
Becker proposal"). 
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tempt to play an educative role of its own, I tum to its 1963 decision in School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 
D. The Supreme Court Responds: School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp 
The Supreme Court's 1963 decision in School District of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 319 which struck down Bible reading and recitation of the 
Lord's Prayer in public schools, is typically viewed as a continuation of the 
Court's countennajoritarian streak in Engel. Not only did the Justices decide 
Engel, but in its wake, they did the most bold, brave thing they could do: they 
took another school religion case and again invalidated religious observances in 
public schools. 320 So stated, Schempp doubles down on Engel's counterrnajor-
itarian narrative, showcasing the Court's capacity to stand firm even as threats 
of a constitutional amendment were hurled against it. Yet here again, the histor-
ical record reveals a different reality. 
The story starts with the Supreme Court's decision to take Schempp in the 
first place--or, more accurately, its lack thereof. Missed in most of the com-
mentary on Schempp is the fact that the case was a direct appeal from a three-
judge district court panel, a mechanism that at the time conferred mandatory 
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 321 Thus, while it is true that the Court de-
cided Schempp in Engel's wake, the reality is that it had no choice.322 
319. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
320. ALLEY, supra note 17, at 120 ("In the midst of this public uproar the Court assem-
bled for the fall and straight away agreed to hear appeals of two cases involving prayer and 
Bible reading in public schools .... "); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 411 (2006) ("The justices could easily have denied review in Abington Township v. 
Schempp, which differed from Engel only in the text of the classroom prayer. Most likely, 
they wanted to tell the politicians who demanded a constitutional amendment to reverse En-
gel that the Court stood firm in the face of pressure."); Lewis, supra note 234 ("Few Su-
preme Court decisions in recent years have aroused so much public anguish as the case of 
the New York Regents prayer. ... Now, as one of the first acts in their new term, the justices 
have agreed to take a fresh look at the broad problem of religion in the public schools."). 
321. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 371 U.S. 807 (1962), noting prob. 
juris. in 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962). For a history of the three-judge district court, 
which was established to hear claims against the state for injunctive relief on constitutional 
grounds, and a discussion of the mandatory appellate jurisdiction that came with it, see Mi-
chael E. Solimine, Congress. Ex Parte Young. and the Fate of the Three-Judge District 
Court, 70 U. Pm. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
322. The Schempps continued to have children in school throughout the litigation, so 
not even taxpayer standing, which had provided the Justices an out in other early school reli-
gion cases, was available. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206 (noting that two of the Schempp 
children were current students and that another was originally a party but graduated and thus 
was voluntarily dismissed from the suit); supra note 119 (citing dismissal of Doremus for 
lack of standing). Not even Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" could have helped the Jus-
tices avoid Schempp, as jurisdiction in the case was mandatory. See Alexander M. Bickel, 
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In fairness, the Supreme Court did have a choice in taking Murray v. 
Curlett, 323 the companion case to Schempp. The plaintiffs in that case were 
William J. Murray III and his mother, Madalyn Murray-an outspoken and 
controversial atheist who would later become known as "The Most Hated 
Woman in America."324 In the wake of Engel, just the fact that the Court 
granted certiorari in Murray suggests some modicum of bravery. 
But not much. Although Murray arrived at the Supreme Court first, the 
Justices did not grant certiorari in the case until the day they recognized juris-
diction in Schempp. 325 Even then, there was substantial discussion among the 
Justices as to whether both cases could be summarily disposed of under En-
gel. 326 Ultimately, they decided against summary disposition because the state 
in Schempp and Murray had not actually composed the religious observances at 
issue. 327 The cases would need to be considered on the merits, and "[b ~ecause 
of the striking similarity in the facts and the identity of the basic issue," 28 they 
would need to be considered together. 
Yet even as a companion case, the Justices' treatment of Murray is telling. 
Murray's case number at the Supreme Court came before Schempp's, which 
should have resulted in the consolidated cases being styled under the caption of 
Murray v. Curlett. 329 But that is not what the Justices did; they gave Schempp 
the lead case name instead. Indeed, the first draft of the Court's opinion did not 
mention the name "Murray" at all, referring to the case by its case number and 
to the Murrays as "petitioners" instead. 330 The move was, to borrow from jour-
nalism professor Stephen Solomon, "like overlooking a town fireworks display 
The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-
42 (1961) (discussing passive virtues in light of the 1960 Supreme Court term). 
323. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
324. Jane Howard, 'The Most Hated Woman in America,' LIFE, June 19, 1964, at 91, 91 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Ironically, her son William later became an evangelical 
Christian and picketed her public appearances. See DlERENFIELD, supra note 14, at 186. For 
an in-depth discussion of Madalyn Murray and her challenge of school religious observanc-
es, see id at 163-86. 
325. Murray's petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on May 15, 1962. The Justices 
granted certiorari on October 8, 1962, the same day they recognized jurisdiction in Schempp. 
Compare Murray v. Curlett, 371 U.S. 809 (1962), granting cert. to 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 
1962), with Schempp, 371 U.S. 807 (noting probable jurisdiction). 
326. Chief Justice Warren, along with Justices Brennan and Douglas, thought the cases 
should be decided summarily under Engel. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 265-67 (relating 
discussion among the Justices as to how the two Bible reading cases should be handled). 
327. See id. 
328. Tom C. Clark, Draft Opinion at 3, Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, No. 
142 (May 1963 ), available at http://tar\ton.law.utex.as.edu/clark/view _ doc.php'!id=al 43-10 
-01. Both cases challenged Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Id at 3 n.3. 
329. Murray's docket number was 119; Schempp's was 142. See Mengler, supra note 
241, at 339 (discussing Murray and Schempp in light of the Court's custom of using the low-
est docket number as the style for consolidated cases). 
330. See Clark, supra note 328. 
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taking place on your front lawn."331 But for a Court under attack, it made 
sense. Having determined they could not ignore Murray, or summarily dispose 
of it and Schempp, the Justices did the next best thing they could: they down-
played Madalyn Murray as much as humanly possible. Whereas the facts of 
Schempp spanned seven pages (beginning with the introduction of the named 
plaintiffs as devout Unitarians), the facts of Murray were relef ated to two short 
paragraphs, appearing almost as an afterthought in the case. 33 
On the law, Schempp was easy. In fact, a number of the Justices-
including Justice Stewart-recognized that the daily devotionals at issue in the 
companion cases were even more of an Establishment Clause violation than the 
state-written prayer in Engel. 333 Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's 
Prayer were unequivocally sectarian, and the state was sponsoring their use.334 
"Unless we reverse [Engel] we must reverse here," Chief Justice Warren stated 
in conference, and only Justice Stewart disagreed. 335 Justice Stewart thought 
that between the two religion clauses, "[t]he free exercise clause is the im-
portant one."336 As long as individuals had room to go their own way, he ar-
gued, what the state did (or did not do) by way of daily devotionals was not 
constitutionally significant. Once again, he was the lone dissenter. 337 
Although on the law Schempp was easy, the public relations aspect of the 
case made it hard. "This issue is a heated one," Justice Goldberg stated in con-
ference, noting that the public would need to be "reassured."338 And that is ex-
actly what the Justices in Schempp set out to do. 
The Justices' efforts at reassuring the public in Schempp started with who 
was assigned to write it: Tom Clark. Unlike Justice Black, Justice Clark was 
one of the Warren Court's core conservatives, a man who could be counted on 
to write a careful, centrist opinion that minimized misunderstanding and em-
phasized the limits of the case. 339 In addition, Justice Clark's hardline anti-
331. SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 288. 
332. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-13 (1963). 
333. In the conference on Murray, Chief Justice Warren stated, "This case is stronger 
than that case was. This is a violation of the establishment clause." SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425. Justice Stewart stated, "This is more of an establishment 
clause case than [Engel v.] Vitale. This is sectarian." Id. at 426. And in the conference on 
Schempp, Justice Goldberg stated, "[T]his is a much more religious prayer than the one in 
Vitale." Id. 
334. Once again, the State essentially conceded the point. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 210 
(noting that the State's expert testified that the Bible was nonsectarian but upon further ques-
tioning "stated that the phrase 'non-sectarian' meant to him non-sectarian within the Chris-
tian faiths"). 
335. See SUPREME COURT JN CONFERENCE, supra note 16, at 425-26 (quoting Chief Jus-
tice Warren). 
336. Id. at 426 (quoting Justice Stewart). 
337. See id. at 425-26; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
338. SUPREMECOURTINCONFERENCE,supra note 16, at426 (quoting Justice Goldberg). 
339. Justice Black would have been the obvious choice for the assignment to write 
Schempp; he had authored not only Engel but also Everson and McCollum-two of the three 
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Communist efforts while Attorney General made it harder for critics to claim 
that the Supreme Court was subvertin~ democracy in favor of atheistic Com-
munists, as they had in Engel's wake. 40 Justice Clark was an ideal choice for 
yet another reason as well: he had been deeply disturbed by the press corps' 
handling of Engel and was certain to be attentive to the public relations aspect 
of the case. 341 In the aftennath of Engel, that was (almost) the entire point. 
The difference was palpable. If any one line of the opinion in Schempp 
captured its overridiny theme, it was this: "The place of religion in our society 
is an exalted one."34 And in Schempp, the Supreme Court's nod to religion 
was not just abstract. It was punctuated with references to religious practices in 
public life-oaths of office, legislative prayer, military chaplains, the Court cri-
er's announcement at the beginning of each session of the Supreme Court-all 
of which were cited with reverence. 343 By design, the opinion in Schempp left 
no doubt about the Court's respect for religion and no room for an overly broad 
interpretation of the case. 
A close second by way of overarching themes in the Schempp opinion was 
the importance ofreligious freedom in a religiously diverse society. Here again, 
the opinion made abstract ideals concrete, providing data on religious diversity 
and explaining how respect for pluralism was a core component of the religious 
freedom that marked the American way. 344 And whereas Engel had not cited a 
single case, Schempp referenced a veritable catalog of Supreme Court prece-
dent, citing case after case to bolster its point. 345 The Constitution required 
"strict neutrality," the Supreme Court explained, not because it was against re-
ligion, but because the First Amendment was for it. 346 
Rounding out the majority's o~inion in Schempp were three concurrenc-
es-one each by Justices Douglas, 47 Brennan,348 and Goldberg. 349 For pur-
poses of the present discussion, Justice Brennan's seventy-page concurring 
opinion is most worthy of note, if only because he asked the other Justices not 
prior school religion cases. See SOLOMON, supra note 31, at 284-85 (discussing the tactical 
assignment of the Schempp opinion to Clark); supra note 134 {listing the three school reli-
gion cases prior to Enge{); see also POWE, supra note 14, at 359 (noting that Justice Clark 
was assigned the Schempp opinion in part because he was "a conservative, not a crazy"). 
340. See SOLOMON, 1mpra note 31, at 285. 
341. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Clark's public 
comments about Engel). 
342. 374 U.S. at 226; see also Lewis, supra note 157 ("[The Justices in Schempp] bent 
over backwards to praise the role of religion in this country. They made clear-as they had 
not entirely done a year ago-that a ban on the use of the public school classroom for devo-
tional exercises did not mean the rooting out of other religious elements from public life."). 
343. See 374 U.S. at 212-13. 
344. See id. at 214-15. 
345. See id. at 215-21. 
346. See id. at 225. 
347. id at 227 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
348. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
349. id at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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to join it. 350 Justice Brennan wanted to appeal to a Catholic audience as a 
Catholic, and for that he feit the opinion needed to be his and his alone. 351 
There could be no doubt as to where he stood. "[N]ot every involvement of re-
ligion in public life violates the Establishment Clause," Justice Brennan ex-
plained, noting that Schempp said nothing about church-state issues such as 
"the propriety of certain tax deductions or exemptions which incidentally bene-
fit churches and religious institutions."352 One could almost hear the Catholic 
sigh of relief. 
The difference between the Engel and Schempp decisions was not lost on 
the media, which credited the Justices for having "learned a bit about public re-
lations" since 1962. 353 In every part of the Schempp opinion-from its caption, 
to its recitation of the facts, to its recognition of religion's importance, to its 
celebration of religious diversity-the Court communicated with the public in 
mind. Even the fact that a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew each wrote an opin-
ion in the case sent a signal of religious solidarity that did not go unnoticed. 354 
As Thomas Mengler has noted, Schempp was nothing if not a public relations 
exercise; "[r]eading the Schempp decision as an ordinary example of Court rea-
soning, therefore, misses the point" of what the Justices were trying to do. 3 55 
350. See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMrEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LJBERAL CHAMPION 173 
(2010) ("Brennan showed the seventy-page final product to his fellow justices in May 1963 
after two and a half months of effort. He made clear to his colleagues that he wished this to 
be his statement alone. He would accept no offers to join the opinion."). 
351. See CRAY, supra note 141, at 407 ("Brennan, the sole Catholic on the court, asked 
that no one else join him. He was, in effect, appealing as a communicant to the hierarchy of 
the Catholic Church in America and to influential laymen for their support."); STERN & 
WERMIEL, supra note 350, at 173 ("Brennan specifically sought to explain to a Catholic au-
dience what justified his breaking with what he viewed as the Church's position."). 
352. 374 U.S. at 294, 301 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
353. A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13; see also K.aufinan, supra note 234, 
at 50 (noting that Schempp was "[w]ritten much more with an eye toward public perusal and 
in anticipation of public criticism"); Lewis, supra note 157 ("The Court, for its part, has sel-
dom shown awareness of public opinion more plainly than in its handling of the new prayer 
cases that came down this week."); Editorial, Moral Heritage and the Law, LIFE, June 28, 
t 963, at 4, 4 (noting that the Schempp opinion "show[ed] that the Court has deeply pondered 
the public fears as well as the legal arguments surrounding the case"); CBS Reports: Storm 
over the Supreme Court Part Ill; Bible Reading in the Public Schools (CBS television 
broadcast June 19, 1963) ("[T]he Court itself has taken a lesson from last year's reaction, 
and has pitched the several opinions to the attitude of the public in full awareness, in fuller 
awareness, indeed, than a year ago, of the delicacy of this issue in the public mind." (quoting 
Harvard Law School professor Paul Freund)). 
354. Church and State, supra note 153, at 48 ("Justice Clark, a Protestant, was support-
ed by the opinions of Justice William 0, Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, the Court's 
only Roman Catholic, and Justice Arthur Goldberg, the Court's only Jew."); Anthony Lewis, 
2 Cases Decided, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1 ("It was particularly noted by courtroom 
observers that the voices of a Protestant, a Catholic and a Jew on the Court spoke up for the 
principle of church-state separation,"). 
355. See Mengler, supra note 241, at 345. 
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To some extent, it worked. Despite the "shudder of apprehension" that 
marked the Supreme Court's consideration of Schempp, 356 and the fact that the 
Court's ruling had a far broader reach than Engel, reaction to Schempp was de-
cidedly mild. 357 Headlines were mostly favorable. 358 Media outlets quoted the 
portions of the opinion that recognized the importance of religion and limita-
tions of the decision. 359 And the same newspapers that had taken an editorial 
position against Engel in 1962 now favored Schempp. 360 Indeed, one study of 
185 editorials written in the aftermath of Schempp revealed that sixty-one per-
cent supported the Supreme Court's decision.361 
Not surprisingly, most religious leaders also supported Schempp. By I 963, 
many mainstream Protestants had come to the conclusion that Bible reading, 
like school prayer, led to "indoctrination or meaningless ritual," 362 and as such, 
had issued statements against the practice even before the Supreme Court is-
sued its ruling. 363 As with Engel, Jews were strong supporters of Schempp, 
356. Westin, supra note 182, at 30. 
357. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 483 ("A careful observer concluded that 
'the reaction in the total American community to the ruling was markedly more positive than 
it had been to the Court's decision in the Regent·,.,. Prayer case one year earlier."' (quoting 
Memorandum from Arnold Forster, Dir., Civil Liberties Div., Anti-Defamation League, to 
All ADL Regional Offices I (July 11, 1963))); Kaufman, supra note 234, at 51 ("Public 
commentary, on the whole, was more moderate in tone."); Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban; 
Some Ask Amendment to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 27 (noting that congressional 
reaction to Schempp "was much milder today than it was after a similar decision a year 
ago"); A Loss to Make Up for, supra note 189, at 13 ("Last week, when the Supreme Court 
issued a far broader ban on religious observances in schools, the reaction was relatively 
mild."). Indeed, a mild public reaction was anticipated even before Schempp was announced. 
See Anthony Lewis, High Court Ruling on School Prayer ls Expected Today, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 17, 1963, at 1 ("The initial public reaction to the prayer decision a year ago was highly 
critical. However, opinion has evidently shifted to a significant extent."). 
358. See JOHNSON, supra note 205, at 81 tb!.4, 82 (noting a "qualitative difference be-
tween these headlines and those of the year before" and providing a table of newspaper 
headlines on Schempp, including "Religious Freedom Protected by the Court," "Jefferson 
Sustained," "Court Decision Draws Mild Reaction," "Congressional Court Critics Less An-
gry," and "Church Reaction to Court Decision Mostly Favorable"). 
359. See id. at 80 (discussing newspaper coverage of Schempp in detail and concluding 
that "news services, then, were quick to pick up the portion of Clark's dicta which explicitly 
stated the limits of the ruling and which acknowledged the traditional place of religion in 
American society"). 
360. See id. at 82 ("The change in tenor was perhaps even more pronounced on the edi-
torial pages. In 1962 all the newspapers which took an editorial position opposed the Engel 
ruling, while in 1963 the same newspapers ... favored the Schempp decision."). 
361. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 483. 
362. Green, supra note 274, at 553 (quoting articles published in Christianity Today and 
Presbyterian Life in 1963). 
363. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 284 n.61 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the May 1963 issue of the Episcopalian as stating that 
"prayer and Bible reading are too sacred to be permitted in public schools"); id. at 284-85 
(quoting the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs as stating, "When one thinks of pray-
er as sincere outreach of a human soul to the Creator, 'required prayer' becomes an absurdi-
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while Catholics and fundamentalists were strong opponents. 364 Even so, Catho-
lic criticisrri of Schempp was more restrained than it had been of Engel, 365 and 
by 1963, some of Engel's critics had changed their minds. "Unlike last 
year, ... when I reacted emotionally, illogically, and non-intellectually," one 
church spokesman told the press, "this decision doesn't disturb me." 366 
This is not to say Schempp was popular by any stretch. Members of Con-
gress submitted almost twice as many proposals for a constitutional amendment 
as they had in response to Engel. 367 Southerners renewed vows of noncompli-
ance.368 And public opinion polls continued to show overwhelming support for 
religious observances in school, 369 although there was some indication that the 
ty" (quoting Editorial, Religion Sponsored by the Stale, 4 J. CHURCH & ST. 141, 144 (1962)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 286 n.65 (quoting a May 1963 draft policy state-
ment of the National Council of the Churches of Christ that "neither true religion nor good 
education is dependent upon the devotional use of the Bible in the public school program" 
(quoting Susanna McBee, Bible Use in Schools Criticized, WASH. POST, May 25, 1963, at 
Al)); SORAUF, supra note 105, at 302 (noting a June 7, 1963, resolution passed by the Na-
tional Council of Churches by a vote of 65 to 1 opposing religious observances in public 
schools). 
364. See George Dugan, Churches Divided, with Most in Favor, N.Y. TlMES, June 18, 
1963, at l; see also Billy Graham Voices Shock over Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 
27; Rabbis Acclaim Prayer Decision, N.Y. T!MES, June 23, 1963, § 1, at 65. 
365. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 484 ("Whereas expressions ofopinion by 
Catholic leaders after Engel had been almost uniformly critical, several Catholic Bishops and 
Archbishops now issued statements calling for restraint."); see also Editorial, The Court De-
cides Wisely, 80 C!IR.ISTIAN CENTURY 851, 851 (1963) (discussing a joint statement of twen-
ty-five Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders supporting Schempp). 
366. Church and State, supra note 153, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
367. That said, congressional commentary on Schempp was likewise relatively mild. 
See Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban; Some Ask Amendment to Kill ft, supra note 357; see al-
so Beaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 492-93 (comparing the number of amendments sub-
mitted after each decision and noting "an interesting paradox: popular reaction to Engel was 
much greater than the outcry after Schempp; yet at the same time positive political action 
was much more significant after Schempp than it had been a year earlier"). 
As to the reason for the disconnect, Bcaney and Beiser arc likely right: politicians were 
gearing up for the elections of 1964. See Seaney & Beiser, supra note 221, at 492-93; see 
also id at 496 (noting that Congressman Becker, chief proponent of the school prayer 
amendment, "put additional pressure on his colleagues by threatening to come into the dis-
trict of every congressman who failed to support his amendment and actively campaign 
against him in the forthcoming election"). Interestingly, the Supreme Court's school prayer 
rulings did not play a part in the 1964 presidential elections. See id at 503 ("But little was 
made of the prayer issue in the [1964] Presidential campaign save as a small part of a broad-
side attack on the Supreme Court."). 
368. The Schools and Prayer, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9, 1963, al 82, 82 ("The greatest bitter-
ness has developed in Southern states. In Alabama, there was open defiance .... 'We are not 
going to conform,' [Governor Wallace] said. 'Ifthe courts rule that we can't read the Bible 
in some school, l 'm going to that school and read the Bible myself.' In Arkansas, State At-
torney General Bruce Bennett advised the schools to continue devotional exercises."). 
369. See 3 GALLUP, supra note 19, at 1837 (reporting that seventy percent of respond-
ents in a 1963 poll disapproved of the Supreme Court's ruling "that no state or local gov-
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intensity of the public's preferences had faded. Whereas the Justices had re-
ceived more than 5000 letters in the first month after Engel, they received just 
100 in Schempp' s wake. 3 70 
What to make of the generally more muted response to Schempp is hard to 
say. Perhaps the Supreme Court's opinion made a difference. Or perhaps in the 
year following Engel, the public had come to understand (or at least accept) the 
decision on its own. Perhaps the country was more mentally prepared for the 
mling,371 or the Court's popularity on other issues had insulated it some-
what. 372 Or perhaps those who were most opposed to the decision had come to 
understand that low-level noncompliance-business as usual until sued-was 
the way to go. 373 
Whatever the explanation, the result was a less inflamed public-but for 
the Justices, enough was enough. It would be almost another twenty years be-
fore the Supreme Court would strike down another school religious observance 
under the Establishment Clause, 374 leaving Engel and Schempp as bookends of 
the Court's foray into the saga of school prayer. The question that remains is 
what a deeper understanding of that saga might tell us about Supreme Court 
decisionmaking in general, the Court's countermajoritarian capacity in particu-
lar, and the role of judicial review. 
emment may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools" (ital-
ics omitted)). 
370. See GREY, supra note 242, at 83. Schempp was nevertheless Justice Clark's most 
controversial opinion during his fourteen-year tenure on the Supreme Court. DIERENFIELD, 
supra note 14, at 178. For thoughts about why Congress cared more about Schempp when 
the people cared less, see note 367 above. 
371. See School Prayer ls Out, CHI. TRJB., June 18, 1963, at 18 ("After the decision a 
year ago which ruled that it was unconstitutional for the New York state board of regents to 
prescribe a noncompulsmy form of prayer for the schools, the latest decision was predicta-
ble."); cf supra note 17 4 and accompanying text (noting that Engel came as a surprise). 
372. The Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), on 
March 18, 1963, recognizing the right to counsel for indigent felony defendants. It was one 
of the most popular cases of the entire Warren Court era. See Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1361, 1391-93 (2004) (discussing Gideon's 
popularity among the public and in the popular press, as well as the best-selling novel that it 
inspired in 1964, Gideon's Trumpet). 
373. See supra note 223 (discussing the persistence of religious observances in South-
ern schools despite the Supreme Court's school prayer rulings, and barriers to enforcement 
actions there). 
374. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985) (invalidating a law authorizing 
teachers to set aside one minute at the start of the school day for a moment of meditation or 
silent prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms); see also Stein v. 
Oshinsky, 382 U.S. 957 (1965), denying cert. to 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (dismissing a 
suit against a grade school that ordered its teachers to stop having children say grace before 
eating). 
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Ill. WHY IT MATTERS 
Having reconstructed the story of Engel, I now turn to why it matters. First 
I consider, and reject, the heroic, countermajoritarian narrative for which Engel 
is famous. Then I tum to three other areas of constitutional law in which a re-
constructed narrative of Engel has purchase. Engel adds a new strand to a 
growing body of work on the power of social movements to generate constitu-
tional change. It presents a rare glimpse of the Justices explicitly engaging in 
the dialogic function of judicial review. And it exposes qualitative differences 
in the way popular constitutionalism might play out in practice, with implica-
tions for the theory itself. 
A. The Reality a/Engel's Heroic, Countermajoritarian Narrative 
Engel is a canonical case because by conventional wisdom, it shows that 
the notion of our Supreme Court defending unpopular minorities against pow-
erful majorities is not just some pointy-headed theory. It actually happens. It 
happened in Engel. 
Here I consider the reality of that heroic, countennajoritarian narrative, but 
before beginning, I pause for a moment to clarify the terms of the debate. When 
we talk about the Supreme Court's countermajoritarian capacity, what sort of 
countermajoritarianisrn is at issue? And what sort of evidence is fair game in 
assessing it? 
As to the first question, what is not at issue is any doubt about whether the 
Supreme Court protects unpopular minorities from local majorities. Surely the 
Court did so in Engel, as it has in countless other cases. But even Congress can 
do that-witness the Civll Rights Act of 1964. 375 What is at issue in the current 
debate about Supreme Court decisionmaking and the role of judicial review is 
the Court's capacity to stand strong against a national majority, not a local 
one. 376 That is the sort of countermajoritarian capacity that only Article llI 
provides, and it is the sort of countermajoritarian capacity that undergirds most 
every normative theory of judicial review. 377 
The second question-what sort of evidence is relevant in determining ma-
jority will in the first place-is trickier. Public opinion poll data, the position of 
elected representatives and other institutional players, treatment by the popular 
press-these and other markers of majority will can be skewed (as Engel shows 
all too well), and yet each is vital to understanding the larger sociopolitical con-
text in which the Supreme Court operates. Each plays a part in gauging the pre-
375. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (cl)dified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
376. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE. L.J. 153, 174-76 (2002) (discussing the 
historical roots of using a national majority as the relevant baseline). 
377. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 257, 279 (2005). 
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vailing view. 378 Thus, in considering the reality of Engel's heroic, counter-
majoritarian narrative, l do just as I have in reconstructing its history: I consider 
whatever helps capture the zeitgeist of the moment in which the Court's ruling 
was made. 
Turning now to the merits of Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative, 
the historical record reveals three truths that controvert our canonical under-
standing of the case. First, the Justices had absolutely no idea that they were 
taking on majority will, and indeed all indications are that if they had known, 
they would not have taken Engel in the first place. Second, the nation's vitriolic 
reaction to Engel, which forms the foundation for its countermajoritarian narra-
tive, was based on a massive misunderstanding of the case. And third, the soci-
opolitical context in which Engel was decided was remarkably supportive of 
the decision on the merits; that is, not only did the Justices believe that the rul~ 
ing was in line with public opinion, but there is reason to think it actually was. 
As to the first point-the Justices' inadvertent heroism in the case--one 
might wonder why it matters. Why does the Supreme Court have to know that 
it is taking on a national majority in order to do it? The answer is in what the 
Court's acts of heroism are supposed to show. We cling to cases like Engel be-
cause they assure us that the Supreme Court will protect minority rights even in 
the face of strong majoritarian pressure the opposite way. This is what Michael 
Klarman calls the "psychological imperative" of a countermajoritarian Court, 
and it is powerful indeed. 379 We need to know that the Court has the courage to 
take a stand against clamoring majorities, that it is brave enough to protect the 
unpopular and weak. Countermajoritarianism by accident does not get us there. 
What the Court does when it thinks the country is behind it says nothing about 
what the Court will do when it knows it stands alone. 
This is the first problem with Engel. Engel is not a story of the Supreme 
Court bravely standing up to a national majority in the name of minority rights. 
Engel is the story of a Court that thought its ruling was eminently agreeable-
so agreeable that it was almost unanimous, so agreeable that it called for little 
discussion in conference, so agreeable that it did not strike the Court as needing 
to cite a single case. Indeed, even after the decision, the Justices steadfastly 
378. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 118 
(2012) ("[l]dentifying majority will is notoriously difficult. Public-opinion-poll data can be 
skewed, depending on how questions are asked. Institutional support can reflect elite, rather 
than popular, opinion. The same can be said of the popular press. Yet each of these measures 
is vital to understanding the larger sociopolitical context in which the Supreme Court oper-
ates .... "). 
379. See Klarman, supra note 26, at 23-24 (discussing "the psychological imperative 
for believing in the Court's countermajoritarian heroics"). This psychological imperative 
goes to the heart of most every nonnative justification of judicial review. Why have an une-
lected branch making decisions in a representative democracy? Because the Court can (in 
theory) stand up to tyrannical majorities. Indeed, we have empowered it to do so by constitu-
tional design. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. 
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maintained that Engel was a ruling with which few could disagree (at least once 
properly understood). 
It could have been different. Tf the Supreme Court had struck down school 
prayer a decade earlier, when the Cold War was at its peak, its decision would 
have exemplified the judicial bravery that lies at the heart of our counter-
majoritarian conception of judicial review. But the Justices had two opportuni-
ties to invalidate religious observances in school during that time, and they de-
clined them both. 380 Only after Cold War religiosity had passed, only after 
Kennedy was elected President, and only after the edifice of Protestantism had 
fallen did the Supreme Court deem the minority rights at issue in Engel worthy 
of protection. Indeed, every scrap of the historical record suggests that if the 
Justices had known just how unpopular Engel would be, they would have been 
much less willing to step into the fray in the first place. 
That brings me to a thought about why the Justices might have been will-
ing to step into the fray with Engel, and the possibility of yet another connec-
tion between Engel and Schempp. As it turns out, the Justices knew that 
Schempp was coming their way on direct appeal. We know the~ knew because 
Schempp had already come their way on direct appeal in 1960. 81 At that time, 
the Justices remanded Schempp on a procedural f:oint that they knew as well as 
anyone would make no difference in the case. 3 2 Schempp was coming back. 
So if the Justices knew Schempp was coming back, as they surely did, why take 
Engel? Why take the oddball case in which the state wrote the prayer when the 
Justices were going to have to rule on the more mainstream practice of Bible 
reading and recitation of the Lmd's Prayer in the next year or two? 
The answer is necessarily speculative but makes sense: the Supreme Court 
took Engel to ease the nation into Schempp. 383 Engel was in many ways low-
380. See supra notes l 18-19 and accompanying text. 
381. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960) (per curiam). 
For a discussion of why Schempp came to the Supreme Court on direct appeal, see note 321 
and accompanying text above. 
382. Schempp initially raised a Free Exercise Clause claim as well as an Establishment 
Clause claim because there was no provision under Pennsylvania law for children to be ex-
cused upon request. On the way to the Supreme Court the first time, the state statute was 
amended to allow excusal. As the district court noted on remand, this did nothing to the Es-
tablishment Clause claim that had been alleged from the start. See Schempp v. Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Twp., 201 F. Supp. 815, 817-18 (E.D. Pa. 1962), ajf'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (dis-
cussing the procedural posture of the case and the Establishment Clause claim on remand). I 
even wonder if the Court's remand was an attempt to buy time so that it could dismiss the 
case on taxpayer standing, as it had done in Doremus in 1952. See supra note 119 (discuss-
ing the Doremus case); see also supra note 322 (discussing why dismiss.al based on taxpayer 
standing was not an option for the Supreme Court in Schempp). 
383. At least one contemporary commentator also recognized this possibility. See Pol-
lack, supra note 98, at 63. If our speculation is right, then my colleague Kevin Walsh is also 
right: those who hated Engel because of its implications (at least for Bible reading) were on 
to something, and the Justices' mistake was in thinking that they could sneak one by them. I 
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hanging fruit. The prayer was written by the state, so it was a particularly easy 
Establishment Clause case. It was sui generis; there was not another prayer like 
it in the country. It was so watered down that even the religious establishment 
hated it. And it did not take sides in the longstanding Catholic-Protestant war 
over Bible reading. So viewed, Engel is not unlike the cautious steps the Su-
preme Court often takes when entering into a new doctrinal area-except, of 
course, that it backfired. The nation's reaction was not what the Justices ex-
pected, which brings me to my second point. 
The second problem with Engel's heroic, countennajoritarian narrative is 
what we can make of the nation's reaction to the case, which is not much. En-
gel's counterrnajoritarian narrative rests entirely on the nation's hostile reaction 
to the ruling, but that reaction was mired in misunderstanding over what the 
Justices actually said. The papers portrayed Engel as a decision that forbade 
schoolchildren from praying in school, even if they wanted to, even if they did 
so on their own, and claimed that the Justices were taking aim at all civic refer-
ences to God next. No doubt these stances were wildly unpopular, but they 
were not a fair representation of what Engel held. 
Evidence abounds that the misunderstanding mattered. Contemporary 
commentators recognized it. The Justices lamented it. And Congress's attempt 
to undo Engel with a constitutional amendment that said the same thing as what 
Engel held only makes sense in light of it. Even the public opinion poll data on 
Engel was based on questions that failed to mention that it was a state-written 
prayer that the Supreme Court had invalidated. 384 Given that this was key to 
the Court's holding, it is difficult to make much of the polling data, as strong as 
it is, 385 or to ignore the possibility that the polls themselves may have contrib-
uted to the misunderstanding that swallowed the case. 
That said, the historical record reveals that there were two types of under-
standing that the public lacked in Engel, not one. To see what I mean, consider 
for a moment why religious and other highly educated cultural elites supported 
Engel. The conventional explanation-which is also the conventional explana-
tion as to why the Justices decided Engel the way they did-is elite policy pref-
thank Kevin Walsh for our conversations on this and other points, which have made this Ar-
ticle better. 
384. Indeed, the 1964 Gallup poll about Engel asked about support for "a constitutional 
amendment to legalize prayers in public schools," again framing the issue in free exercise 
terms. See supra notes 19, 271 (providing the text of questions asked in 1962 and 1964 Gal-
lup polls). 
385. More recent polls have demonstrated the tremendous importance of how the ques-
tion is asked. See Gash & Gonzales, supra note 271, at 68 (noting that in the school prayer 
context, "question wording and survey methodology can have a dramatic effect on results, 
leading to differences that exceed 30 percentage points between surveys conducted within a 
relatively brief span of time"); supra note 271 (noting polls showing that support for school 
prayer in the abstract hovers around 70%-80%, while support for "Christian prayer" hovers 
around 10% and support for "general prayer," like the prayer in Engel, hovers around 20%). 
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erences. 386 The Justices are highly educated cultural elites, so the story goes, 
and highly educated cultural elites tend to take a separatist stance on issues like 
school prayer. 387 And that much is true. 
But what the historical record shows is that elites may have supported En-
gel not because they had elite values, but because they understood it in a way 
the public did not. The demagogues in Congress did not have "elite values" (at 
least not of the sort that supported Engel from the start). They started out hell-
bent on overturning Engel, then changed their minds. What moved them was an 
appreciation for the intractable problems associated with school prayer in a plu-
ralistic society, an appreciation gleaned only because the amendment process 
had forced them to think about the issue in concrete terms. 388 This was the un-
derstanding that religious and educated elites had from the start and the one that 
rank-and-file members of the public largely lacked. 389 It was an understanding 
not only of what Engel held, but why. 
386. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 264-65 ("Yet it also is possible that the justices ob-
tained a skewed picture of the public's likely reaction or were more likely to misjudge in this 
instance. Opposition to school prayer tends to be highest among the better educated and 
more well-to-do in society."); POWE, supra note 14, at 358 {"There was a dominant view 
shared by the well-educated-and therefore the justices of the Court-that religion was a 
private matter, best left to the homes and the churches."); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 
326 (''Not surprisingly (and not for the last time), the justices championed the dominant 
views of the nation's elite as against popular opinion."); Smith, supra note 26, at 1015 ("En-
gel and Schempp imposed a view generally accepted in elite culture but widely rejected in 
more popular culture."). 
387. See Gash & Gonzales, supra note 271, at 66 (discussing quantitative studies on 
support for school prayer, which "find that those supporting school prayer tend to be older, 
less educated, and politically and socially conservative"); see also Adams, supra note 273, at 
482-83 (same). 
388. See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text (discussing growing appreciation 
for the complexity of the issue as the amendment hearings progressed); see also Hearings, 
supra note 288, at 597 {quoting Representative George Meader as saying that he didn't like 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, but that "[w]e have not found 
the proper language to [overturn it], I admit"); BOLES, supra note 31, at 328-29 (discussing 
the changed views of Representative Robert L. Leggett as illustrative of the phenomenon, 
noting that he had been one of the first to introduce a proposed amendment in Congress but 
by the end of the hearings urged the Judiciary Committee against it, noting "the absence of 
an understanding of facts which characterized some who supported the amendment"). 
Interestingly, the same sort of learning process played out in the 1980s, in the wake of 
President Reagan's call for a constitutional amendment to restore school prayer in 1982. 
Senator Jeff Bingaman was quoted as stating, "If those arguing about this issue in the Cham-
ber cannot themselves agree, then what sort of chaos is going to be visited on every school 
board, teacher, and child in this country?" FENWfCK, supra note 212, at 154. Senator John 
Heinz similarly stated, "What we have gone through these past 2 weeks is proof of the diffi-
culty, if not impossibility, of permitting group, vocal prayer without transgressing our strong 
tradition of religious tolerance and freedom." 130 CONG. REc. 5899-900 (1984). The attempt 
to pass a school prayer amendment again failed. See FENWICK, supra note 212, at 165. 
389. Further support for this thesis comes from polling data that compare support for 
school prayer in general with support for "Christian prayer" or "general prayer"--questions 
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In the wake of Engel, contemporary commentators credited "careful study" 
of the school prayer issue as the reason most religious leaders favored Engel 
when most other people did not. 390 Social science research at the time largely 
agreed, concluding that the Supreme Court's ruling impacted "the mass public 
whose capacities for differentiation are lower than those of the attentive 
elite." 391 When elite opinion differs from that of the public, maybe the differ-
ence reflects elite values, but Engel is a reminder that it may reflect differences 
in the infonnation, and inclination, people have to think through issues in-
stead. 392 Research shows that public opinion is highly susceptible to media in-
fluence, and that issue framing is a primary means by which this influence oc-
curs. 393 Highly educated elites are subject to media influence too, but research 
shows that they are more inclined to critically assess information than the aver-
age Joe, less subject to undifferentiated emotional views, and better equipped to 
resist distortions from the media. 394 That's elitist, you say. And it is. But what 
if it is true? 
that make the public think about the issue in concrete terms. See supra note 271 (comparing 
support across different polling questions). 
390. A Tide Reversed, supra note 284, at 62 (quoting the United Presbyterian Stated 
Clerk). 
391. Casey, supra note 259, at 14-17. 
392. The death penalty is another issue in which these sorts of differences appear to 
matter. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (dis-
counting public opinion polls showing support for the death penalty and "[a]ssuming" that 
with "knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the aver-
age citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice"); 
Dwight Aarons, The Marshall Hypothesis and the Rise of Anti-Death Penalty Judges, 80 
TENN. L. REV. 381, 391-96 (2013) (reporting substantial empirical support for Marshall's 
claim); Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth 
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wrs. L. REV. 171, 171-97 (same). 
393. See Stephen M. Engel, Frame Spillover: Media Framing and Public Opinion of a 
Multifaceted LGBT Rights Agenda, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 403, 406 (2013) (reviewing the 
literature and concluding that "variation in public understanding of and agreement with a 
judicial ruling can, to some extent, be gauged by identifying variation in how news media 
framed the ruling"); id. at 411-12 ("[S]ince citizens' knowledge of the Court is heavily fil-
tered through media coverage, public opinion on legal decisions may be highly susceptible to 
media influence .... News media bombard the viewing, listening, and reading public with 
different frames, or ways of organizing and emphasizing facts into a coherent story, on a par-
ticular subject, thereby creating competing perceptions of the same event." (citations omit-
ted)); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct 
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 132 (1995) ("The mass media are widely regarded as 'the 
primary source of information about public affairs received by most citizens.' Thus, they 
have formidable powers to frame and shape not only political campaigns, but 'public opin-
ion' more generally." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael Margolis & Gary Mauser, Public 
Opinion as a Dependent Variable: An Empirical and Normative Assessment, in 
M ANIPULATlNG PUBLIC OPINION: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC 0rJNION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
365, 366 (Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser eds., 1989))). 
394. See Casey, supra note 259, at 6-7 (noting that elites are more attentive to infor-
mation gathering and also have "better developed cognitive skills" for critically considering 
the infonnation they have); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic 
Principles in the Global Arena, 51 V AND. L. REV. 217, 264 (1998) (arguing that "elites are 
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The point has implications well beyond Engel and goes to the heart of our 
counlennajoritarian conception of judicial review. Is a decision still counter-
majoritarian if it is really just misunderstood? What level of understanding mat-
ters, and how do we gauge understanding in a world where partisan media 
dominates the discourse? I do not pretend to have the answers to these ques-
tions, but I do think they should be part of the conversation. At the very least, 
Engel attests to the importance of looking beyond the standard majoritarian 
markers and recognizing the role that media and information deficits can play 
in shaping the public's views. 395 
That leaves a third, and final, problem with Engel's heroic, counter-
majoritarian narrative: the sociopolitical context of 1962. When the Supreme 
Court decided Engel, the notion of public secularism was so widely accepted 
that John F. Kennedy touted the principle in his successful 1960 presidential 
campaign. 396 Contemporary observers talked about a "broad public consensus" 
that religion was a private matter, 397 and in much of the country, religious ob-
servances in public schools had already died out on their own. 398 Even the 
Board of Regents that wrote the prayer in Engel had issued a statement main-
tainin~ that the religious inculcation of children was best left to the church and 
home. 99 In short, not only did the Justices think that Engel was well in line 
with popular opinion at the time, but there is ample reason to conclude that it 
actually was. 
Upon reflection, this should come as no surprise. Supreme Court Justices 
are a part of contemporary society; thus, we can and should expect their 
decisionmaking to be influenced by the dominant societal norms of their time. 
Indeed, the real surprise is that Engel's countermajoritarian narrative has per-
sisted for fifty years despite an easily accessible historical record to the contra-
ry. Why has Engel's reality been so hard to see? The answer, I believe, is a 
mindset that routinely fails to consider the indelible historical context in which 
themselves heavily influenced by the media," although "politically sophisticated elites tend 
to treat media coverage more critically than does the mass electorate"). interestingly, the ad-
vent of biogs, Internet news, and other media sources has not changed elites' information 
advantage. See Ilya Sornin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L REV. 625, 643 
(2012) ("Although the cost of acquiring information has declined thanks to modern technol-
ogy, ... the key constraint on political knowledge is not the availability of information, but 
citizens' willingness to spend time and energy learning and understanding it."). 
395. For a modem account of how, as in Engel, the media's focus on a Supreme Court 
decision's implications impacted public opinion on the more limited holding of the decision 
itself, see Engel, supra note 393, at 404-30 (discussing the media coverage of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and its implications for gay marriage, finding a negative spillo· 
ver effect on public support for the more limited ruling in Lawrence itself). 
396. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
397. See supra notes 153.54 and accompanying text (quoting contemporary news mag· 
azines noting the "widely agreed upon" view that religious instruction was best left to the 
church and home and a "broad public consensus" that religion was a private matter). 
398. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text 
399. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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the Supreme Court operates. When we ignore the cauldron of cultural forces 
that influence the Justices' inclination to protect minority rights, we get a dis-
torted image of the countermajoritarian capacity of judicial review. 400 
In the end, Engel's heroic, countermajoritarian narrative is largely fiction. 
This is problematic not only because the dominant conception of Engel is inac-
curate, but also because it has eclipsed other conversations in constitutional law 
in which Engel has purchase. Engel has a much richer, multidimensional story 
to tell than what we see in the countermajoritarian narrative-a story about so-
cial movements generating constitutional change, about the dialogic function of 
judicial review, and about popular constitutionalism. To those conversations 
the discussion turns next. 
B. The Influence of Culture in Generating Constitutional Change 
Over the past decade, one of the most significant contributions to the con-
stitutional law literature has been legal history work showing the powerful in-
fluence of culture in general, and social movements in particular, in generating 
constitutional change. Thus far, this burgeoning body of scholarship has fea-
tured the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the labor movement, 
and the gay rights movement, showing each to have had a tremendous impact 
on the development of constitutional law.401 Not yet recognized is that the 
1950s ecumenical movement is also an example of this phenomenon, and Engel 
another thread in a tapestry of constitutional meaning forged by larger societal 
change. 402 
400. This distorted image might well be viewed as a Platonic "noble lie," a psychologi-
cal imperative that feeds not only the public's need for protection from democracy's worst 
excesses, but also the Supreme Court's need for legitimacy in a land of majority rule. See 
supra notes 377, 379 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's 
countennajoritarian capacity as the basis for most every normative theory of judicial review 
and the psychological imperative of a countermajoritarian Court). 
401. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Move-
ments, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062 (2002); Michael J. Klarman, Wind-
sor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127 (2013); 
James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: labor and the 
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. I (2002); Reva B. 
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The 
Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL!!'. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
402. Others have recognized the ecumenical movement's impact in the civil rights are-
na, just not in the place it is closest to home---our understanding of the First Amendment's 
religion clauses. For a history of the ecumenical movement's involvement in the struggle for 
racial equality, see generally JAMES F. FINDLAY, JR., CHURCH PEOPLE TN THE STRUGGLE: THE 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT, 1950-1970 (1993). 
For a discussion of the 1950s ecumenical movement, see notes 80-83 and accompanying text 
above. 
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Although it has been almost entirely overlooked in the law review litera-
ture, 403 the 1950s ecumenical movement played a powerful role in Engel in 
three ways. First, and most obviously, it produced the ecumenical Regents' 
Prayer at issue in the case. Second, and more broadly, it created a compromise 
position for those who wanted to keep religious observances in school but also 
accommodate religious diversity, a middle ground between traditional (i.e., 
Protestant) observances and none. Third, and most importantly, it showed the 
futility of that move, further fueling the impetus for change realized in Engel. 
A brief review of the conundrum of school prayer illustrates the point. One 
option for states responding to the pressures of religious pluralism in the con-
text of school religious observances was to simply stop those observances alto-
gether. As previously discussed, this response was a prominent feature of the 
sociopolitical landscape when Engel was decided, particularly in the West and 
Mid west. 404 
A second option, and one that was also prominent at the time Engel was 
decided, was for schools to do nothing-to ignore the pressures of pluralism 
altogether. This was the dominant response in the East and South, where deep 
colonial customs and Bible Belt practices rendered religious observances in 
schools particularly well entrenched and resistant to change.405 Still, one gets 
the sense that even here, the status quo could hold out for only so long. By the 
mid-twentieth century, Catholics and Jews were no longer outsiders; they were 
insiders, and increasingly demanded to be treated as such. 406 As the pressures 
of pluralism mounted, states that wanted to keep religious observances in 
school would have to find another way. It was quickly becoming no longer 
enough to excuse religious minorities; states would need to find a way to in-
clude them. 407 
That brings us to the third option-the compromise position illustrated by 
the ecumenical prayer in Engel. For states that wanted to retain religious obser-
vances in school but make the content more amenable to religious minorities, 
the ecumenical approach seemed the ideal way to go. Except it wasn't. Experi-
403. My own search has revealed only one law review article about the ecumenical 
movement's impact on the Establishment Clause. See Robert C. Casad, The Establishment 
Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419 {1964). 
404. See supra notes 86-88, 92 and accompanying text. 
405. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
406. See MORGAN, supra note 77, at 81-82 ("Roman Catho lie consciousness of itself as 
a minority, set apart from the mainstream of American culture and community life, evapo-
rated. Laity and hierarchy alike, the Catholic conununity emerged from the Second World 
War newly confident, and eager to exert its influence on a culture which it now perceived as 
its own .... ");see also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the dominance 
of the ''three great faiths" and "Judeo-Christian" tradition by the mid-1950s). 
407. See People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251, 256 (Ill. 1910) ("The exclu-
sion of a pupil from this part of the school exercises in which the test of the school joins, 
separates him from his fellows, puts him in a class by himself, deprives him of his equality 
with the other pupils, subjects him to a religious stigma and places him at a disadvantage in 
the scboo I .... "). 
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ence showed that no one was happy, and the harder one tried to devise a prayer 
that pleased everyone, the closer one came to an empty formality that offended 
the religious and irreligious alike. 
It was a lesson that was likely to replay elsewhere. States that were deter-
mined to keep religious observances in school but felt the need to bend to the 
realities of religious diversity were going to do what the school board in Engel 
did-move toward a more inclusive, ecumenical prayer. And that was going to 
prove unsatisfactory. And that was going to add even more pressure to just get 
rid of such practices altogether. 
In an early draft of Engel, the Supreme Court recognized this conundrum 
explicitly. Even the most seemingly innocuous prayer would never please eve-
ryone, the Court wrote. 408 The pressures of religious pluralism were propelling 
the nation toward constitutional change, and the ecumenical movement was 
fueling that momentum with the strong sense that there was no other way. 
Thus far, I have discussed Engel's contribution to the literature on social 
movements as an engine of constitutional change, but Engel also has purchase 
for "court and culture" scholarship more generally. Recall that by the late 
1880s, most states had enacted prohibitions against sectarian education in pub-
licly funded schools.409 At the time, these provisions were viewed as having 
nothing to say about Bible reading and school prayer because the prevailing 
(i.e., Protestant) view was that such practices were not sectarian. It was not un-
til the fall of Protestantism in the early to mid-twentieth century that the coun-
try began to take a different view, recognizing that the ban against sectarian 
practices included Protestant practices too. 410 
So stated, the Supreme Court in Engel can be viewed as just holding the 
nation to a standard it had long embraced on its own. Indeed, in that sense, En-
gel was a good seventy-five years late. The reason it did not feel that way is a 
lesson Engel teaches with stunning clarity: it was not the law that mattered, but 
our cultural conception of the law. 
The point is important not only for "court and culture" scholars, but also 
for those writing in the area of law and religion. Although Sarah Gordon, 
Thomas Berg, Steven Green, and others have done important work on the ex-
tralegal narrative of the law in this area, 411 there remains a striking paucity of 
discourse on the extralegal forces that drove the Justices' decisionmaking in 
408. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
409. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
410. The first state to ban Bible reading from public schools-Ohio in 1869-did so 
well before the fall of Protestantism as the nation's de facto religious establishment, but it 
too proves the point. See GREEN, supra note 31, at 93-135 (discussing the "vibrant religious 
diversity" that led educators, and ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court, to view Bible reading 
as a sectarian practice). 
41 L See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 107; Gordon, supra note 66; Berg, supra note 65; 
Berg, supra note 34; GREEN, supra note 31; Green, supra note 49. 
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Engel, a marquee "law and religion" case.412 This paucity is all the more stun-
ning in light of the lack of conventionai sources that can plausibly explain the 
constitutional change that Engel wrought. 413 To understand Engel, one must 
look beyond the Framers and original intent; the only way the decision makes 
sense is as a response to, and reflection of, larger societal forces of change. 
C. A Rare "Strong Form" of the Dia logic Function of Judicial Review 
The notion that judicial review functions as a dialogue with the coordinate 
branches and the American public is hardly new. Back in 1962, Alexander 
Bickel described the Supreme Court's use of judicial review as a '"continuing 
colloquy" with the people and their representatives in which constitutional 
meaning is "evolved conversationally" rather than declared unilaterally. 414 
Since then, a number of scholars have shown that, far from the juricentric 
world of constitutional law that first-year law students study, the Supreme 
Court is but a part of an ongoing conversation about constitutional meaning that 
continues over time until some sense of consensus is reached. 415 Recent work 
on the role of nonjudicial actors in determining constitutional meaning (of 
which "court and culture" scholarship is a part) has only heightened scholarly 
interest in the dialogic function of judicial review. 
Within this geme of scholarship, Engel has appeared as an example of how 
dialogic judicial review can go wrong-and rightly so.416 The majority's fail-
ure to set forth the limits of the Court's holding in the text as opposed to a foot-
412. I have found just four sources in the legal literature that undertake such an inquiry 
in more than passing fashion. See supra note 26 (listing sources). Why the underdeveloped 
discourse? It may be because Engel is now fifty years old and, over time, has come to stand 
for an ideal that scholarship has then built upon in analyzing later doctrinal developments. I 
credit with gratitude Paul Horwitz for this insight. 
413. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 26, at 281 ("In terms of the conventional sources 
of 'legitimacy' in constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause 
decisions are at least very venturesome, if not completely rootless."); Klarman, supra note 
26, at 47 ("Neither doctrinal logic nor changes in Court composition can explain the dra-
matic departure effectuated by the Court in its post-1945 Establishment Clause decisions. 
Only an external account, focusing on deep political, social, and ideological forces, can plau-
sibly explain this scachange in constitutional doctrine .... Inexplicably, this sort of social 
and political history of the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine remains largely 
unwritten."). 
414. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 240, 244 {2d ed. 1986). 
415. For particularly prominent examples, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); and Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. R.Ev. 577 (1993). 
416. See FISHER, ~·upra note 415, at 181; see also Paul G. Kaupcr, The Warren Court: 
Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REV. 269, 288 (1968) ("A large 
part of the public furor aroused by Justice Black's blunt opinion in Engel might well have 
been avoided if the Court had given thought to the public impact of the decision and dealt 
more discreetly with the issue-as Justice Clark did in the later Schempp opinion."). 
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note, and its curt, conclusory opinion devoid of a single citation, has to be one 
of the more wanting exercises of dialogic judicial review in Supreme Court his-
tory. 417 Meanwhile, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Engel show how 
minority voices on the Court can contribute to confusion over the holding of a 
case. To the extent Engel was the opening salvo in a dialogue with the Ameri-
can people, little wonder the public's reaction was akin to a certain hand ges-
ture in response. 
That said, the Justices' opinions in Engel are in my mind the least interest-
ing aspect of the decision for dialogic theory; the hidden gem of Engel lies in 
everything that happened after the decision was announced. That begins with 
Justice Black answering letter after letter of hate mail on the case. Justice Black 
told people to read the Engel opinion, and he often told them to write back if 
after reading it, they still disagreed with what the Supreme Court had done.418 
In so doing, he took the notion of a dialogue with the American people to a 
whole new level-a literal one. 
Justice Clark did essentially the same thing, and he did it in two ways. 
First, he broke from longstanding tradition against commenting on the merits of 
a case to clarify Engel while speaking at a national convention. Second, he 
wrote the majority opinion in Schempp. Every aspect of the Schempp opinfon-
from its styling, to its recitation of the facts, to its rich assurances of the exalted 
status of religion, to its explanation of why religious diversity rendered daily 
devotionals in school untenable-was written with the public in mind. Throw 
in Justice Brennan's insistence upon writing separately so he could talk to a 
Catholic audience, and it is hard to imagine a stronger example of the dialogic 
function of judicial review. 
So viewed, dialogic theory simply looked away too soon. The Supreme 
Court decided Engel. The people reacted. And the Justices reacted to that reac-
tion in letters, speeches, and their opinions in Schempp. This is not to say they 
did so in the way dialogic scholars have theorized. Although dialogic theory 
417. One might wonder why, if the Justices took Engel to ease the nation into Schempp, 
they were not more attentive to the Engel opinion. While speculative, my sense is that the 
answer lies in the fact that the Justices saw Engel as a ruling so obvious they could not imag-
ine the country taking a different view. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 220-21 (1963) (describing Engel as resting on principles "so universally recog-
nized" that the Court ruled "without the citation ofa single case"). 
418. A number of these letters were quite direct. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Hugo L. 
Black to Lois Wilson (July 2, 1962) (Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Box 358) ("In order that 
you may know what the Court actually decided, I am sending you a copy of the opinion to 
which you referred. You will note that the Court decided that no State could prescribe offi-
cial prayers through its politicians or officials. After you have read the opinion of the Court, 
I think you will find that there is not one word in it that puts a single obstacle in the way of 
any person in the United States who genuinely wants to pray his own prayer in his own way 
to the God he worships."). On the letter was written the annotation, "Lois Wilson was a fa-
mous movie actress (HLB)," id (underlining omitted), which she was, perhaps explaining 
why this letter was more detailed than most. See Lois Wilson, SILENT ERA, http://www 
.silentera.com/people/actresses/Wilson-Lois.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). For other ex-
amples of Justice Black's correspondence, see note 159 and accompanying text above. 
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generally posits that the Court will moderate its position in response to sus-
tained democratic dissent, 419 Engel's aftermath shows there are other possibili-
ties as well. Sometimes the Court will respond in dialogic fashion not by mod-
erating its position, but by clarifying, limiting, or simply selling it better in-
instead. 
Whatever the response, scholars thus far have theorized what one might 
call a weak form of dialogic judicial review: dialogue is something that hap-
pens by virtue of the actions and reactions of various actors, whether they are 
thinking about it as dialogue or not.420 What Engel and Schempp show is that 
the dialogic function of judicial review can exist in strong form too. Sometimes 
the Supreme Court is actually trying to talk to the American people. That is, 
sometimes the Court is dialogic not only in what it does, but also in what it 
means to do. 
This conception of the Supreme Court is dramatically different from that 
for which Engel and Schempp are famous. Engel's countennajoritarian narra-
tive is the story of a Court fiercely independent from the sway of public opin-
ion, with Schempp a story of the Justices doubling down on that stance. Yet the 
reality of both cases flips those narratives on their heads. The Justices' actions 
in the wake of Engel, and their subsequent opinions in Schempp, reveal a Court 
that cared deeply about the public's perception of its rulings. Nowhere is that 
more apparent than in the exercise of explicitly dialogic judicial review. 
D. Not All Popular Constitutionalism Is Created Equal 
Having discussed the dialogic function of judicial review, I tum now to one 
aspect of that dialogue-the voice of the people and their representatives. Over 
the past decade, the notion that the people and their representatives should play 
an active role in determining constitutional meaning has catapulted to the cen· 
ter stage of constitutional theory under an umbrella of work dubbed "popular 
constitutionalism."421 This genre of scholarship is notoriously elusive as to 
what the tenn means, 422 but the central animating theory is that ours is a gov-
419. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 382 (discussing the moderating influence of dia-
logic judicial review). 
420. See Friedman, supra note 415, at 653-58. 
421. For a sampling of this work, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTlTUTlONALlSM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTJON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular 
Constitutionalism. Nostalgia, and the Troe Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 
897 (2005); and Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutiona!ism, Departmentalism, 
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L REV. 1027 (2004). 
422. See Gewirtzman, supra note 421, at 900 ("The problem begins with 'the People,' a 
term popular constitutionalists invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define. To the 
extent there is a shared definition, it apparently refers to any participant in constitutional in-
terpretation who is not a federal judge." (footnote omitted)); Larry Alexander & Lawrence 
B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REY. 1594, 1618 (2005) (reviewing 
KRAMER, supra note 421) ("But as articulated by Kramer, 'popular constitutionalism' lacks 
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emment "of the people, by the people, for the people,"423 and as such, the peo-
ple and their representatives should be the ultimate arbiters of constitutional 
law.424 
By and large, Engel has not played a role in this discourse, although Lucas 
Powe has discussed it as an overlooked example of modem popular constitu-
tionalism. 425 By Powe's account, attempts to override Engel by constitutional 
amendment may have failed, but in the end the peof:le won. Even today, school 
prayer remains a feature of some Southern schools. 26 
In my mind, Powe was right in citing Engel as a vastly underappreciated 
example of popular constitutionalism, but Engel's contribution to the literature 
in this area is even greater than Powe recognizes in two ways. First, Engel 
shows the variety of forms that popular constitutionalism might take, exposing 
qualitative differences in the way democratic dissent fosters constitutional dis-
course. Second, Engel shows that even popular constitutionalists have reason to 
celebrate judicial review: popular constitutionalism may not exist without it. 
As to the first point, one cannot help but think of one of the earliest works 
on popular constitutionalism-Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away 
from the Courts427-when thinking about the congressional amendment hear-
ings to overturn Engel. When the hearings began, supporters of an amendment 
even the articulation and relatively sharp definition of a cumulus cloud in the lower atmos-
phere."); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 
83 TEX. L REV. 855, 857 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 421) ("Kramer's interpre-
tation of what constitutes popular constitutional ism may be so elusive that only he can apply 
it."). 
423. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 14, 14 (Leo Paul 
S. de Alvarez ed., 1976). 
424. See KRAMER, supra note 421, at 107 ("In a world of popular constitutionalism, 
government officials are the regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority 
rests with the people themselves."); Gewirtzman, supra note 421, at 898-99 (naming various 
popular constitutionalists and noting that "[e]ach argues that the People and their elected rep-
resentatives should-and often do---play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation, 
evolution, and enforcement of constitutional norms"); Powe, supra note 422, at 895 ("Popu-
lar constitutionalism's core idea [is] that all citizens have the right to interpret the Constitu-
tion for themselves .... "). 
425. See Powe, supra note 422, at 866, 875-77. 
426. See McGuire, supra note 223, at 60, 62 ("The ban on organized prayer-the 
Court's longest standing policy on devotional activities in public schools-is fully enforced, 
at least outside the South. Almost one quarter of southern students, though, report that these 
prayers remain a regular part of their education, despite the Court's long-established policy 
to the contrary .... Because latitude decreases in a southerly direction, the negative coeffi-
cient confirms that the further south a school is located, the more recalcitrant it will be when 
it comes to adhering to the Court's mandates on school prayer."); Powe, supra note 422, at 
876-77. 
427. TUSHNET, supra note 421. 
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had a majority in the Judiciary Committee and a majority in the House.428 The 
Constitution was theirs for the taking. 
Then something unexpected happened. In the process of taking the Consti-
tution away from the Supreme Court, committee members were forced to en-
gage with the school prayer issue in concrete tenns, as it would play out on the 
ground. When they did, most all of those congressmen decided that the Court 
had done alright after all (or at least came to understand that there was no other 
way).429 
In my mind, the sort of deliberative process that played out in Congress is 
qualitatively different from the acts of outright defiance and low-level noncom-
pliance that Powe cites as examples of popular constitutionalism in the wake of 
Engel. Indeed, it strikes me as qualitatively different from most everything that 
the people and their representatives did to register their dissent, and Engel 
shows us the gamut. Public denunciations. Billboards and picketing. Letters 
and editorials. Resolutions and legislation. Vows of defiance and resolute non-
compliance. Calls to amend the Constitution, impeach the Justices, strip their 
jurisdiction, buy them Bibles, and inscribe the words "In God We Trust" above 
their bench. Engel puts flesh on the bones of what popular constitutionalism 
might look like, offering an opportunity to think about whether we like what we 
see. 
Thus far, those who champion popular constitutionalism have focused on 
the word "popular" in popular constitutionalism, assuming, it appears, that as 
long as the people are the ones doing the deciding, the ideals of civic republi-
canism have been realized. 430 Engel shows that is simply not true. There is an-
other, critical component to civic republicanism, and it is reflected in the notion 
of deliberative democracy-an authentically discursive process in which argu-
ments are marshaled, information gleaned, and the merits of competing posi-
tions fully considered.431 That is the quality that the amendment hearings had, 
and it is the quality that backlash politics largely lack. 
428. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text Some were already predicting the 
timing of when the amendment would be ready for ratification by the states. See supra note 
277. 
429. See supra note 388 (quoting members of Congress involved in the 1964 amend-
ment process and the 1982 amendment process, in which the same sort of learning process 
played out). 
430. See supra note 422; see also Powe, supra note 422, at 890-91 ("Popular constitu-
tionalism embraces our modern notions of civic republicanism and the romantic ideal of an 
engaged citizenry."). For a primer on civic republicanism, see lSEULT HONOHAN, CIVlC 
REPUULICANISM (2002). 
431. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Where Civic Republicanism and Deliberative Democracy 
Meet, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 12, 13. For insightful discussions of delib-
erative democracy and the clements that define it, sec DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS 
ON REASON AND POLITlCS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); AMY GUTMANN & 
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); and AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, WHY DEL!BERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004). 
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In Engel, the difference mattered, and it should matter to popular constitu-
tionalists too. If the point of popular constitutionalism is for the people to de-
cide the Constitution's meaning for themselves, then we ought to care how 
much thouri-t goes into doing it. After all, this is the Constitution they are ex-
pounding. 4 2 Popular constitutionalism that entails some modicum of delibera-
tion is one thing; popular constitutionalism that amounts to little more than giv-
ing the middle finger is something altogether different.433 That's not even close 
to deliberative democracy. That's just defiance. 
That brings me, briefly, to my second point-the importance of judicial re-
view for popular constitutionalism, with Engel as a prime example. Despite the 
fragility of the status quo before Engel, the propriety of religious observances 
in public schools did not capture the nation's attention until 1962, when the Su-
preme Court struck down school prayer. It was Engel that launched a national 
conversation about the rights of religious minorities, Engel that triggered the 
democratic dissent that lies at the heart of popular constitutionalism, and Engel 
that led to the deliberative democracy at work in the amendment hearings. 
In galvanizing debate, Engel democratized the Constitution, jump-starting 
civic engagement about the content of constitutional rights. Contemporary 
commentators recognized it. 434 Justice Black wrote about it. 435 And ~opulist 
calls to arms illustrated it, albeit often in less than respectful fashion. 43 At the 
risk of stating the obvious, none of the acts of democratic dissent in Engel's 
wake would have happened without Engel. As scholars rally to take the Consti-
tution from the Court, Engel is a vivid reminder that popular constitutionalism 
without Supreme Court decisions may mean no popular constitutionalism at all. 
432. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must 
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."). 
433. This is not to deny that even unreasoned outrage can serve a useful pmpose, only 
to say that it is a poor basis for constitutionalism. For an example of how even bigoted mob 
violence can play a productive part in the dialogic function of judicial review, consider the 
violence that followed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which 
denied protection to Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Supreme Court's response in Wesl Virgin-
ia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 ( 1943), which overruled Gobitis. For 
an excellent account of the violent public reaction to Gobitis and the seeds it sowed for 
Barnette, see generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000). 
434. See Kaufman, supra note 234, at 51 (applauding "the widespread public dialogue 
touched off by the Court's opinions" in Engel and Schempp). 
435. See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Fred Larkins (July 6, 1962) (Hugo 
LaFayette Black Papers, Box 354) ("Although one never knows, I have an idea that the loy-
alty of the people for the principles of the First Amendment may emerge from this wide-
spread discussion with more strength in the hearts of the people than they had.before."). 
436. "Wake up, America!" Representative Philip Philbin of Massachusetts declared. 
"Do not sit by while Communists, atheists, agnostics, materialists, bleeding hearts, and their 
unwitting dupes tamper with and imperil the very foundation stones, sacred beliefs, and 
shrines of our great majestic Na~ion." 109 CONG. REC. 19,278 (1963) (statement of Rep. 
Philbin). 
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Here, then, lies one of the many ironies of Engel. The case famous for 
working against democratic values in fact played a key role in fomenting them. 
And those who set out to take the Constitution away from the Supreme Court 
instead gave it back at the end of the day. It is hard to imagine a higher form of 
popular constitutionalism than that. 
CONCLUSION 
A robust, historically accurate understanding of Engel v. Vitale is important 
not only because it shows the decision's strong countennajoritarian narrative to 
be inaccurate, but also because it shows us all that we have missed. As today's 
cutting-edge constitutional law scholarship continues to explore the varied 
ways in which constitutional meaning is generated by forces outside the Su-
preme Court, Engel stands as a vivid reminder that the lessons of legal history 
are for yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Understanding the Court in the past 
helps us know it in the present, and our conception of the Court in the pre-
sent~how it responds to cultural forces, how it communicates with the Ameri-
can public, how it democratizes issues and jump-starts civic engagement-
gives us some sense of its dynamic, decidedly democratic potential going for-
ward. For the past fifty years, we have not understood Engel well enough to see 
all that it has to offer. Now we do. 
*** 
